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Abstract 
 
American literary realism and naturalism emerged in an era in which the forces of capital 
were remaking not only the American social landscape, but also the physical landscape as 
such.  Social upheaval was accompanied by new experiences of physical speed, 
telecommunications, and the mechanization of the urban grid  As the traditional ordering of 
movement through space gave way to such new spatial phenomena as the Pullman sleeper, the 
stock-exchange floor, and the traffic jam, space itself quickly became more mediated by text. 
Text not only represented space, but textuality took on a more crucial role in the process of 
knowing and using spaces. This dissertation discusses how white middle-class authors of the 
American Gilded Age and Progressive Era struggled to interpret the fluidity of new American 
spaces. I argue that for Mark Twain, Frank Norris, and Theodore Dreiser, physical motion and 
the continual remaking of the built environment enabled new kinds of subjectivity. 
Specifically, I assert texts such as Mark Twain’s early narratives, Norris’s The Octopus, and 
Dreiser’s An American Tragedy attempted to model ways of understanding new American 
spatialities, while betraying a persistent anxiety about the power of writing itself to render such 
spatialities transparent. Focusing on systems of mobility during the Gilded Age and 
Progressive Era, I analyze the fundamental tensions in the texts under discussion, as well as on 
the way they addressed the material contradictions in systems of mobility around 1900. I argue 
that Twain, Norris, and Dreiser were ambivalent about the experience of motion and spatial 
ephemerality, and that that their writings therefore register the inherent difficulty in making 
sense of the technosocial systems undergirding those experiences.  
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The town man [. . .] has overlaid and overwrapped nature with artifices; light, heat, and food 
come to him through mechanical media. In the country he lifted himself into apparently 
spontaneous and reciprocal relations with his material; in the town he still remains in 
automatic subordination to things. [. . .] Education must arouse him to the domination of his 
new world by stimulating eye and ear until he sees and hears fresh inducements to activity. It 
follows that he should be given a mobile body and mind in order that he may be made 
acquainted with the unimagined possibilities of his strange environment. 
— Simon Nelson Patten, The New Basis of Civilization (1907) 
 
 
The fascinating thing about the study of crises, as of crowds, is that so far as they are in fact 
due to psychological causes, that is, so far as they are the result of the mobility of the 
communities in which they occur, they can be controlled. 
— Robert E. Park, “The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in 
the City Environment” (1915)  
 
 
I am the passenger and I ride and I ride I ride. 
 — James Osterberg, “The Passenger” (1977) 
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Introduction:  
American Literature and the Invention of Mass Mobility 
 
A defect in their narratives 
In 1886, Charles Francis Adams—brother of Henry and Brooks Adams and great-
grandson of president John Adams—published Railroads: Their Origin and Problems, an 
overview of railroad development in Britain, Continental Europe, and the United States. 
Adams’s purpose  was to promote (voluntary) regulation of the main extant US trunk railroads 
by the Federal government. Oddly enough, however, the book begins with a foray into literary 
criticism. Indeed, Adams frames much of what is to follow by critiquing two earlier histories 
of British railroads—specifically the Manchester and Liverpool Railway—written by Samuel 
Smiles and John Cordy Jeaffreson. Adams begins with backhanded praise, commending 
Smiles’s “great literary skill” and writing that Smiles 
carries his readers along with him through episodes of opposition, 
discouragement, disappointment, almost defeat,—the interest in the 
narrative and the fortunes of its hero continually growing until it exceeds 
that of any work of fiction of the day, even though Walter Scott himself was 
then a living author,—until at last the great dramatic climax is reached in 
the memorable pageant of September 15th, 1830. (Origins 1-2) 
Yet, for all this—indeed because of all this—Smiles’s account falls short of Adams’s 
standards of historiography. For, Adams writes, “Smiles’ appreciation of the dramatic fitness 
of things proved too strong for his fidelity to facts” (2). Even Jeaffreson, whose biography of 
Stephenson gives “a much more correct account [. . .] of the Manchester & Liverpool opening” 
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(3), falls short of factual accuracy because, having written long after the fact, Jeaffreson “sees 
what he undertakes to describe with eyes accustomed to railroads and locomotives and trains 
of cars”; his “narrative is “skilful,” but “it is, after all, not the narrative of one who was 
actually there.” Both Smiles’s and Jeaffreson’s narratives, therefore, are double mediated. 
They are mediated by time and by literary convention. They fail to take account of the 
experience of social and material shock, of how the railroad “burst rather than stole or crept 
upon the world.” Hence, in rendering the inaugural journey of Stephenson’s locomotive 
“literary,” Smiles glosses over such troubling events as the accidental death of MP William 
Huskisson, along with the presence of anti-Corn Law protestors who encountered the train 
along the way. Adams takes Smiles and Jeaffreson to task because they ignore both the 
material strangeness of the railroad as an intrusive presence in everyday European life and the 
social chaos of a world in which the British aristocracy simultaneously promoted railroad 
construction and desperately clung to the last vestiges of mercantilism. 
Adams is more interested in the accounts of those who actually witnessed the event 
because such narratives more vividly register the social, technical, and corporeal crises 
occasioned by the advent of rail travel. An “element of spontaneity,” writes Adams, “gave a 
peculiar interest to everything connected with the Manchester & Liverpool railroad”: 
The whole world was looking at it, with a full realizing sense that 
something great and momentous was impending. Every day people watched 
the gradual development of the thing, and actually took part in it. In doing 
so they had sensations and those sensations they have described. There is 
consequently an element of human nature surrounding it. The complete 
ignoring of this element by both Smiles and Jeaffreson is a defect in their 
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narratives. They describe the scene from a standpoint of forty years later. 
Others described it as they saw it at the time. To their descriptions time has 
only lent a new freshness. They are full of honest wonder. (5) 
And yet, while Adams is quick to use, for example, Fanny Kemble’s account of the opening of 
the Manchester and Liverpool as evidence of the “honest wonder” of these earliest observers 
of the railroad, he is far from endorsing these first-hand views as a superior kind of 
historiographic narrative. On the contrary, if such narratives are more “interesting and life-
like,” they for that very reason show how unprepared and astonished early Victorian railway 
passengers really were in their encounter with railroads. If representations too preoccupied 
with a “dramatic fitness of things” over documentary detail overlooked the technical disasters 
and social upheavals of the 15 September railroad trip, there was equally a shortcoming in the 
way the participants themselves thought about railroads. That, indeed, is precisely why Adams 
begins his discussion of railroad problems by narrating the catastrophe that lead to Huskisson’s 
death. Adams was himself an expert on railway accidents as well as on the political economy 
of rail transportation, and the Huskisson accident resonated simultaneously for him as a 
signifier for the cultural, technical, technical—and even epistemological—problems associated 
with railroads. He had already rehearsed the accident eleven years earlier in a serial article in 
the Atlantic Monthly (the first installment of which, interestingly enough, followed 
immediately the eleventh chapter of Roderick Hudson) titled “Of Some Railroad Accidents.” 
In this essay, Adams implicitly blames Huskisson, and more specifically his unfamiliarity with 
railroad spaces, for his own death. As the locomotive Northumberland took on water outside 
Manchester, writes Adams, “disregarding every caution against their so doing, the excited and 
joyous passengers left their carriages and mingled together, eagerly congratulating one another 
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upon the unalloyed success of the occasion” (“Accidents I” 572). Even more recklessly, “Mr. 
Huskisson, though in poor health and somewhat lame, was one of the most excited of the 
throng, and among the first to thus expose himself.” If historians like Smiles and Jeaffreson 
had been blinded by too much literariness in tier accounts, Huskisson was blinded to the 
dangers of the railyard by his own excitement; Huskisson then entered into a conversion with 
the Duke of Wellington and  
As they were talking [. . .] the Rocket locomotive—the same famous Rocket 
which a year previous had won the five hundred pounds prize, and by so 
doing established forever the feasibility of rapid steam locomotion—came 
along upon the other track to take its place at the watering station. It came 
up slowly and so silently that its approach was hardly noticed; until, 
suddenly, an alarm was given, and, as every one immediately ran to resume 
his place, some commotion naturally ensued. In addition to being lame, Mr. 
Huskisson seemed also under these circumstances to be quite agitated, and, 
instead of quietly standing against the side of the carriage and allowing the 
Rocket to pass, he nervously tried to get round its open door, which was 
swinging out across the space between the two tracks in such a way that the 
approaching locomotive struck it, flinging it back, and at the same time 
throwing Mr. Huskisson down. (“Accidents I” 572) 
Too much “honest wonder,” it seems, is indistinguishable from “commotion” and “agitation,” 
which can come along with a surfeit of self-congratulation—which had also been one of the 
problems with the accounts of Smiles and Jeaffreson. The distinction between these two 
epistemological poles—the overly-mediated and the too-immediate, the too-distant and the 
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too-close—collapses in Adams’s discussion because both tend to misdirect attention, to inspire 
mistaken confidence, and to render the origins of crises obscure. For Adams, misreading 
begets misreading. The chaotic, illegible spectacle of 15 September becomes—later, but still in 
the infancy of the railroad era—legible only as a spectacle of progress. Railroad passengers of 
the early Victorian era often literally couldn’t see what was coming; and, in their subsequent 
representations the advent of the railroad era, they compounded the problem by effacing their 
earlier blindness. 
This rhetorical pattern structures much of the rest of Adams’s argument. When he turns to 
the railroad in America, for example, Adams emphasizes the lack of mechanical regularity and 
sophistication of the Best Friend, the first locomotive of the South Carolina Railroad; he calls 
it “[a] queer looking machine, the outline of which was sufficient in itself to prove that the 
inventor owed nothing to Stephenson” (39) and a “very simple product of native genius” (40). 
Significantly, he ties this backhanded praise of “native genius” to his satire of the “regional” 
character of the railroad itself: 
Naturally, and even necessarily, inasmuch as [the Best Friend, actually 
constructed in New York] was a South Carolina institution, it was provided 
with a negro [sic] fireman. It so happened that this functionary while in the 
discharge of his duties was much annoyed by the escape of steam from the 
safety valve, and not having made himself complete master of the principles 
underlying the use of steam as a source of power, he took advantage of a 
temporary absence of the engineer in charge to effect a radical remedy of 
this cause of annoyance. He not only fastened down the valve lever, but 
further made the thing perfectly sure by sitting on it. The consequences 
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were hardly less disastrous to the Best Friend than to the chattel fireman. 
(Origins 42) 
Adam’s use of the word master here was undoubtedly especially evocative for his 
contemporaries. By relying on a “negro” fireman, the southern masters of chattel slaves 
showed they were no masters of railroad machinery. The distancing of the technical apparatus 
from direct control by white men arises “[n]aturally, and even necessarily” from a “peculiar” 
social form which itself depended on a double ideology of regional exceptionalism and 
agrarian romanticism. The black man shows his backwardness and naïveté by corporeally 
defeating the boiler’s automatic safety apparatus; by analogy, southern white men (and by 
implication, Americans generally) show their own ineptitude by trying to adopt an outmoded, 
eccentric, and place-bound social form to railroad operations. Adams adds that these perennial 
southerners—men who would later go to war to preserve their southernness and lose a war at 
least in part because of their inability to marshal the technics of modern warfare—did away 
with slave labor in the locomotive but preserved the regional character of the railroad by then 
adding to trains a “barrier car consist[ing] of a platform on wheels upon which were piled six 
bales of cotton” (43). The image of southern passengers huddling behind the shelter of stacked 
cotton bales, enjoying a “negro band, in general appearance very closely resembling the 
minstrels of a later day,” would have reminded Adams’s readers in 1886 of both the cotton-
clad warships of the defeated Confederacy and the cliché of the pleasure-loving but backward 
and provincial white southerner. Like a cotton-clad vessel, a cotton-clad locomotive is not just 
an anachronism, but a dangerously deceptive one. 
Adams, then, prefaces his much more polemical and elaborate discussion of railroad 
“problems” by characterizing their origins as piecemeal and haphazard, as mixed up with the 
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archaic and atavistic. He aligns a set of socioeconomic signifiers—the British aristocracy, the 
Corn Laws, African-American slaves, white southerners, cotton agriculture—with a preference 
for the “dramatic fitness of things” over “fidelity to facts.” He thereby yokes the fumbling 
origins of railroad technology to a flawed aesthetic and epistemological regime, to an era when 
“Walter Scott himself was [. . .] a living author” (1). If Adams here establishes a link between 
outmoded and parochial social forms and antiquated modes of representation, it is noteworthy 
that he had focused his discussion in 1875 on technical shortcomings in “linking” itself. In “Of 
Some Railroad Accidents,” Adams attributes many of the casualties of railroad accidents to the 
phenomenon of “telescoping,” which occurs when railroad “cars are closed up in each other 
like the slides of a telescope, under the immense pressure of the instantaneous stopping of a 
train in rapid motion” (“Accidents I” 577). Adams calls this the “most frightful danger to 
which travel by rail is liable,” but points out that telescoping accidents have been almost 
eliminated by “the atmospheric train brake” and “the Miller platform and buffer.” Adams 
writes that  
By the first the velocity of the whole train in its every part is placed directly 
and immediately under the control of its engineer; and by the last the cars of 
a train are practically converted into one continuous body, in which there 
are no separate or loosely connected parts to be crushed into each other or 
piled on top of each other. 
Centralized control of “the whole train in its every part” and the technical unification of the 
elements of the train “into one continuous body” helps prevent accidents and mitigates the 
dangers of accidents that do occur. If clumsy early train passengers just couldn’t help 
stumbling into hazards, trains themselves were anarchic jumbles before the advent of the 
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pneumatic brake and Miller buffer—rather like the United States in the years before 1865, in 
which such absurdities as “negro” firemen could be seriously contemplated (and, “by 
necessity,” were employed) in South Carolina. 
All of this—for my purposes, the 1875 Atlantic Monthly article just as much as the first 
part of the 1886 book—is prelude to “The Railroad Problem,” the main section of Railroads: 
Their Origin and Problems, which argues for “some healthy control” (189) of the railroad 
companies, for the purpose of securing “a reasonable an equable system charges for carriage, 
permitting an unchecked flow of travel and commerce, the continuation of which may with 
safety be calculated upon” (190). “The present competitive chaos,” writes Adams, “must be 
reduced into something like obedience to law. Yet this apparently can only be effected when 
the system in changed into one orderly, confederated whole” (189). Adams’s “chaos” is itself 
ambiguous inasmuch as it seems to signify both spatial fixity and ephemerality; it interferes 
with “unchecked flow[s],” yet is itself “an increasing scale of wild fluctuations” (189); for 
Adams, flux is both fluency and fluctuation, at once productive motion and destructive 
vacillation. Nor is it sufficient to say that Adams merely opposes controlled motion to 
uncontrolled motion. Indeed, while Adams attacks the “lawless independence” (192) of the 
individual railroads, he reserves some of his most scathing criticism for those like the Chicago 
and New York boards of trade and the populist Granger legislatures who attempted to 
intervene in railroad practices in the name of “temporary local advantages” (188) and by 
means of “mere abstract laws aimed at the inequalities which arise out of railroad competition” 
(131). The boards of trade in the East and the Grangers in the West were, if anything, more 
arbitrary and myopic in their attempts to regulate railroad rates than were the railroads 
themselves. Adams attributes this shortsightedness to, first, the purely local interests driving 
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these interventions, and second, the complete lack of knowledge of or interest in the specific 
technical and organizational character of railroad transportation on the part of the regulators. In 
fact, while Adams consistently ties outmoded and atavistic modes of thinking with everyday 
geographic parochialism, he also relentlessly associates both of these with a glib ignorance of 
the material character of locomotives, rolling stock, boilers, and the rail apparatus as a whole. 
Adams, then, is less concerned with opposing stasis to motion, or controlled motion to 
uncontrolled motion, than with the idea that the social problem of the railroad must be 
rethought with explicit and methodical reference to the technical nature of railroads 
themselves. Here, he has recourse again to the Tory leaders of early Victorian Britain. He 
points out that the Duke of Wellington “is reported to have said that in dealing with [railroads] 
it was above all else necessary to bear in mind the analogy of the king's highway” (82). 
However, dismissing this “analogy” as “characteristic both of the individual and the [English] 
race,” Adams argues, it was 
essentially a false one. In no respect did the railroad in reality resemble the 
highway, any more than the corporation which owned and operated it 
resembled the common carrier. The new system was not amenable to the 
same natural laws which regulated and controlled the operations of the old 
one, and the more the principles and rules of law which had grown out of 
the old system were applied to it, the worse the result became. 
Adams is adamant that the false analogy of the King’s Highway overlooks that “the railroad 
system was a thing sui generis” (83). Consequently and fatally, like those defective narratives, 
“The old analogy suggested by the Duke of Wellington, as mischievous as it is false, still 
maintains a strong hold on the legislative mind and belittles a great question.” For Adams, old 
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stories still colonized consciousness in 1886, perhaps because consciousness had been 
paralyzed by the unexpectedly rapid development of the railroads. It would take a new kind of 
storyteller—implicitly Adams himself, an expert in the shocks and fluctuations of both the 
railroad apparatus and the railroad organization—to bring about a more perfect union of the 
mobile republic. 
Adams, therefore, is just as interested in narratives and analogies as he is in freight rates 
and automatic safety systems. Rather, for him they are essentially elements of the same 
problem. In short, his concern is that that railroads be brought under some kind of control, but 
also that such control be effected on the basis of analogies and narratives proper to the railroad 
itself. Beginning with a dismissal of romantic literariness that foreshadows the kind of 
language William Dean Howells and Mark Twain would later employ in defending realism, 
Adams argues that an overly scrupulous regard for the dramatic fitness of things and shopworn 
literary topoi literally blinds passengers and managers to the material nature of railroads. 
Moreover, Adams consistently associates such archaisms with the local and merely local ways 
of knowing the world; Negro chattel slavery and the Corn Laws were barriers to the 
“unchecked flow” of traffic, and Adams’s own stories of the 15 September accident or the 
explosion of the Best Friend’s boiler emphasize that railroads managed according such notions 
would have their unambiguously material revenge on railroad subjects. Adams uses these 
stories to argue that eccentric practices based on local metaphors alien to mass mobility and 
designed to maintain the centrality of places could only hasten both technical catastrophe and 
the eventual falling into eccentricity of these places themselves1. The conjunction of the 
literary, the technical, and the socioeconomic in Adams evinces a concern that, I argue, 
constitutes an attractor to which much American writing in the subsequent years returned 
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again and again; it is a center of gravity about which any number of texts, textual genres, and 
literary movements orbited—even when those orbits were distant or eccentric. This study, 
accordingly, explores the struggle to produce new, more refined and fine-tuned, narratives 
during the first decades of mass mobility in America. It argues that what is usually called 
American realism is both a literary double and integral social element of an entire constellation 
of institutions, discourses, techniques, and machines that together remade Americans as 
mobile subjects in the years 1869-1929. I want to show that mass mobility—or what I will 
sometimes call mass passengerhood—deeply informed the structure and thematics of realist 
writing, and that realist writing saw itself in turn as offering narrative solutions to the 
contradictions of everyday life under the regime of mass mobility. More specifically, I intend 
to show that American realist writing had a complex, often contradictory relation with mass 
mobility: It was at once a mode of literary representation influenced by the reorganization of 
the human sensorium occasioned by the advent of mass passengerhood, a didactic genre for 
reforming and refining social and corporeal practices of mobility, and itself a material textual 
practice that struggled to find a place for itself within the proliferating textualities associated 
with the technical apparatuses of mass transportation.  
When I speak here of mobility, I mean motion—but not mere movement. I do not mean 
the empirical fact of mechanized transportation. Nor do I only mean the kind of spatial 
evanescence of which de Tocqueville wrote in 1849, observing that the typical American 
“settles in a place, which he soon afterward leaves, to carry his changeable longings 
elsewhere” (622). In this study, “mobility” closely follows a definition proffered by Tim 
Cresswell: 
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First, when talking of human mobility, we are talking about mobility as a 
brute fact—something that is potentially observable, a thing in the world, an 
empirical reality. [. . .] Here mobility comes closest to pure motion and is at 
its most abstract. Second, there are ideas about mobility that are conveyed 
through a diverse array of representational strategies ranging from film to 
law, medicine to photography, literature to philosophy. These 
representations of mobility capture and make sense of it through the 
productions of meanings that are frequently ideological. [. . .] Third, 
mobility is practiced, it is experienced, it is embodied. Mobility is a way of 
being in the world. (3) 
To Cresswell’s discussion I would add that mobility is not only corporeal and experiential, it is 
technosocial as well. It is tied up with the politics of the parliament of things. Creswell points 
out that “how we experience mobility and the ways we move are intimately connected to 
meanings given to mobility through representation” and that, likewise, “representations of 
mobility are based on ways in which mobility is practiced and embodied” (4). To this, I 
respond that even the brute fact of motion itself, its technical instantiation in history, bears a 
complicated relationship with textuality and perception. Here, I follow Nigel Thrift, who, 
following Raymond Williams in turn, defines mobility a “structure of feeling,” an aggregation 
of “new figurations of the self, new enunciative practices and new forms of ‘livedness’” (258). 
Thrift, now borrowing from the cyborg theory of Donna Haraway, maintains that mobility is a 
historically specific structure of feeling that registers “the difficulties associated with projects 
that divide the world into the human and the non-human” and emerges when people “live in an 
increasingly artificial, or more accurately, manufactured, environment” (260). Moreover, 
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mobility only comes into being in the late nineteenth century, when “increasingly ‘travel’ 
became a value in and for itself as speeds increased, another country with its own distinctive 
practices and culture” (267). Hence, mobility is materially and rhetorically tied to a world 
increasingly dominated by what geographer Ronald Horvath has called machine space, or 
“territory devoted primarily to the use of machines” (168). The inevitability of this process of 
spatial domination, in turn, suggests yet another aspect of mobility: its existence as the spatial 
modality of capitalism. In his magisterial study The Limits of Capital, David Harvey defines 
the specifically capitalist character of mobility as the abolition of “[p]hysical barriers to the 
movement of both commodities and money over space” (375). For Harvey, the development of 
the technosocial networks of mobility is at once precondition, result, and obstacle to the 
expansion of the capitalist mode of production: 
[C]apitalism seeks to overcome spatial barriers through the creation of 
physical infrastructures that are immobile in space and highly vulnerable to 
place-specific devaluation. [. . .] Value has to be immobilized in the land to 
an increasing degree, therefore, in order to achieve spatial integration and to 
eliminate spatial barriers to the circulation of capital. At some point or 
other, the value embodied in the procured space of the transport system 
becomes a barrier to be overcome. The preservation of particular values 
within the transport network means constrain to the further expansion of 
value in general. (379-380) 
Both labor and capital must be mobile to realize their value; but the same means of 
transportation that make mobility possible can also eliminate spatial advantages of individual 
capitalists and lead to sudden devaluations of fixed capital. Mobility, then, always 
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paradoxically mixes ideas of material and cognitive freedom, autonomy, and agency with 
those of domination, menace, and enclosure by technē. Moreover, it perpetually seeks to find a 
way to resolve the stubborn contradictions between these poles. 
American literary realism emerged as a “new enunciative practice” in an era in which the 
forces of capital were remaking not only the American social landscape, but also the physical 
landscape as such. Social upheaval was accompanied by new experiences of physical speed, 
telecommunications, and the mechanization of the urban grid. As the traditional ordering of 
movement through space based on animal and wind power gave way to such new spatial 
phenomena as the Pullman sleeper, the stock-exchange floor, and the traffic jam, space itself 
quickly became more mediated by text. Ticker tapes, circuit diagrams, subway maps, 
telephone books, user’s instructions for typewriters and phonographs, and cinematic intertitles 
were all new genres of writing that emerged simultaneously with American realism. Text not 
only represented space, but textuality took on a more crucial role in the process of knowing 
and using spaces. Discussing our own era, Thrift and Shaun French write, 
For a long time, much of the human world has been on automatic, has 
expanded beyond the immediate influence of bodies and has made its way 
into machines. The expansion of humanity beyond bodies has taken place in 
two ways, as a result of the invention of writing and then print, and as a 
result of the invention of various machines; line-by-line instructions and 
rude mechanicals. “Software” and “hardware.” In the past, these two means 
of manipulating the world have often been held separate. But now what we 
are seeing is an age in which writing is able to take on many new 
mechanical aspects—what we are seeing coming into being, therefore, is an 
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age of software, but software so complex that it is beginning to take on 
many of the features of an organism. But this is an organism with a passion 
for inscription. (311) 
I argue that American literary realism came into being coterminously with the birth of these 
“new mechanical aspects” of writing, which Thrift and French explicitly tie to the rise of 
systems of mass transportation2. I contend that in the years between 1869 and 1929, textuality 
was enmeshed with mobility, not only as reference and representation, but as production and 
prosthesis. Herein, therefore, I examine the ways in which some middle-class authors of the 
American Gilded Age and Progressive Era struggled to interpret the fluidity of new American 
spaces. By examining their treatment of emergent technosocial systems of mobility, I argue 
that for Mark Twain, Frank Norris, and Theodore Dreiser, physical motion and the continual 
remaking of the built environment enabled new kinds of subjectivity. Accordingly, such texts 
as Mark Twain’s early book-length narratives, Frank Norris’s The Octopus (1901), and 
Theodore Dreiser’s 1925 novel An American Tragedy attempted to model ways of 
understanding new American spatialities, while betraying a persistent anxiety about the power 
of writing itself to render such spatialities transparent.  
 
The reformation of space 
Writing not only represented the remaking of American landscapes in the decades around 
1900, it played a direct role in the remaking process itself. Reformers like Jacob Riis and Jane 
Addams not only advocated for making the urban built environment more humane, but 
implicitly drew parallels between the technical and cognitive aspects of authorship, 
transportation and mobility, and the process of social reform. Passengerhood and 
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transportation appear as both metaphor and referent frequently appear in Addams’s writings—
surprisingly so, considering her enduring and inevitable association with settlement houses3. 
For example, Adams explicitly ties mobility and the capacity to use transport systems to 
navigate Chicago’s cityscape to the development of democratic citizenship. In Twenty Years at 
Hull-House, she writes of “the curious isolation of many [. . .] immigrants,” including an 
Italian woman who refuses to believe that roses, which she associates with her European 
youth, could have been grown in the United States. Having lived six years in Chicago, 
according to Addams, the woman has yet failed to realize that she “had lived within ten blocks 
of a florist’s window [and] she had not been more than a five-cent car ride away from the 
public parks; but she had never dreamed of faring forth for herself, and no one had taken her. 
Her conception of America had been the untidy street in which she lived and had made her 
long struggle to adapt herself to American ways” (76). The isolation of the immigrant here is 
double: She does not know how close she is to her beloved roses, and she does not know that 
the streetcar is a means to overcome the distance that does intervene between them. Addams 
here implies that passengerhood is a way of knowing the world; but first, the world itself must 
be understood as a machine space, as overwritten by the text of technosocial networks. The 
underdeveloped mobility of Italian woman, then is implicitly contrasted with the German 
immigrants in rural Illinois whom her father had canvassed for subscriptions to “stock in the 
Northwestern Railroad, which was the first to penetrate the county and to make a connection 
with the Great Lakes at Chicago” (29). She writes,  
Many of the Pennsylvania German farmers doubted the value of “the whole 
new-fangled business,” and had no use for any railroad, much less for one 
in which they were asked to risk their hard-earned savings. My father told 
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of his despair in one farmer’s community dominated by such prejudice 
which did not in the least give way under his argument, but finally melted 
under the enthusiasm of a high-spirited German matron who took a share to 
be paid for out of “butter and egg money.” 
This narrative has, for Addams, the effect of a fable illustrating the persistent tension between 
spatial fixity and flux in American life in the nineteenth century. The occasion of the tale is 
John H. Addams’s return to the area to address a meeting of “old settlers” of the county, and as 
he tells the story of the “German matron,” an “old woman’s piping voice in the audience called 
out ‘I’m here to-day, Mr. Addams, and I’d do it again if you asked me.’” The moment of the 
old woman’s reaffirmation of her embrace of the railroad is, itself, epiphanic for Jane Addams, 
for it suggests an inseverable link between democratic public-spiritedness and an awareness of 
the condition of mobility. The old German woman, breaking with the community’s resistance 
to the railroad, declares her allegiance to the nation as figured by both a “connection” to 
Chicago and the railroad’s “penetration” of Stephenson County. Whether she knows it or not, 
the authentic American subject, Addams implies, is always-already a railroad subject; her true 
homeland is machine space. Nor is this merely a national community imagined as constituted 
by the technosocial, for it is everywhere conditioned by the material dialectic of connection 
and penetration, of a built environment that is inherently ephemeral. 
Middle-class (and “Anglo-Saxon”) passengers who do know how to use the transport 
grid, however, may still need Addams’s guidance in the significance of mobility; Addams is 
often at pains to show how the condition of mobility makes the larger world available to 
middle-class Americans, and hence, how it brings home to them their democratic 
responsibilities. In Democracy and Social Ethics, Addams asks her readers to imagine “a row 
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of people seated in a moving street-car, into which darts a boy of eight, calling out the details 
of the last murder, in the hope of selling an evening newspaper” (168). Addams contrasts the 
responses of the various passengers to the paper-selling boy: A middle-class man “buys a 
paper from him with no sense of moral shock [and] may even be a trifle complacent that he has 
helped along the little fellow, who is making his way in the world,” while a middle-class 
woman “make[s] up her mind [. . .] to redouble her efforts for various newsboys’ schools and 
homes, that this poor child may have better teaching, and perhaps a chance at manual 
training.” Finally, Addams conjures the image of a “workingman trained in trades-unions 
methods” who 
knows very well that he can do nothing in the way of ameliorating the lot of 
this particular boy; that his only possible chance is to agitate for proper 
child labor laws; to regulate, and if possible prohibit, street-vending by 
children, in order that the child of the poorest may have his school time 
secured to him, and may have at least his short chance for growth. 
Here, Addams at first paints the streetcar as a location of alienation and anomie. No middle-
class passenger, sympathy and good intentions notwithstanding, can see why the young 
vendor’s plight can be remedied by collective action alone; on the other hand, only the laborer, 
“because of [the] feebleness in all but numbers” of the proletariat, can perceive the need go 
beyond individual philanthropy toward “[b]oth public agitation and a social appeal to the 
conscience of the community” (169). Yet, Addams’s appeal in defense of labor organizing is 
itself directed toward middle-class readers, and it asks them to rethink their own role as 
passenger, to see the vendor through the eyes of the labor organizer, who, despite his 
differences with his fellow passengers, has passengerhood itself in common with them. Here, 
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Addams’s text is both supplement and double to the streetcar scene it narrates; it invites its 
readers to think reflexively about the social by seeing themselves in the of the scene of 
passengerhood, while also modeling a mode of passengerial reading of public space. 
The idea of the built environment as an epistemological prosthesis, as a apparatus for 
seeing, informs much of Addams’s thinking about the settlement house itself. For instance, in 
Twenty Years at Hull-House, Addams narrates the development of the Hull-House Labor 
Museum, which she imagines as “build[ing] a bridge between European and American 
experiences in such wise as to give them both more meaning and a sense of relation” (155). 
Echoing the rhetoric of the power of the streetcar to bring together the immigrant and the 
Anglo-Saxon, the city laborer and the “old settler,” she writes,  
[T]he power to see life as a whole is more needed in the immigrant quarter 
of a large city than anywhere else, and that the lack of this power is the 
most fruitful source of misunderstanding between European immigrants and 
their children, as it is between them and their American neighbors; and why 
should that chasm between fathers and sons, yawning at the feet of each 
generation, be made so unnecessarily cruel and impassable to these 
bewildered immigrants? (155-156) 
The “power” to perceive life—life characterized both by the ephemerality of institutions and 
continual literal motion—as a unity, is to be encouraged by building bridges over chasms. 
Building bridges, however, is accomplished by building a museum: 
We found in the immediate neighborhood, at least four varieties of [. . 
.] methods of spinning and three distinct variations of the same spindle in 
connection with wheels. It was possible to put these seven into historic 
20  
 
 
sequence and order and to connect the whole with the present method of 
factory spinning. The same thing was done for weaving, and on every 
Saturday evening a little exhibit was made of these various forms of labor in 
the textile industry. Within one room a Syrian woman, a Greek, an Italian a 
Russian, and an Irishwoman enabled even the most casual observer to see 
that there is no break in orderly evolution if we look at history from the 
industrial standpoint; that industry develops similarly and peacefully year 
by year among the workers of each nation, heedless of differences in 
language, religion, and political experiences. (156-157) 
The purpose of this museum, then, is, first, to reveal to the immigrant that her own apparent 
isolation is an illusion produced by underdeveloped technosocial competences, and second, to 
construct a progressive world-historical narrative by suppressing geographic difference. 
Addams proposes to do this by arranging a space in which the living museum exhibits are also 
spectators. Given Addams’s unstinting and sincere emphasis on enhancing the agency of the 
marginalized, then, it is remarkable that she wants so eagerly to instruct them is the almost 
Spencerian doctrine of “industry [developing] year by year among the workers of each nation, 
heedless of differences in language, religion, and political experiences.” Indeed, in Addams’s 
account, the Hull-House Labor Museum seems to have begun with the goal of celebrating the 
variety of the traditional, but ended up, in its very material form, instructing its audience in 
something like technocratic managerialism, in “history from the industrial standpoint.” It 
provides lessons in spectatorship as well as labor history, and it converts the material craft 
work of immigrant women into an apprenticeship in museum curation. Moreover, inasmuch as 
this is a paradoxically consumerist form of managerialism, both the material form and 
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Addams’s rhetoric of the Hull-House Labor Museum uncannily adumbrate the advent of the 
self-service supermarket. Indeed, when Clarence Saunders patented his “Self Serving Store” in 
1916, he explicitly described it as both a means for bringing his customers into direct contact 
with his goods as industrial commodities and a kind of vision machine: “Another purpose [of 
the self-service layout is] to dispense with the employment of many clerks who are usually 
engaged to wait upon the customers; and to insure that the customers become acquainted with 
the variety of lines of goods in the store and with the various items in the several lines” 
(Saunders). Just as the tropes of passengerhood and the built environment as vision machine 
bring together the immigrant and the Anglo-Saxon for Addams, self-service supermarkets, for 
Saunders, eliminate the hierarchy of shopper and shopkeeper by displacing the specialized 
knowledge of goods onto the material form of the store, which is specifically designed to 
allow customers to select their own purchases “while making a circuitous path through the 
store [. . .] without confusion, and in an expeditious manner.” Here, the notion of 
“circuitousness” is as double-valenced as that of “flow” had been for Adams. In this case, 
however, both meanings are positive, as the notion of the circuit at once implies elaborate and 
aimless, and directed and productive, motion, as in the passage of current through a circuit. 
The space of the supermarket, in other words, is both maximum and minimum: Maximum 
vision for minimum effort (see fig. 1). Saunders’s patent application, along with the 
accompanying drawings, make the space of shopping a text to be read and an apparatus for 
producing a new spatial literacies—literacies in which, as in the Hull House Labor Museum, 
“history from the industrial standpoint” is encoded directly in the form of the text. But while 
something like passengerial citizenship is the implicit goal of the Labor Museum (and of Hull 
House as a whole), the circuitous path of self-serve supermarket leads always and only to the 
22  
 
 
cash register. The self-service supermarket, like Hull-House, is many texts with one meaning, 
but the leveling work it performs is that of commodity exchange, not democracy. 
  The axis of text, space, and mobility evoked by Addams and Saunders appears again and 
again as a way of thinking about the social in the years around 1900. One of the most 
audacious schemes for redesigning the built environment during the era was laid out in Daniel 
H. Burnham and Edward H Bennett’s Plan of Chicago, a document that not only reimagined 
Chicago’s cityscape as a mechanism for the production of “circulation,” but avidly advocated 
for “circulation” as a means both for the democratization of city life and for the edification and 
elevation of the interior lives of individual citizens. Chicago, write Burnham and Bennett, is 
situated between a vast prairie and an enormous lake, both of which are “immeasurable to the 
senses” and “give the scale” to the city (79). “Elsewhere, indeed,” they write, “man and his 
works may be taken as the measure; but here the city appears as that portion of illimitable 
space now occupied by a population capable of infinite expansion” (80). “Natural scenery,” 
they write elsewhere, “furnishes the contrasting element to the artificiality of the city” (53). 
They echo Emerson when they argue that “[h]e who habitually comes in close contact with 
nature develops saner methods of thought than can be the case when one is habitually shut up 
within the walls of a city.” Yet into this Emersonian rhetoric of the natural American sublime, 
however, they immediately insert the language of planning and artifacticity: 
Whatever may be the forms which the treatment of the city shall take, 
therefore, the effects must of necessity be obtained by repetition of the unit. 
If the characteristics set forth suggest monotony, nevertheless such are the 
limitations which nature has imposed [. . .]. On the other hand, the 
opportunity now exists to create out of these very conditions a city which 
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shall grow into both convenience and order, and shall possess all the means 
of making its citizens prosperous and contented  
It is in the grouping of buildings united by a common purpose [. . .] 
that one must find an adequate method of treatment; or again in far-
stretching lines of lagoons inviting the multitudes to seek recreation along 
the endless miles of water front; or in broad avenues where the vista 
seemingly terminates with a tower by day, or in the converging lines of 
lights by night, in each case the mind recognizing that there is still space 
beyond. Always there must be the feeling of those broad surfaces of water 
reflecting the clouds of heaven; always the sense of breadth and freedom 
which are the very spirit of the prairies. (80) 
Here, Burnham and Bennett imply that the limitlessness of the prairies and Lake are, 
paradoxically enough, “limitations which nature has imposed.” Moreover, it is the most 
artificial of architectural artifacts—“repetition of the unit,” manmade lagoons, straight and 
long avenues—that reveal the natural “spirit of the prairies to Chicago’s citizens. Burnham and 
Bennett imagine the remade Chicago much as Addams images the settlement house—as a 
vision apparatus, as a device that distances and brings closer at once, simultaneously projector 
and screen for the sublime image. They continue: 
At no period in its history has the city looked far enough ahead. [. . .] 
The mind of man, at least as expressed in works he actually undertakes, 
finds itself unable to rise to the full comprehension of the needs of a city 
growing at the rate now assured for Chicago. Therefore, no one should 
hesitate to commit himself to the largest and most comprehensive 
24  
 
 
undertaking; because before any particular plan can be carried out, a still 
larger conception will begin to dawn, and even greater necessities will 
develop. 
Burnham and Bennett now suggest that not only should Chicago be a machine for producing 
sublime, edifying visions, but that this very plan is itself already, before being put into 
practice, just such a vision. The city is to be what The Plan of Chicago already is—an optical 
device for seeing beyond the cramped present. 
If the text is a means for seeing the future, it follows that the city itself should be as much 
like a text as possible. The idea of the “repetition of the unit” already suggests something like 
alphabeticity, a texture made up of a limited number of perpetually interchangeable modules. 
Burnham and Bennett, however, are even more concerned with making the physical 
negotiation of space as frictionless as vision as they are with the aesthetics of vision itself. 
They write, 
The proposed street plan of Chicago is based on a system of circuits 
and radials. This is also true of the railroad and traction systems. [. . .] [T]he 
heart of Chicago is surrounded by a circuit of railways [following] 
Michigan Avenue, Canal Street, Sixteenth Street, and Kinzie Street. 
Following the same lines, a subway circuit may be constructed for handling 
freight, and another for passengers, the latter running, however, on Twelfth 
and Washington. To this circuit would be tangent three others enclosing 
areas increasing in size [. . .]. By means of these circuits a complete system 
of distribution of passengers and freight may be secured. To the inner 
circuit will relate the various services of distribution of the elements of life, 
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produce, and commodities for manufacture; and on it should be placed the 
freight substations, the markets for general produce, the main post-office, 
and postal substations. The various services for water, sewers, power, 
telephone, and telegraph also may be schemed on the inner circuit as a 
basis. (68) 
Here, no less than the most rigorous scientific manager, Burnham and Bennett ruthlessly 
subject human passengers to the same spatial logic as freight and even sewage. Moreover, 
when transportation of freight is strictly rationalized, it begins to attain the near-immateriality 
of the postal parcel, which, after all, has now already been enchained in the machine processes 
of typewriter, the Linotype machine, and offset lithography. In fact, the logic of the “circuit” 
subsumes the movement of these material things under the metaphor of the immaterial motion 
of electric currents and telephone and telegraph signals. This ontological leveling, both 
presupposed and produced by the transportational system, follows much the same pattern as 
the cultural leveling already proposed by Jane Addams and later appropriated by Clarence 
Saunders. For Adams, Saunders, and Burnham and Bennett, mobility is agency, liberation, 
uplift; yet it requires an unceasing and total remaking of everyday practice according to the 
requirements of machine space. All of this, perversely, both echoes and challenges the kind of 
argument made by John Ruskin about industrialized transport around half a century earlier in 
The Seven Lamps of Architecture. In a screed against rail travel, Ruskin had written that  
[t]he whole system of railroad travelling is addressed to people who, being 
in a hurry, are therefore, for the time being miserable. [. . .] The railroad is 
in all its relations a matter of earnest business, to be got through as soon as 
possible. It transmutes a man from a traveller into a living parcel. For the 
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time he has parted with the nobler characteristics of his humanity for the 
sake of a planetary power of locomotion. Do not ask him to admire 
anything. [. . .] Carry him safely, dismiss him soon: he will thank you for 
nothing else. [. . .] There never was more flagrant nor impertinent folly than 
the smallest portion of ornament in anything concerned with railroads or 
near them. Keep them out of the way, take them through the ugliest country 
you can find, confess them the miserable things they are, and spend nothing 
upon them but for safety and speed. (121) 
Ruskin here famously accused industrialized transport of transforming travelers into parcels 
and thereby separating them from “the nobler characteristics of [their] humanity for the sake of 
a planetary power of locomotion.” And Adams, Saunders, and Burnham and Bennett would 
have agreed: Think of the passenger, the shopper, the citizen, as a circulating body; by all 
means eliminate the clutter and excess of ornament; being in a hurry is what it means to be 
modern. But for these Americans of the Progressive Era, this transformation was ennobling. 
Indeed, the very system that ontologically elides the difference between passenger and parcel 
is the technosocial foundation for the emergence of liberal agency, because the entrainment of 
the passenger in the system of circuits allows her to, as it were, sort herself out, to find her 
own path, to plan a unique journey through space. To be sure, this kind of self-production is 
unambiguously just that—production. Because she must keep moving, for example, the 
shopper in Saunders’s supermarkets is obliged by the technical form of the store to shop, even 
if she buys nothing. Consequently, the difference between production and consumption is 
confounded when shopping is always a labor of reading and no longer simply socializing or 
loitering. There are no Bartlebys in a Piggly Wiggly.  
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What interests me here, though, is less the thorny problem of reconciling discipline and 
autonomy in spaces of mobility than that of the formal and generic schisms that traverse these 
texts themselves. The Plan of Chicago, for example, announces itself as a vision of a vision, as 
a model for the way the proposed city plan will elevate and purify the moral vantage of 
Chicago’s citizens4. The technical base of the aesthetic superstructure must be largely self-
effacing to do its work; for Burnham and Bennett, indeed, this is the whole point of promoting 
“circulation.” However, if in the Chicago of the future, technical rationality is to be the 
handmaiden of both public harmony and private edification, in the book The Plan of Chicago, 
these elements are merely arranged serially on the printed page. They jostle each other. In 
other words, the automatic sorting and distributing performed by the transportation system 
outlined in the book has no double in the book itself. The Plan of Chicago calls for unity and 
order, but is itself rhetorically, generically, and materially multiple. It is both a “plan” and a 
portable museum that lays bare the materiality of the urban planning process. It is at once a 
theatrical spectacle and a manual of stagecraft. And yet, we know that this textual 
heterogeneity did not undermine the persuasiveness of the Plan. Arguably, this is because it 
did not only advocate rhetorically for a certain kind of city planning; nor did it merely serve as 
a training manual for living in the kind of city it proposes; rather, it performed both of these 
functions and also interpellated its audience as a certain kind of readers. That is, the book 
thinks of city spaces as texts to be read, but also implicitly mandates a kind of reading practice 
that adumbrates the urban mobility it explicitly calls for. The text presupposes a reader who 
will cognitively assemble the new Chicago from the collection of print genres, graphic modes, 
and rhetorical registers contained by the Plan. The reader is to perform the same kind of labor 
with the book as the transportation network does in the book. I call The Plan of Chicago a 
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representative text of mobility, then, not just because it represents the condition of 
technosocial mobility, but because it also seems to train its readers in epistemological practices 
directly related to the mobile practices it advocates. 
 
Fictions of passengerhood 
Of all the figures we can associate with American realism, surely Henry James is the one 
who most resisted, or at least resented, the techniques and function of mobility. James, by his 
own account of himself, was a veritable anti-passenger. And yet, writing as a British subject in 
1907, James produced one of the most intriguing examples of the writing of American 
passengerhood. In The American Scene James narrates his return to the environs of New York 
City from the Midwest; from his rail carriage, James sees the Hudson River  
shine [. . .] as a great romantic stream, such as could throw not a little of its 
glamour, for the mood of that particular hour, over the city at its mouth. I 
had not even known, in my untravelled state, that we were to strike it on our 
way from Chicago, so that it represented [. . .] so much beauty thrown in, so 
much benefit beyond the bargain—the so hard bargain, for the traveller of 
the American railway-journey, at its best. That ordeal was in any case at its 
best here, and the perpetually interesting river kept its course, by my right 
elbow with such splendid consistency that, as I recall the impression I 
repent a little of having just now reflected with acrimony on the cost of the 
obtrusion of track and stations to the Riverside view. One must of course 
choose between dispensing with the ugly presence and enjoying the scenery 
by the aid of the same—which but means, really, that to use the train at all 
had been to put one’s self, for any proper justice to the scenery, in a false 
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position. That, however, takes us too far back, and one can only save one’s 
dignity by laying all such blames on our detestable age. [. . .] A possible 
commerce, on the other hand, with one’s time—which is always also the 
time of so many other busy people—has long since made mince-meat of the 
rights of contemplation; rights as reduced, in the United States, to-day, and 
by quite the same argument, as those of the noble savage whom we have 
banished to his narrowing reservation. (144) 
Here, James seems to stand in full opposition to those who implicitly or explicitly argued that 
there was no contradiction between the “ugly presence” of the transportation network and an 
unobstructed “enjoyment” of spectatorship. James admits that the starkly industrial railroad 
apparatus both produces and obscures the sublime vision of the Hudson, but he laments that it 
must be so, suggesting that this kind of vision is inferior—“false”—in comparison to some 
more presumably authentic vista of the River—perhaps one from a rivergoing steamboat, 
which, he writes has “for the true raffiné, [a] particular note of romance.” James’s view 
contrasts directly with those like Adams, Saunders, and Burnham and Bennett for whom the 
presence of technoscientific mediation is, if anything, a guarantor of a true relation between 
spectator and spectacle because machine-mediation displaces older spatial conventions that 
keep people in their places and obstruct the advance of democracy. Yet even James seems 
ambivalent about the “ugliness” of the transportation infrastructure, for if he implies here that 
the Pennsylvania Railroad tracks along the Hudson both produce and mar a vantage of the 
River, he elsewhere quite rapturously describes visions of this very same network from 
vantages physically impossible without the intervention of the machine system.  
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Earlier in the book, James narrates his circumnavigation of Manhattan Island from Jersey 
City to Brooklyn via the Pennsylvania Railroad “car float,” a system of barges that transported 
rail cars across New York Harbor: 
I had arrived at one of the transpontine stations of the Pennsylvania 
Railroad; the question was of proceeding to Boston, for the occasion, 
without pushing through [New York] [. . .] and the easy and agreeable 
attainment of this great advantage was to embark on one of the mightiest (as 
appeared to me) of train-bearing barges and, descending the western waters, 
pass round the bottom of the city and remount the other current to Harlem; 
all without “losing touch” of the Pullman that had brought me from 
Washington. This absence of the need of losing touch, this breadth of effect, 
as to the whole process, involved in the prompt floating of the huge 
concatenated cars not only without arrest or confusion, but as for positive 
prodigal beguilement of the artless traveler, had doubtless much to say to 
the ensuing state of mind the happily-excited and amused view of the great 
face of New York. The extent, the ease, the energy, the quantity and 
number, all notes scattered about as if [. . .] nature and science were 
joyously romping together, might have been taking on again, for their 
symbol, some collective presence of great circling and plunging, hovering 
and perching sea-birds, white-winged images of the spirit, of the restless 
freedom of the Bay. (70-71) 
If the Hudson River passage sounds, however ambivalently, like something from Ruskin, in 
this passage James seems almost Whitmanesque in his (again, ambivalent) technophilia. In the 
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first passage, the railroad infrastructure interrupts the pristine view of the Hudson River, and 
even if James admits it also makes such a view possible, he implies this interruption spoils 
what would otherwise be an organic encounter with the majesty of the landscape. It makes 
“mince-meat of the rights of contemplation”; it cuts into experience from the outside, and 
because it is out of place in the landscape, it also displaces and fragments the spectator’s 
consciousness. By contrast, a river steamer may be artificial, may even be “ugly,” but it is at 
home on the Hudson and never reminds the spectator of some other place or effaces the 
uniqueness of places. Here, however, the ubiquity of the rail network, its capacity to subsume 
even fluvial transport, is precisely what produces a sense of continuity, an “absence of the 
need of losing touch,” which, in turn, leads to “beguilement,” or the very enjoyment that he 
later says is flawed by its having been mediated by the rail infrastructure. Indeed, James’s 
beguilement by the fact of not losing touch was practically a literary commonplace in 1907. 
Just four years earlier in The Pit Frank Norris provided his heroine Laura Dearborn with a 
sublime kaleidoscope of urban life as seen from a speeding streetcar: Laura experiences an 
epiphany of “tremendous” life mediated by technology as “[a]ll around, on every side, in every 
direction the vast machinery of Commonwealth clashed and thundered from dawn to dark and 
from dark till dawn.” Even earlier, in A Hazard of New Fortunes (1890), William Dean 
Howells makes the elevated trains of New York a means by which Basil March and his wife 
Isabel come to know the city; seeing the urban landscape from the train, write Howells, Basil 
feels himself a part of it all “no matter what whimsical, or alien, or critical attitude he took” 
(276); he feels as if “[a] sense of the striving and the suffering deeply possessed him, and this 
grew the more intense as he gained some knowledge of the forces at work—forces of pity, of 
destruction, of perdition, of salvation (276-277). Like these characters in Norris and Howells, 
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James finds the experience of passengerhood to be, itself, a realist way of seeing the city, 
somehow both directly connected to it yet making a space for “beguilement.” What is even 
more “realist” about James’s take on rail travel, however, is that both critical and celebratory 
narratives of passengerhood stand side-by-side. James registers the shock, the discomfort, the 
disorientation of mobility while nevertheless presenting himself, even in middle age, as an 
eager apprentice in passengerhood. Only together do these two passages from The American 
Scene demonstrate the real problem of mobility and its relation to literary realism. Together 
they reveal both an embrace of new ways of seeing occasioned by transportation technology—
and specifically by the networks of transportation that putatively “seamlessly” integrated 
liberal subjectivity and machine space—and a stubborn skepticism about such networks, not 
just as spiritual affronts to the humanistic subject, but as materially dangerous, chaotic, and 
unknowable. 
If the most celebrated American realist could be said to have embraced mobility 
grudgingly at best, it might still be said that American realism and the passengerhood narrative 
had their birth at the same moment, namely with Howells’s first novel, Their Wedding 
Journey, published in 1872. This fiction, in contrast to Howells’s earlier European travel 
narratives, continually emphasizes both its Americanness and the centrality in America of 
spaces of travel. In the novel, the newly-wed Marches take a journey from Boston to Niagara 
Falls by way of New York City. At Boston’s South Station, Basil and Isabel observe 
passengers constantly coming and going, and in this welter of movement, “they formed many 
cordial friendships and bitter enmities upon the ground of personal appearance, or particulars 
of dress, with people whom they saw for half a minute upon an average” (11). An “old 
gentleman with vigorously upright iron gray hair, who sat fronting them and reading all the 
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evening papers” and “a young man who hurled himself through the door, bought a ticket with 
terrific precipitation, burst out again and then ran down a departing train before it got out of 
the station”—Basil and Isabel struggle to imagine these and other passengers as if they were 
their nearest neighbors, constructing biographies and forming moral evaluations of them. 
Howells here and everywhere gently satirizes the kind of ambivalences James may have had 
about passengerhood, comically making Isabel in particular seem as provincial as those she 
herself judges as gauche and rude. In fact, when Howells writes that, as the crowd increases in 
the station, Basil and Isabel “became once again mere observers of their kind, more or less 
critical in temper, until the crowd grew so that individual traits were merged in the character of 
multitude” (14-15), he could almost be satirizing—a quarter century avant la lettre—James’s 
attitude toward public transportation in The American Scene. What James writes of the various 
ethnic “types” he encounters in New York could just as well have been the Marches’s reaction 
to the regional and class types they see at South Station: “The [electric streetcar], again and 
again, is a foreign carful; a row of faces, up and down, testifying without exception, to 
alienism unmistakable, alienism undisguised and unashamed” (122). Social homogeneity is the 
veritable condition of the passenger, suggests James, and yet this also means that 
The great fact about [James’s] companions was that, foreign as they 
might be, newly inducted as they might be, they were at home, really more 
at home, at the end of their few weeks or months or their year or two, than 
they had ever in their lives been before; and that he was at home too, quite 
with the same intensity: and yet that it was this very equality of condition 
that [. . .] made the whole medium so strange.  
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A carful of strangers feeling at home precisely because they are all together on the streetcar, 
because they are all always-already passengers, evoking a sense of alienation in James—one 
that he nonetheless writes makes him feel at home, which make the very condition on 
passengerhood both comforting and strange. This, too, is the sentiment felt by Basil and Isabel 
March at South Station, where they 
were already as completely cut off from local associations and sympathies 
as if they were a thousand miles and many months away from Boston. They 
enjoyed the lonely flaring of the gas jets as a gust of wind drew through the 
station; they shared the gloom and isolation of a man who took a seat in the 
darkest corner of the room, and sat there with folded arms, the genius of 
absence. In the patronizing spirit of travellers in a foreign country they 
noted and approved the vases of cut-flowers in the booth of the lady who 
checked packages, and the pots of ivy in her windows. (12)  
A citizen in the republic of passengers must not only sympathize with the “genius of absence,” 
he must, in spite of himself, identify with it; indeed, doing so is a product of having been “cut 
off from local associations and sympathies” in the railway station. The—in this case 
edifying—state of being cut off from local associations, however, is both a material condition 
and a cognitive competence. It is neither a direct result of the mere fact of the rail network, nor 
does it follow immediately from the discursive idea of the railway. Moreover, solidarity 
among passengers is not a straightforward matter of affective identification. The rail station is 
profoundly unfamiliar for Basil and Isabel; it is specifically not an “imagined” extension of the 
local community. Observing “an acquaintance of the ticket-seller” visiting his friend at work, 
Basil remarks, “‘[T]his is very strange. I always felt as if these men had no private life, no 
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friendships like the rest of us. On duty they seem so like sovereigns, set apart from mankind, 
and above us all, that it’s quite incredible they should have the common personal relations.’” 
(10). Basil seems rather disappointed to discover that the ticket agent passes the time with his 
“private” friend; his condition of “sovereignty” may set him apart from mankind, but in a 
railroad station that seems like an enviable circumstance, and it’s the intrusion of familiarity 
itself here that is “strange” and discomforting. But passengerhood is not mere affective 
estrangement, either. Like James, but without James’s consternation or resistance, Basil and 
Isabel begin to find themselves at home in the spaces of the railway—oddly almost as much 
because of the technical character of the as in spite of it. 
The streetcar, the car float, the urban rail station: all paces at once strange and familiar, at 
once marked by both an interruption of experience and by a continuity and interconnectedness 
of experience. These are what Marc Augé calls “non-paces,” places in which “thousands of 
individual itineraries” meet, and in which these paths encounter 
the uncertain charm of the waste lands, the yards and building sites, the 
station platforms and waiting rooms where travellers break step, of all the 
chance meeting places where fugitive feelings occur of the possibility of 
continuing adventure, the feeling that all there is to do is to “see what 
happens.” (3) 
Augé’s non-places are paradoxical sites of waiting and hurrying. Moreover, they defy 
traditional premodern hierarchical notions of space like those of the distinctions between city 
and country, castle and village, sanctuary and nave. They, however, are not simply points in 
abstract space; rather, they give direct material substance to Taylorist and Fordist 
mathematical ideas of space, in the process producing new—often contradictory and 
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heterogeneous—technosocial practices that escape and subvert the rationalist principles that 
gave birth to them. In this respect, it is helpful here to remember John Kasson’s discussion of 
antebellum representational practices in Rudeness and Civility. Writing of “the problem of 
reading the city” in America during the decades just before the Civil War, Kasson examines 
“[t]wo primary strategies” of knowing urban spaces: “the bird’s-eye view and what might be 
called the mole’s-eye view—the splendid urban panorama and the searching urban 
exploration,” a literary genre that includes Melville’s “Bartleby” and Poe’s “The Man of the 
Crowd” (72-73) Bird’s-eyes views were a genre of illustration, a hybrid of map and landscape 
painting, that, according to Kasson sought to “rise above disparate surfaces of the city, either 
literally or imaginatively, in order to read it as a coherent structure, its various parts 
subordinated to the whole” (73). “Mole’s-eye views,” in contrast, were often sensationalistic 
and lurid fictions and journalistic essays that “presented the city primarily from the shadowy 
depths to emphasize its degradation and chaos” (74). The bird’s-eye view was a map of a city 
as a legible whole; the sensationalistic fiction or exposé was a guided tour of an unreadable 
labyrinth. Arguably, however, the advent of the non-place itself occasions a blurring of these 
two representational modes. In the years between 1869 and 1929 these perspectives become 
entangled; the constructed technical whole becomes too extensive and complex to be known 
all at once, while it becomes increasingly difficult to navigate interior spaces without the 
mediation of cartographic and diagrammatic texts. Cartographic views begin to fragment, 
proliferate, and compete; on the other hand, practices of everyday life becomes more and more 
characterized by the need to know about distant spaces and the technical means to reach them. 
Non-places are meant to be read from the perspective of the bird’s-eye view, but we 
nonetheless keep encountering derailments, delays, lost luggage, traffic jams—we must, 
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therefore, keep constructing new mole’s-eye views. These narratives of passengerhood both 
supplement and critique the celebratory stories of the bird’s-eye view. They teach us how to 
live in non-spaces; they constantly register the limits imposed on us by non-spaces. 
Basil and Isabel March learn to remake themselves as middle-class subjects in South 
Station. On one hand, they find their class differences partially effaced by the way 
passengerhood makes them, like passengers of all classes, mere parcels to be moved across the 
country. Yet this very condition, or rather their consciousness of it, is the scaffold upon which 
a new, reformed, middle-class identity is constructed. Even Henry James seems to concede 
something new and enlightening about “absence of the need of losing touch,” and for Howells, 
it is precisely the degree to which this novel and new kind of continuity is threatened that the 
new mode of middle-class subjectivity is threatened. Howells’s narrator warns of “the many 
dangers” that face the speeding rail traveler:  
The draw-bridges that gape upon the way, the trains that stand smoking and 
steaming on the track, the rail that has borne the wear so long that it must 
soon snap under it, the deep cut where the overhanging mass of rock 
trembles to its fall, the obstruction that a pitiless malice may have placed in 
your path, —you think of these after the journey is done but they seldom 
haunt your fancy while it lasts. The knowledge of your helplessness in any 
circumstances is so perfect that it begets a sense of irresponsibility, almost 
of security; and as you drowse upon the pallet of the sleeping car, and feel 
yourself hurled forward through the obscurity, you are almost thankful that 
you can do nothing, for it is upon this condition only that you can endure it 
[. . .]. (18-19) 
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Howells may tell us that all these potential catastrophes “seldom haunt [the] fancy” of the rail 
passenger, but this stipulation cannot keep them from haunting imagination of the novel 
itself—or ours. The narrator has already shown us passengers rushing to “be off to some place 
that lay not only in the distance, but also in the future—to which no line of road carries you 
with absolute certainty across an interval of time full of every imaginable chance and 
influence” and tells us that this scene is “not a particularly sane spectacle” (15), implicitly 
equating that which is beyond the railroad’s control with what is not represented by the novel 
itself. The possibility of the broken rail or missed signal is always there to threaten the 
frictionless world of non-spaces. And yet the novel consistently good-naturedly lampoons 
those like Isabel March who worry too much about such questions. The novel constantly asks 
us to disregard the very dangers that it evokes. Returning from Canada by rail at the end of the 
novel, “Basil's life became a struggle to construct a meal from the fragmentary opportunities of 
twenty different stations where they stopped five minutes for refreshments” (284). This 
improvised gustatory mobile practice seems to comment on the ambivalent view Their 
Wedding Journey takes of mobility; mobility, the condition of an “absence of the need of 
losing touch,” subsists somehow both in technosocial networks of transportation and in the 
passenger himself, in the way he improvises his travel practices. It is as if the fluidity and 
efficiency of mobile being, which is supposed to be inculcated in the subject by the encounter 
with the transportation system, must nonetheless already be available as cognitive habit for the 
passenger in order for mobility to work at all. 
 
Written circuits 
The March 1897 issue of Godey’s Magazine included the following editorial gloss on the 
article “Standard Time and Time-Tables,” written by the pseudonymous Juncus: 
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Few indeed are they who really know how to correctly read a railroad time-
table; and those who have been literally “left,” because they failed to note 
the marks on their time-tables, are not a small portion of the American 
community. [. . .] Modern railroad management has become almost an exact 
science—if one may use this term for lack of a better—in which no 
allowances are made for assumptions and guess-work of any kind. The 
time-table is a part of this exact system, and is made to correspond in every 
detail with the schedule of the train service. Intelligent study of one’s time 
tables will be found a very useful part of the traveller’s education. It is 
never safe to take it for granted that your time-table gives you a privilege of 
latitude in your interpretation of its contents. It always means just what it 
says—no more, no less. (320) 
This editorial note represents the railroad timetable as both a perfect map and a perfectly 
functioning technical element of the railway system. The timetable is a necessary and 
sufficient textualization of the railroad; because the timetable obviates “guess-work” and 
“assumptions,” the Godey’s editors suggest that discontinuities and errors in rail travel are 
always the fault of the traveler: “Every little symbol, each single letter, no matter how small, 
and even the variations in the styles of types used in printing a time-table mean something 
definite, which, unnoted by the traveller may lead to trouble and annoyance, for which none 
but himself is to blame.” Yet this screed against unobservant travelers is itself rich in 
ambiguities and contradictions. Indeed, its claim that timetables transparently mean exactly 
what they say directly contradicts the article to which the editor’s comments refer; in fact, 
Juncus himself writes, “The lack of knowledge about time-tables is partly the fault of their 
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diversity. It is necessary to use arbitrary signs in order to get the required information into little 
space; but unfortunately, the abbreviations and signs are not given uniform meanings by all 
railroads” (277). For Juncus, moreover, the proliferation of different graphic representations of 
the rail systems results from the piecemeal, hence arbitrary, adoption of the railroads of 
Standard Time, a convention he writes was “invented solely for the benefit of the railroads.” In 
essence, suggests Juncus, problems with reading timetables arise because the railroads 
themselves have failed to conform both their transportational and textual practices to the 
“theoretical map” of standard time (279). While the Godey’s editors blame delays and missed 
trains on too much “latitude” in passenger’s reading practices, Juncus attributes being “left” to 
the writing practices of the railroads themselves.  
To an extent, however, the Godey’s editors and Juncus are not at odds: Reliable mobile 
practices must also be reliable literate practices. Mobility should be directed by texts, which 
themselves must take their character from the “exact science” of industrialized transportation. 
Both of these texts, one commenting on the other even as both comment on timetables, 
presuppose the technical unity and completeness of the rail system. Likewise, both texts, in 
asserting the authority of the timetable, tautologically authorize themselves as guides to 
understanding how timetables work. In establishing the timetable as the only legitimate means 
for negotiating passengerhood, they thereby ally themselves as well to mobile practices and 
announce themselves as part of the textual apparatus of mobility. What remains obscure is how 
exactly these texts imagine their relationship to their own readers and to the timetable itself. 
The editorial commentary, for example, ambiguously addresses both the many who cannot 
correctly read timetables and the mobile élite who can. It seems to scold its readers while 
simultaneously inviting them to join in the scolding. Moreover, its implicit gesture of alliance 
41  
 
 
with timetables undermines its explicit claim for their representational completeness. It asserts 
that the rail timetable is self-interpreting and unambiguous, yet it refers to another text that 
explicitly critiques the plurality of graphic schemes used by different railroads. By presuming 
to intervene in the material relationship of timetable and reader, then, the commentary 
challenges the absolute authority of timetables. On the other hand, it also implies that any 
reader who can grasp its argument about the consequences of failing to read timetables can 
also understand timetables themselves. While the explicit rhetoric of the note urges its readers 
to be better readers in order to be passengers, its very act of intervention tends to elide any 
difference whatsoever between literacy and passengerhood. To that extent, the editorial does 
not so much instruct its readers in a literate practice as interpellate its them into an ideology of 
passengerhood. It works implicitly to affirm the perfection of the rail system as something 
self-evident to literate passengers. 
The Godey’s editors, then, are just as concerned with literacy as with passengerhood. 
Moreover, they address their readers ambiguously, raising anxieties about mobile practice as 
both a form of etiquette and a species of technosocial competence, while at the same time 
suggesting that élite readers are, by definition, élite travelers, and vice versa. Arguably, then, 
their commentary implicitly does what Their Wedding Journey and The American Scene do 
explicitly. It imagines a moment in which various ethnic, gender, class, and regional subjects, 
formerly spatially separate, have been brought together in the non-places of the transportation 
systems; more significantly for my purposes, it also registers the emergence of passengerhood 
as a mechanism by which social groups sort themselves out. However, even as it thinks an 
American civilization divided into passengers and non-passengers—one in which technosocial 
differences supplant sociocultural distinctions—it struggles to find a place for textuality itself. 
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These texts, that is, raise the question of whether all writing should strive to be like the self-
evident and self-sufficient railroad timetable. This study asks a similar question about the 
place of literary prose. If inscriptive genres like the timetable, the circuit diagram, the 
organizational chart, already “correspond in every detail” with the world they purport to 
represent, of what use is a play, a novel, or an expository essay? On the other hand, if these 
kinds of representation are somehow incomplete, flawed, or deceptive, how can literature 
simultaneously supplement them and convincingly portray a world in which they have come to 
dominate much of everyday life? Can and the literary text be other than the timetable without 
being a distraction from the timetable, thereby running the risk of causing its readers to be 
“left”? What becomes of the literary text that not only narrates a world in motion, but must 
address an audience in motion—an audience whose mobile practices are already increasingly 
mediated by printed texts? This question is a thread running through all of the texts I examine 
in this study. Railroad maps and passes in The Gilded Age, railway maps (again) and ticker-
tapes in The Octopus, tourist auto maps in An American Tragedy—all play a decisive role in 
each of these fictions. Each of these novels thematizes the kind of mobile literacy urged by 
Juncus and the Godey’s editors; and each registers the emergence of a kind of mediated 
immediacy—reading as direct technical agency—as an element of mobile subjectivity. The 
literary itself became increasingly enmeshed in networks of mobility in the years around 1900; 
as Janice Radway has written, the literary producer of the these years was “a corporate, 
prosthetically augmented, creative agent whose capacity to produce reading material was 
significantly expanded [. . .] by systematic integration into a carefully managed and controlled, 
mechanically assisted system” (133). This study, therefore, asks how such texts as The Gilded 
Age, Life on the Mississippi, The Octopus, and An American Tragedy framed themselves as 
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narratives about the rise of such systems, as addressing an audience of such agents, and as 
themselves elements of such a prosthetic augmentation. At the same time, it looks at the ways 
each of these novels struggled to maintain a privileged position for literary prose 
On the other hand, each of these texts also betrays troubling reservations about the limits 
of this mode of literary mediation. If they register conflicting desires both to imitate the print 
genres of mobile systems and to reserve a place for the literary, they are also haunted by 
persistent doubts about the knowability of mobile systems themselves. In each of them, mobile 
systems are often incomplete, discontinuous, hazardous. In The Railway Journey: The 
Industrialization of Time and Space in the Nineteenth Century, Wolfgang Schivelbusch 
weaves a remarkable network of connections between, on one hand, late nineteenth-century 
industrial accidents and Marx’s explanation of capitalist economic crises, and Freud’s 
examination of traumatic neuroses observed in World War I veterans, on the other. According 
to Schivelbusch, the paradox of “shock” in industrial society is that the large-scale 
coördination of productive, military, or transportational forces—their economic 
rationalization, temporal regularization, and mechanization—raises the “falling height” of such 
forces and paves the way for catastrophic crises. He writes,  
The precondition for this [kind of catastrophic “shock”] is a highly-
developed general state of dominance over nature, both technically [ . . . ] 
and physically [ . . . ]. The degree of control over nature and the violence of 
that control, in shock, are proportionate: the more finely meshed the web of 
mechanization, discipline, division of labor, etc., the more catastrophic the 
collapse when it is disrupted from within or without. (158) 
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Importantly, for Schivelbusch “control over nature” also includes the development of those 
social practices which mediate individual consciousness and the industrial machine ensemble 
in which they are embedded. Rail travel educated the senses in what Schivelbusch calls 
“panoramic perception,” a kind of reduction of the distant landscape to a quasi-cinematic 
image, which “in contrast to traditional perception, no longer belonged to the space of the 
perceived objects: the traveler saw the objects, landscapes, etc. through the apparatus which 
moved him [sic] through the world. That machine and its motion it created became integrated 
into his visual perception: thus he could only see things in motion” (64; emphasis in original). 
Therefore, what Marx calls the “annihilation of space by time” (Grundrisse 524), a process of 
both the acceleration of industrial processes and the relentless assimilation of geographic space 
into the social space of capitalist production and circulation, simultaneously produced the 
increasing potential for perceptual disorientation, physical trauma, and social disorder, and 
new, more mediated and regulated, modes of perceiving the world. 
Schivelbusch draws on Freud’s arguments in Beyond the Pleasure Principle to suggest 
that both rail travelers themselves and railroad companies adopted a constellation of practices 
that naturalized the traumatic experience of integration into the machine ensemble of railway 
travel while simultaneously fostering new modes of perception. Following Freud, he argues 
that these practices, both technological and cultural, came to constitute a “stimulus shield” that 
“enabled the traveler to lose the fear that he formerly felt towards the new conveyance” (160). 
Amy Kaplan has suggested a function for late nineteenth-century realism remarkably resonant 
with Schivelbusch’s description of ameliorative rail practices. In her discussion of Howells’s 
critical writings on realism, Kaplan writes that realist literature was expected to “make known 
to middle-class, ‘cultivated’ readers people, culture, and ways of life that are foreign to them,” 
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but not to “jar readers with the shock of otherness”; realist representation should, then, 
“represent diversity in an unthreatening shape” (23). Much as panoramic perception saw the 
world as separate from the perceiving consciousness, Kaplan argues that realism developed the 
representation of inwardness and “character,” relegating broadly social contexts to the status of 
mere background or environment. However, Schivelbusch suggests that such practices 
intended to mask the industrial character of the rail apparatus—practices such as outfitting rail 
cars with sumptuous seats and draperies and constructing opulent classical rail stations—could 
not anticipate the increased “falling height” of rail travel catastrophically revealed when trains 
derailed or collided. Rail accidents, despite the domestication of the rail experience, were still 
perceived as traumatic, violent, and disorderly. In short, such practices failed to ameliorate the 
shock of industrial-capitalist crisis under circumstances that were the most catastrophic. 
Schivelbusch’s discussion bears directly on my own because it hints at how literary 
fiction around 1900 thought the transportation accident. I have already shown how Their 
Wedding Journey establishes railroad spaces as sites of a (potential) social utopia while 
simultaneously warning readers of the dangerous gaps and obstacles that may lie just beyond 
the passenger’s horizon. This tendency both to soothe and warn, to titillate with direct 
reference to collision, chaos, and mayhem, while formally containing such discontinuities 
within narratological bounds, characterizes all three of the novels discussed in this study. Each 
of these texts has a primal scene of technological violence that sets narrative in motion and 
proleptically announces the narrative’s thematics. The portions of The Gilded Age authored by 
Mark Twain present us with a corporate protagonist, a family literally constituted by a 
steamboat journey across the southern United States and by the witnessing of a steamboat 
explosion that leaves them “richer by twenty-four hours of experience in the contemplation of 
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human suffering and in learning through honest hard work how to relieve it” (34). Yet those 
experiences will not give the Hawkins family the competence to foresee or avoid the crises and 
turnabouts of the future, and the novel will present the murder of Col. George Selby by Laura 
Hawkins as both a consequence and delayed repletion of the Amaranth explosion. Likewise, in 
The Octopus, the Eastern dandy Presley’s hair’s-breadth escape from a speeding locomotive, 
“shooting by in a sudden crash of confused thunder; [and] filling the night with the terrific 
clamour of its iron hoofs” (49), is at once a corporeal trauma, a trope (as Leo Marx has 
famously argued5) for the power of technology invading and subsuming that of “nature,” and a 
figure for the explosive acts of violence that occur throughout the rest of the novel. In this 
case, it has been a matter of debate among readers whether Presely does learn anything from 
his violent encounters with the railroad and its spaces. Finally, Dreiser’s Clyde Griffiths’s fatal 
auto accident, a collision with a small child on the streets of Kansas City, implicitly rehearses 
the “murder” of Roberta Alden for which he is eventually convicted—an event which, at least 
according to Clyde’s attorneys, is itself more a transportation accident than a deliberate 
homicide. In each case, the repetition of the transportation accident by the literary narrative 
seems to contain and naturalize the accidents repeated within it. Yet, as I will argue, this very 
narration of repetition often, in various ways, undoes the meliorative work of narrative as such. 
In these texts, collision and catastrophe often take on a life of their own, often standing both as 
moral lessons in the dangers of misreading the spaces of mobility and as examples of the kind 
of verisimilitude realism claimed as its hallmark. William Greenslade has seen this dichotomy 
as a reflection of the bifurcation in evolutionary thought in the nineteenth century: 
Whereas Lamarckian biology [. . .] had stressed the organism’s creative 
adaptation to the impact of change, in [. . .] neo-Darwinian accounts, 
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development proceeded erratically, randomly, alarmingly. The organism 
now learnt [sic] nothing from experience but re-made itself on the sole basis 
of chance adaptation. Indeed the impress of the contingent and the 
haphazard threatened to obliterate memory, tradition and rationality. (16) 
Greenslade is writing here specifically about British literature of the nineteenth century, 
arguing that this difference in evolutionary models the difference between “realism” and 
“naturalism” in Britain. I, however, see both of these paradigms often flourishing side-by-side 
in American literature of the same era. But Greenslde’s point holds nevertheless: During the 
years 1869-1929, transportation accidents are both puzzles to be solved and the ineluctable and 
implacable background noise of modernity. In other words, transportation accidents—not just 
collisions and explosions, but also breakdowns, delays, missed connections, and wrong 
turns—often themselves hovered unsteadily between functioning as metonymy and metaphor. 
Each one could be read a trope for any other, or each could be read as precisely what evades 
metaphoricity entirely. They are figures of both the known old and the unknowable new. 
Hence, as paradoxical figures for contingency itself, that is, they are as troubling for writers 
and readers as they were for transportation managers and passengers. 
Thus, this study examines two closely related ambiguities in American writing of the 
realist era: that of literary fiction’s specific cultural work in an era where mobility brought 
with it new textual mediations of everyday life, and that of the knowability of large-scale 
technosocial systems themselves. Herein, I present an arc or triptych of chapters that examine 
the vicissitudes of realism’s handing of these contradictions, which I argue are closely related. 
The first chapter, “A Husbanded Grandeur: Mark Twain, Steamboats, and Gilded-Age 
Spaces,” investigates the complex role of the steamboat in the early work of Mark Twain. I 
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look specifically at the steamboat itself as both a trope and a material example of the spatial 
incoherence of antebellum America, and argue that Twain often uses the steamboat—a 
technosocial system linking the North and South—as a metaphor for the problem of the 
material interdependence of reactionary and progressive spatial regimes before the Civil War. I 
also examine the representations of the steamboat in The Gilded Age, Twain’s collaboration 
with Charles Dudley Warner, to show that Twain never fully accepted the victory of northern 
technosocial rationality over southern sham and charlatanism. Finally, I argue that Twain’s 
close reading of steamboats in Life on the Mississippi at once seeks to make writing an 
instrument for distinguishing the reactionary from the progressive and registers the futility of 
ever disentangling pure spectacle from technical efficiency and progress. The next chapter 
reads Frank Norris’s 1901 novel The Octopus in the context of the simultaneous development 
of the middle-class American reader, the industrial manager, and the railroad passenger. In 
“Quick Enough to Interpret the Cipher Message of the Eye: The Octopus and Railroad 
Perception,” I suggest that The Octopus was part of a much larger textual network that not 
only represented, but also materially participated in, contemporary railroad systems. Much 
writing of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries encouraged readers to imagine 
themselves in the place of railroad managers—who were in turn, represented as skilled users 
of textuality. Similarly, in his nonfiction work, Norris often presented himself as a privileged 
guide to the labyrinthine spaces of turn-of-the-century technosocial systems; yet, in his critical 
writings he also implies that the work of writing itself—not the author’s innate imaginative 
power or sensibility—is what makes such spaces legible6. Drawing on these texts, I argue that 
Norris’s implicit solution to the kinds of historical problems that plagued Twain is realist 
fiction itself—or, as Norris would have insisted, the “naturalist” novel—as a literate technique. 
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The final chapter, “At Breakneck Pace: The Limits of Mobility in An American Tragedy,” 
argues that, while Twain and Norris may have seen mobile competence as the key to an 
authentically autonomous liberal subject, in An American Tragedy, Theodore Dreiser 
represents the chaos of capitalist mobility as a corrosive to agency. Dreiser represents the 
spaces of automobility as a fundamentally unknowable industrial territory characterized by 
contingency and crisis. Consequently, the movement from the optimism of Sister Carrie to the 
pessimism of An American Tragedy is also a return to the skepticism of The Gilded Age. Yet, 
while Twain and Warner’s novel holds out the hope of satire as a corrective to the 
recrudescence of older and regressive spatialites, An American Tragedy sees mobility itself as 
a decentered and arbitrary mechanism of social power. If earlier writers of the Gilded Age and 
Progressive Era could see mobility as liberation, Dreiser, by the middle of the 1920s, sees it as 
a machinery of entrapment. 
I see mobility as providing a uniquely useful vantage on the material circumstances that 
conditioned the emergence and waning of American realism. More precisely, reading mobility 
shows us the conditions of realism’s decline already in place as it came into being in the 
1870s. Writers like Charles Francis Adams and William Dean Howells may have seen a clear 
pathway from mass mobility leading to a kind of passengerial American community, but in his 
earlier works, Mark Twain sometimes seems already to see obstacles in the road; in particular, 
he worries if Gilded-Age American culture will keep up with the rapid rationalization of 
production effected by the unification of both the American polity and the American rail 
system. Can representation remake itself to keep pace with invention? Or, will the antebellum 
culture of sham and hoax ride the rails as it had the steamboat? Often, Twain’s writing seems 
to warn against this possibility while also resigning itself to its inevitability. I argue, therefore, 
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that much of “naturalism’s” reaction to early realism’s (putative) just-so mobile narratives is 
already present in the ambiguities and turnabouts of Twain’s satire. On the other hand, while 
Norris may have famously argued that “naturalism” is “a form of romanticism, not an inner 
circle of realism” (“Zola” 86), his own realist fiction, I suggest, merely turned the realism of 
Howells or Twain (or James) inside-out; the smashups and breakdowns that, in earlier realism, 
either happen offstage or appear as straightforward consequences of bad judgment, are brought 
centerstage in Norris and stripped of their satiric or moralistic character. I suggest that Norris’s 
realism is not the inner circle of realism, but realism at the limit. The Octopus doesn’t imagine 
a bourgeois world materially within, but cognitively safely outside, the collisions and swerves 
of machine space; it imagines a literary mode that can train readers in interpreting and 
managing these very catastrophes. If Twain, James, and Howells seek to merge mobile 
practices with literate practices, Norris works to refound the role of the passenger-reader (not 
to mention the author) on the model of the railroad manager-engineer. Accordingly, Norris 
moves his drama from the space of the railroad to the spaces being conquered by railroads; he 
takes us closer to the scene of the catastrophe to help us see how it fits into the evolution of the 
network itself. Finally, I see An American Tragedy as a fully-fledged critique of realism’s 
love-affair with mobility. The 1925 novel repudiates even Dreiser’s own ambivalent embrace 
of mobility in Sister Carrie (1900); unlike Twain and Norris, Dreiser writes enmeshment in 
networks of mobility as a foreclosure of agency. In An American Tragedy, the rationalized 
spaces of mobility are exactly what Addam’s or Burnahm and Bennett’s plans were intended 
to reform: Piranesian, labyrinthine spaces of danger and uncertainty. More contemporaneous 
with the gloomy outlook on mobility of Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby (1925) and Faulkner’s 
The Sound and the Fury (1929) and Light in August (1932), An American Tragedy is also more 
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distant from the progressive take on networks in The Gilded Age and The Octopus than either 
of these texts are from each other. This progression of fictions shows how the problems of 
mobility—problems that hovered around mobility’s margins, disappearing or already all but 
invisible—became mobility as problem. It show how what, for Jane Addams or Daniel H. 
Burnham and Edward H. Bennett, was a new way of knowing things—modeled on, and a 
model for, writing—became not only unknowable, but tragically so.  
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Chapter One: 
A Husbanded Grandeur: Mark Twain, Steamboats, and Gilded-Age Spaces 
 
Curiously confused and commingled 
Many readers of Life on the Mississippi have observed that for Twain, river navigation 
requires a privileged reader of sublime, mysterious Nature; it calls for a specific kind of labor 
that makes the river legible, that turns its noises into signals. However, Twain’s lay observers, 
the audience to the spectacle of river navigation, also see the riverboat itself as sublime, as 
something that resists reading. In Twain and Warner’s The Gilded Age, the enslaved Uncle 
Dan’l and Aunt Jinny, along with a group of white children, observe the approach of a river 
steamer: 
A deep coughing sound troubled the stillness, way toward a wooded 
cape that jutted into the stream a mile distant. All in an instant a fierce eye 
of fire shot out from behind the cape and sent a long brilliant pathway 
quivering athwart the dusky water. The coughing grew louder and louder, 
the glaring eye grew larger and still larger, glared wilder and still wilder. A 
huge shape developed itself out of the gloom, and from its tall duplicate 
horns dense volumes of smoke, starred and spangled with sparks, poured 
out and went tumbling away into the farther darkness. Nearer and nearer the 
thing came, till its long sides began to glow with spots of light which 
mirrored themselves in the river and attended the monster like a torchlight 
procession 
“What is it? Oh, what is it Uncle Dan’l?” 
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With deep solemnity the answer came: 
“It’s de Almighty! Git down on yo’knees!” (21) 
The racist comedy that Twain derives from Uncle Dan’l’s gullibility and superstition only 
partially masks the fact that the narrator himself really believes that the steamboat is in some 
sense, and from a certain perspective, “de Almighty.” The narrator makes the spectacle of the 
craft completely overwhelm the sublime “grandeur and solemnity” of the river itself, the ship’s 
cyclopean eye simultaneously casting a panoptic gaze onto the river and plowing a path 
through it. This rhetoric makes even the steamboat’s windows into lesser eyes, seeing the 
spectators but only obscurely seen by them, and transforming the surface of the river into a 
field of glimmering duplicates. For observers, the Mississippi steamboat really does reorder 
the whole space of the river and distances the slaves and children—local subjects—from that 
very space. Uncle Dan’l plays an odd double role here: His provincialism and crude emotion 
infantilize him even as he struggles to establish himself as a privileged interpreter for the white 
children. As we are signaled to laugh at Uncle Dan’l’s religious misreading of the 
technological spectacle, we are nevertheless invited to see it through his eyes; we are thereby 
simultaneously put in the place of the astonished spectator and that of the sophisticated insider.  
Arguably, the ambivalent stance of The Gilded Age toward the steamboat—at once 
cynically aware and naïvely ecstatic—not only doubles the perspective of the narrator himself, 
but it doubles the way many readers have characterized Mark Twain’s attitude toward both his 
provincial beginnings and his mature status as a cosmopolitan literary figure. Richard Gray, 
for example, writes that in Twain’s treatments of the steamboat, “the glamour of the past is 
dismissed at one moment and then recalled with elegiac regret the next, [and] the pragmatism 
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and progress of the present is welcomed sometimes and at others coolly regretted” (105). Gray 
concluded that Twain 
lacked the language to reconcile his different attitudes to the past. All he 
could do, evidently, was take over the familiar vocabularies of his region, 
with their patriarchal dreams of the past and their populist hopes for the 
future, and their confused mixture of progressivism and nostalgia, 
utopianism and elegy; apply these vocabularies with far more enthusiasm, 
frankness, and energy than any of his contemporaries; and, in doing all this, 
offer his readers what can only be describes as a verbal equivalent of a 
double vision. (106) 
Other scholars have debated Twain’s ambivalence toward the profession of piloting itself. 
Lawrence Howe has suggested that in Life on the Mississippi, Twain opposes realist writing’s 
“multi-voiced structure” to the authoritative homoglossia of the steamboat pilot’s language 
(438). He argues that by shifting “value from actual to textual experience,” Twain narratively 
reinvents himself in the mode of a Franklin or a Douglass and establishes his own literary 
voice over and above that of the experienced pilots (421). More recently, Brian McCammack 
has suggested that Twain’s nostalgic memory of the steamboat pilot’s “level-headed 
competence” was itself the model for his conception of realist authorship (9). For Howe, the 
steamboat pilot was precisely the kind of romantic hero Twain rejected in the work of Sir 
Walter Scott and James Fenimore Cooper; for McCammick, on the other hand, the steamboat 
pilot’s “negative capability”—his ability to improvise and adapt his practices to the river’s 
vicissitudes—allowed him to resist the kind of cant, dogma, and hubris that hindered late 
nineteenth-century technoscience. Despite the apparent diametric opposition of these two 
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arguments, both Howe and McCammick presuppose the actual mastery of the steamboat pilot 
as historical fact; moreover, neither considers the historic and technical specificities of the 
steamboat itself and its limits. For Gray, Howe, and McCammick, the ambivalence is all on the 
side of words or ideas about the steamboat, not in the steamboat itself. 
This silence is all the more remarkable since the steamboat makes at least a perfunctory 
appearance in almost all of Twain’s fiction set in the nineteenth century. The Gilded Age, 
specifically, treats steamboats, steamboat passengerhood, and steamboat spaces with an 
apparently incoherent mix of reverence and satire7. Significantly, for example, the novel 
begins with the backwoods Tennessean Silas Hawkins proclaiming his faith in steamboats to 
his wife Nancy:  
“Nancy, you’ve heard of steamboats, and maybe you believed in them—of 
course you did. You’ve heard these cattle here scoff at them and call them 
lies and humbugs,—but they’re not lies and humbugs, they’re a reality and 
they’re going to be a more wonderful thing some day than they are now. 
They’re going to make a revolution in this worlds affairs that will make 
men dizzy to contemplate.” (11) 
Silas’s zeal for the steamboat, like, Uncle Dan’l’s, arises from an peculiar mix of insider 
knowledge and outright ignorance. He understands the growing importance of the boats, but 
wildly overestimates the likelihood that steam navigation will bring prosperity to his own 
corner of Tennessee. Like his friend Beriah Sellers, he also perceives the potential of deposits 
of coal and “black gummy oil” on his land, but—again like Sellers—he cannot seem to 
distinguish between the mere fantasy of a “revolution in this worlds affairs” effected by steam 
navigation and the actual ability to realize any profit from such a revolution. For Silas, coal 
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and rivers make technosocial revolutions all by themselves, and people profit from them by 
their mere spatial connection to them. He continues to harangue Nancy: 
“Well, do you know [the railroads have] quit burning wood in some places 
in the Eastern states? And what do you suppose they burn? Coal!” [He bent 
over and whispered again:] “There's whole worlds of it on this land! You 
know that black stuff that crops out of the bank of the branch? well that's it. 
You’ve taken it for rocks; so has everybody here; and they’ve built little 
dams and such things with it. One man was going to build a chimney out of 
it. Nancy I expect I turned as white as a sheet! Why it might have caught 
fire and told everything. [. . .] Then he was going to build it of copper ore—
splendid yellow forty-per-cent. ore! There's fortunes upon fortunes of 
copper ore on our land! It scared me to death, the idea of this fool starting a 
smelting furnace in his house without knowing it, and getting his dull eyes 
opened. And then he was going to build it of iron ore. There’s mountains of 
iron ore here, Nancy—whole mountains of it! [. . .] Pine forests, wheat land, 
corn land, iron, copper, coal—wait till the railroads come, and the 
steamboats! We’ll never see the day, Nancy—never in the world—never, 
never, never, child. We’ve got to drag along, drag along, and eat crusts in 
toil and poverty, all hopeless and forlorn—but they’ll ride in coaches, 
Nancy! They’ll live like the princes of the earth; they’ll be courted and 
worshiped; their names will be known from ocean to ocean. Ah, well-a-day! 
Will they ever come back here, on the railroad and the steamboat, and say 
‘This one little spot shall not be touched—this hovel shall be sacred—for 
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here our father and our mother suffered for us, thought for us, laid the 
foundations of our future as solid as the hills!’” (12; emphasis and brackets 
in the original) 
Karl Marx famously wrote that “while the miser is merely a capitalist gone mad, the capitalist 
a rational miser” (Capital III 254); the miser accumulates for the sake of accumulation, while 
the capitalist accumulates by augmenting mere hoarding through the production process. In 
Silas Hawkins, however, Twain has given us a figure who is neither a miser or a capitalist; 
more precisely, Silas isn’t mad enough to be a miser and isn’t rational enough to be a 
capitalist. In fact, what Silas dreams of becoming is a rentier; he fantasizes about neither 
hoarding nor production, but of withholding what he already owns from the circuit of 
production. Rentier income, of course, is precisely the kind of income appropriated by the 
gentry, men called “Squires,” which is also what the residents of Obedstown call Silas. Silas is 
given this appellation, though, not because he owns land, but because of his position as 
postmaster of his little town—“not that the title properly belonged to the office, but because in 
those regions the chief citizens must have titles of some sort” (7-8). Silas, in other words, has 
already managed to parlay his connection to national networks of transportation and 
communication into a sham medieval authority. As in his steamboat dreams, Silas does not 
actually actively participate in the distribution of mail. Both the mail carrier and the local 
citizenry come to Silas; Silas stays in place. And yet the satirical point of the Hawkins chapters 
of The Gilded Age is that Silas cannot stay in place; his profligacy (and the influence of 
Sellars) has driven his from Virginia to Kentucky, and then to Missouri. Drifting from place to 
place, vaguely following the path of the Ohio westward, Silas dreams of mastering the spaces 
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of the steamboat yet finds himself in the position of a bit of flotsam impelled by a historical 
bow wave. 
Twain will later retell the story of the Hawkins land as his own story. In the collection of 
writings redacted by Charles Neider and published as Twain’s Autobiography in 1917, Twain 
writes of his own family land near Jamestown, Virginia. Twain writes that his father John 
Marshall Clemens,  
had always said that the land would not become valuable in his time but that 
it would be a commodious provision for his children some day. It contained 
coal, copper, iron, and timber, and he said that in the course of time 
railways would pierce to that region and then the property would be 
property in fact a well as name. (24) 
However, just as Twain confirms the story of the bountiful Clemens land as fact, not 
imaginative satire, he contradicts himself, writing that his father “had never seen a railway and 
it is barely possible that he had not even heard of such a thing” (29). “Curious as it may seem,” 
he adds, “as late as around 1860 there were people living close to Jamestown who had never 
heard of a railroad and could not be brought to believe in steamboats.” In this version of the 
story, John Clemens is less a charletain than a product of his era and place, but it reinforces the 
earlier text’s ambivalences about its own situatedness. On one hand, Twain constantly insists 
on the Virginia tenure of the Clemenses as his own prehistory; he writes that everything he 
tells us about Jamestown is, like his stories of his family’s glorious medieval past, based on 
“hearsay, not from personal knowledge” (24). Twain implicitly presents himself as a westerner 
and a product of an American landscape dominated by transportational systems, as someone 
who finds it “curious” that people could be unaware of railroads as late as 1860, and not as a 
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product of the antebellum southern backwoods. On the other, by rewriting fiction as 
autobiography, Twain makes an identificatory gesture toward the kind of people who had 
never heard of railroads or steamboats. Moreover, Twain narrates his fist encounter with a 
steamboat as hallucination and sham, not as passengerhood. He writes that, at the age of 
fifteen, under the influence of an itinerant “mesmerizer, ” he “fled from snakes, passed buckets 
at a fire, became excited over hot steamboat-races, made love to imaginary girls and kissed 
them, fished from the platform and landed mud cats that outweighed me—and so on, all the 
customary marvels” (67). In passages like this, Twain paints his youthful self as little different 
from Uncle Dan’l or Silas Hawkins, as a naïf for whom the steamboat is part of a universe of 
unlikely adventure and the supernatural. 
The ambivalence over the spaces of mobility in The Gilded Age adumbrates the passage 
in Life on the Mississippi in which Twain recalls the arrival of steamboats in antebellum 
Hannibal; the townspeople swarm the wharves and “fasten their eyes upon the coming of the 
boat as upon a wonder they are seeing for the very first time” (65). Twain insists that the 
fascination with the ship, which both sets the town in motion and immobilizes it like a 
theatrical audience held in their seats by a “mesmerizer,” is not simply mass delusion: 
And the boat is a rather handsome sight, too. She is long and sharp and trim 
and pretty; she has two tall, fancy-topped chimneys, with a gilded device of 
some kind swung between them; a fanciful pilot-house, all glass and 
“gingerbread,” perched on top of the “texas” [sic] deck behind them; the 
paddle-boxes are gorgeous with a picture or with gilded rays above the 
boat’s name; the boiler deck, the hurricane deck, and the texas deck are 
fenced and ornamented with clean white railings; [ . . . ] the captain stands 
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by the big bell, calm, imposing, the envy of all; great volumes of the 
blackest smoke are rolling and tumbling out of the chimneys—a husbanded 
grandeur created with a bit of pitch pine just before arriving at a town; [ . . . 
], and an envied deck-hand stands picturesquely on the end of it with a coil 
of rope in his hand; the pent steam screaming through the gauge-cocks; the 
captain lifts his hands, a bell rings, the wheels stop; then they turn back, 
churning water to foam, and the steamer is at rest. (65). 
Here again, this passage satirizes the indolent townspeople for their fascination and 
astonishment. For his literate readers, on the other hand, Twain provides a glimpse behind the 
curtain, literally laying bare the steamboat’s theatrical devices, anatomizing the sublime 
spectacle into a jargon-laden list of “pilot boxes,” “paddle-boxes,” and “gauge-cocks.” 
Moreover, while we are shown the steamboat’s gilt, its ornament, its theatrical “husbanded 
grandeur,” we also see the really productive labor of the stoker who feeds the boiler with pitch 
pine. Twain also emphasizes the way the townspeople themselves participate in the theater of 
the ship’s appearance, as upon the first sign of the boat’s approach, “instantly a negro 
drayman, famous for his quick eye and prodigious voice, lifts up the cry, ‘S-t-e-a-m-boat a-
comin’!’ and the scene changes!”  As Uncle Dan’l attributes omnipotence to the steamship, 
thereby helping to produce the steamboat spectacle in The Gilded Age, this passage stages the 
collaboration of ship’s crew and townspeople in the production of a social ritual. Like Silas 
Hawkins and Uncle Dan’l, the townspeople are spectators, not actors; or rather, since they 
participate in the steamboat system without grasping the humbug involved with its appearance, 
they are actors only to the degree that they are spectators. They are interpellated imperfectly by 
the steamboat; they recognize that it is significant, but cannot read its meaning. To the extent 
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that the humor here derives from the false or mistaken way the townspeople perform what I 
have called passengerhood, however, the text itself invites its readers to identify with the 
operators of the steamboat itself.  
The technological sublime as fetishism seems, likewise, to be precisely what separates the 
townspeople from the steamboat crew. The townspeople see only the spectacle, but not 
themselves producing the spectacle. In apparent contrast, surely the steamboat’s crew are 
aware of what they are doing when they unfurl the flag, stoke the boiler fires with pitch pine, 
and appear theatrically on deck. Yet Twain, in one of the most famous passages in Life on the 
Mississippi, seems to attribute something like this same attitude to the boatmen themselves. 
When Jerome Bixby attempts the dangerous Hat Island crossing in Chapter VII, “A Daring 
Deed,” he is accompanied by an audience of veteran pilots, the very pinnacle of the river elite 
who—in contrast to the shiftless rubes of Twain’s youth—“bore themselves with a dignity 
proper to men of solid means and prodigious reputation as pilots” (80). As Twain’s boat, the 
Paul Jones, approaches the island in near-darkness and the visiting pilots—once again in 
contrast to the busy and swarming townspeople—congregate anxiously around Bixby, “The 
dead silence and sense of waiting became oppressive,” and everyone strains to hear the 
leadsmen’s calls: 
The cries of the leadsmen began to rise out of the distance, and were 
gruffly repeated by the word-passers on the hurricane deck. 
“M-a-r-k three! . . . . M-a-r-k three! . . . . Quarter-less-three! . . . . Half 
twain! . . . . Quarter twain! . . . . M-a-r-k twain! . . . . Quarter less”— 
Mr. Bixby pulled two bell-ropes, and was answered by faint jingling 
far below in the engine room, and our speed slackened. The steam began to 
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whistle through the gauge-cocks. The cries foe leadsmen went on—and it 
was a weird sound, always, in the night. Every pilot in the lot was watching 
now, with fixed eyes, and talking under his breath. Nobody was calm and 
easy but Mr. Bixby. He would put his wheel down and stand on a spoke, 
and as the steamer swung into her (to me) utterly invisible marks—for we 
seemed to be in the midst of a wide and gloomy sea—he would meet and 
fasten her there. (82-83) 
On one level, the scene in the pilot house could not more different than the one from Twain’s 
youth, with its grotesque and rustic mélange of pigs, watermelon rinds, town drunks, scattered 
freight pallets, and drowsy clerks; no-one here sees Mr. Bixby as the equivalent of a “clown” 
or a “negro [sic] minstrel,” as the youthful Twain imagines the steamboatmen. “[W]aiting” and 
quiet, jargon-laden talk in the pilot-house replace the “hurrying” and “scrambl[ing]” of the 
Hannibal docks; a carnival scene is replaced by a nineteenth-century version of Mission 
Control. Nonetheless, the two passages contain unmistakable resonances. In both passages, a 
youthful witness observes other watchers, who in turn observe and comment on a 
technological spectacle; in both scenes, an audience is fascinated, mesmerized, or “fixed” by 
what it sees. More importantly, both scenes imply a fetishistic misrecognition on the part of 
the audience. In the first passage, the grandeur of the steamship appears as divine fire and 
cloud; the actual laborers producing the spectacle, in turn, seem like attendant lords, their own 
glamor as merely reflected glory. In the Hat Island anecdote, on the other hand, the pilot 
himself is deified, made into a demiurge who effortlessly commands the ship and its crew as if 
they were mere prostheses; everything is attributed to Bixby even though the other pilots know 
very well that the crossing was the product of collaborative labor, of the training and 
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competence of the engineer and the leadsmen as much as the skill of the pilot. The scene 
makes these other workers literally invisible, turns them into ghostly voices, the sound of bells, 
signals transmitted by elaborate relays. Moreover, the persistent halo of glamor, romance, and 
heroism attributed to river navigation elides the historical and technosocial milieu which 
makes the boatmen’s collaborative labor possible—the system of shipwrights, woodlots, 
dockworkers, snagboats, deckhands, instruments, and regulations presupposed by the existence 
of the “mental laborer” of the pilots. 
In spite of the differences between the two scenes, then, both present an unmasking of a 
process of reification. However, I want to observe provisionally that only in the second does 
the specifically capitalist form of reification begin to appear—that is, the form of reification 
that not only contributes to the reproduction of social forms, but to the production of surplus 
value itself. Twain’s provincial townspeople (including Silas Hawkins, Uncle Dan’l, and his 
own younger self) relate to the industrial transportation apparatus as spectacle; for them, the 
only difference between the steamboat and a medieval mystery play is that the nineteenth-
century deus ex machina is considerably more elaborate. Unlike mystery players, however, 
Twain’s boatmen are not simply engaged in the production of theatrical spectacle, but in 
production as such—that is, the production of relative surplus value, the driving-down of 
necessary labor-time that makes the production of a surplus possible. For the townspeople, 
who are both geographically and socially outside the mainstream of industrial production, the 
attitude of fetishism results from the production of spectacle; for the boatmen, it seems to 
result from the spectacle of production. In this scene, Bixby’s omnipotent mastery appears to 
his colleagues because the pilot’s role in the division of labor is misrecognized as the 
determining role in the technosocial apparatus, the role of the brain in the otherwise unruly 
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body of capital. Bixby’s calm mastery recalls Georg Lukacs observation that with the role of 
the bureaucratic manager in advanced capitalism, “we witness [how] the contemplative nature 
of man under capitalism makes its appearance” (98). Lukacs explains further: “The specialised 
‘virtuoso,’ the vendor of his objectified and reified faculties does not just become the [passive] 
observer of society; he also lapses into a contemplative attitude vis-à-vis the workings of his 
own objectified and reified faculties” (100). For Lukacs, then, thinking appears to the mental 
worker as the polar opposite of “brute” labor. Although the mental worker is actually 
dependent upon an entire network other workers—and of the material means of production 
themselves—his successful accomplishment of his own tasks presupposes that he imagines 
himself at the center of this network, as the point through which all production must 
“naturally” pass.  
Importantly, however, the steamboat pilot is not an industrial manager, despite his 
command of a process of industrial production. Rather, his role is an odd hybrid of a feudal 
guild-master and an industrial manager. Lukacs points out that managerial labor, the labor of 
one who stands in for the capitalist himself, calls for the abandonment of technical practices 
rooted in “the empirical, the concrete, and the traditional” (97). Managerial labor, on the 
contrary, appears to be the application of abstract “rational calculation” and the “working-out 
of the probable effects of [a priori] ‘laws’ without making the attempt to intervene in the 
process by bringing other ‘laws’ to bear [ . . . ].” (98). The manager both does everything 
(nothing is done without him) and does nothing (his labor is abstract calculating power as 
such; it has no positive empirical characteristic tying to the body of the worker). But this 
model of mental labor seems to be a poor description of the pilot’s work, with its “pretty 
hardly learned” and tradition-bound interpretative skills and filiative mode of institutional 
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reproduction. Moreover, the elevated pilot-house notwithstanding, the steamboat itself 
materially resists any panoptic managerial stance on the part of the pilot. When Bixby and the 
young Clemens leave the Paul Jones to take a job on “a big New Orleans steamer,” Clemens 
discovers the luxuries of a more elaborately maintained pilot house: “[H]ere was a sumptuous 
glass temple; room enough to have a dance in; showy red and gold window-curtains; an 
imposing sofa; leather cushions and a back to the leather high bench where visiting pilots sit, 
to spin yarns and ‘look at the river’ [ . . . ]” (77). This space is bourgeois, to be sure; but it 
suggests leisure, ritual, and ostentation, not calculation and supervision; Twain writes that he 
saw the steamer as a whole as “dainty as a drawing-room,” implying a space into which the 
bourgeois subject withdraws from business and production. The elevated and glassed-in pilot 
house gives the young Clemens a towering vantage over both the ship and the river—so much 
so that he seems “perched on a mountain”—but Twain’s language aestheticizes this view, and 
the spatial division between the pilot house and the boiler room interrupts, rather than furthers, 
the possibility of surveillance over the work going on below. Here, the language of showiness, 
gilt, fringe, and pomp by the co-author of The Gilded Age evokes a odd and contradictory 
compromise between gilded cage and control tower. Moreover Twain’s seeing the workers as 
a “regiment of natty servants” (78) further reinforces a sense of feudal social separation, rather 
than capitalist cybernetic management. 
Twain’s picture of the western steamboat is literally one of a feudal superstructure 
arbitrarily bolted onto an industrial base whose technical development is impeded precisely 
because of this yoking; it, in fact, portrays the internal space of the steamboat in a condition of 
uneven development. Other observers of the era communicated a sense of the western steamer 
itself as somehow an awkward and unwieldy hybrid of industrial power and feudal humbug. 
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For example, for Charles Dickens, the steamers lacked both technical and aesthetic unity, and 
they were simultaneously risible and dangerous. He insists that because they are not modeled 
on the traditional lines of a seagoing vessel, the steamer “might be intended, for anything that 
appears to the contrary, to perform some unknown service, high and dry, upon a mountain-
top” (143). He further describes the parts of the superstructure as “jumbled as oddly together 
as though they formed a small street, built by the varying tastes of a dozen men” and observes 
that “in the narrow space between this upper structure and [the] deck are the furnace fires and 
machinery, open at the sides” to the elements. Emphasizing its “jumbled” and “varying” 
character, Dickens’s portrayal of the steamer both ridicules the superstructure’s pretense of 
grandeur and worries about the safety and effectiveness of the machinery below. Dickens’s 
rhetoric, moreover, multiples this grotesque heterogeneity, reading the ship as an incoherent 
text, something more like the shifting and untrustworthy river itself than an instrument for the 
technical mastery of the river. Not only is the feudal opulence of the superstructure 
contaminated by the industrial squalor of the space below, but the industrial space itself is 
inefficient and disunified, a “great body of fire [ . . . ] that rages and roars beneath the frail pile 
of painted wood.”  
Similarly, Frederick Law Olmsted, designer of Central Park and antislavery theorist, 
writes of his “amuse[ment]” upon discovering that parts of a steamer’s hull were sometimes 
literally hacked away in the rush to navigate bars and shoals, pointing out “how little account 
the boat was considered, in comparison with the value of time” (29). Olmsted’s observation 
highlights the technical inefficiency of the boats in accomplishing (beyond simply facilitating 
the previously arduous upriver journey) the supreme technical goal of capital: the reduction of 
socially necessary labor-time. Moreover, Olmsted points out that the boatmen were usually 
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desultory about keeping schedules—in sharp contrast, say, to the way postbellum railways 
were managed. Olmsted observes that it was a “matter of luck” if passengers could depart “a 
matter of hours [ . . . ], not days” later than a scheduled departure time” (23). He is further 
astonished to see a steamer make a special landing to deliver as single box of raisins to an 
isolated farmer: “Think of a huge ‘floating palace,’ of 600 tons, with 200 passengers on board, 
spending a quarter of an hour on such an errand!” (24). Olmsted’s account again gives an 
impression of a preoccupation with speed coupled with an indifference to efficiency; although 
the western steamboat was an industrial artifact, the drive for speed here seems so 
disconnected to shrewd capitalist management that it has the air of feudal or gentlemanly 
sport, not production. The French Saint-Simonian Michel Chevalier—like Dickens and 
Olmsted, a reformer of urban and industrial space—also saw the steamers as a heterogeneous 
and incomplete combination of technical sublimity and aesthetic quaintness. He called the 
superstructures of the western steamers “huge houses of two stories” and compared their 
appearance to that of “the Vigier baths on the Seine” (217). He continues, “Two large 
chimneys of columnar form vomit forth torrents of smoke and thousands of sparks; from a 
third a whitish cloud breaks forth with a loud noise; this is the steam-pipe. In the interior they 
have that coquettish air that characterizes American vessels in general; the cabins are showily 
furnished, and make a very pretty appearance.” However, Chevalier also insists that “when the 
feeling of curiosity is once satisfied, a long confinement” in such a craft is tedious and even 
dangerous. Despite his initial admiration for the boats, he compares them to “floating 
barracks” (219) and points out that “[e]xplosions of the boilers are frequent” (220). For 
Chevalier, the steamboat in the 1830s was simultaneously a weapon against untamed nature 
and a restoration of a Lockean state of nature, a site where discipline “is more complete that in 
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the camp,” but where, as in the military camp, life “consists of a mixture of absolute 
independence and absolute obedience” (225). For Twain’s characters, especially the “naïve” 
ones, the steamboat is the cosmopolitan writ large, the “almighty” itself; conversely, Chevalier 
admires the boats, in spite of their technical shortcomings, as the ephemeral harbingers of 
something more permanent to come. 
The readings of Dickens, Olmsted, and Chevalier especially resonate with Twain’s 
account of steamboat racing in “Racing Days,” Chapter XVI of Life on the Mississippi. Twain 
writes that “[w]hen the ‘Eclipse’ and the ‘A.L. Shotwell’ ran their great race many years ago, 
it was said that pains were taken to scrape the gilding off the fanciful device that hung between 
the ‘Eclipse’s’ chimneys, and that for that one trip the captain left off his kid gloves and had 
his head shaved” (140). Here, Twain indicates that, when the boats were pushed to the limits 
of speed, the steamboatmen easily understood superfluity of the trappings of opulence. For the 
steamers to become as lean and mean in reality as they were in spectacle, the apparatus of 
spectacle itself was expendable. Moreover, Twain tells his readers that they “should be on 
board when they take a couple of those wood-boats in tow and turn a swarm of men into each; 
by the time you have wiped your glasses and put them on, you will be wondering what has 
become off the wood” (141). Unlike the earlier scenes of the technological sublime on the 
river, this portrayal emphasizes both the collaborative and technosocial nature of steamboat 
labor (“a swarm of men” working on the woodboats); it also suggests that this labor, because it 
happens while “you have wiped your glasses,” is performed specifically without concern for 
spectacular production.   
However, Twain also suggests that during races production itself had to be sacrificed for 
speed. Twain writes that “[i]f the boat was known to make her best speed when drawing five 
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and a half feet forward and five feet aft, she was carefully loaded to that exact figure—she 
would n’t enter a dose of homœopathic pills in her manifest after that” (140). Moreover, 
keeping the boat absolutely trim meant that “[h]ardly any passengers were taken” because 
“[t]hey always run to the side when there is anything to see, whereas a conscientious and 
experienced steamboatman would stick to the centre of the boat and part his hair in the middle 
with a spirit level.” Such descriptions imply that if under normal conditions technical 
efficiency was sacrificed for speed and profitability, during races, speed and efficiency were 
often achieved at the expense of productivity. The comic representations of the lengths to 
which steamboatmen went in driving down travel times also suggests both the highest 
development and the limits of the kind of steely competence evoked in the Hat Island passage. 
If Bixby’s navigation of Hat Island had evoked Auguste Dupin’s purely mental interpretive 
expertise, coupled with his characteristic immobility (in Bixby’s case, paradoxically used for 
achieving motion), “Racing Days” portrays pilots anxiously rearranging their hair and even 
shaving their heads to reduce draft and keep the boat in trim, and engineers “constantly on the 
alert, trying gauge-cocks and watching things” (139), thereby emphasizing both the materiality 
of piloting labor and the unruliness of the steamboat itself. Here, the serene and sovereign 
reader of the river whose thoughts are almost effortlessly converted to productive action is 
replaced by the overtaxed technical laborer restlessly and unrelentingly testing the limits of a 
technical system imperfectly adapted to the task of speed. If “A Daring Deed” portrays the 
pilot’s immaterial labor overcoming the natural obstacles involved in steamboat navigation, 
then, “Racing Days” depicts this same labor becoming starkly corporeal again in the process of 
overcoming its own limits.  
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The denouement of “Racing Days,” stages the return trip, as it were, of the journey that 
began with “The Boy’s Ambition,” the first essay in a series of articles in The Atlantic 
Monthly, collectively titled “Old Times on the Mississippi,” which was later incorporated into 
the first half of Life on the Mississippi. The first installment of “Old Times” gave readers a 
glance behind the curtain and revealed the theatrical chicanery of the steamboatmen, thereby 
satirizing the rustic view of the steamboat as a fire deity and of the workers as its votaries. The 
final installment, conversely, not only exposes the shortcomings of the steamboats themselves, 
but reveals that under frontier conditions, the production of spectacle cannot so simply be 
superceded by the spectacle of production.8 Driving steamboatmen’s competencies beyond 
their normal uses exposes the limits of the steamboat system; likewise, the Dupin-like skill of 
the pilot breaks down when the demands of speed push the technical system to the limit. Under 
normal circumstances, that is, reading the river may seem to come automatically to the pilots, 
but reading is not in itself piloting. The river must be, as it were, written upon; and, the pilot’s 
skill notwithstanding, this writing is not always produced without effort. On the contrary, if it 
is produced at all, it is often produced haphazardly, laboriously, and inefficiently.  
Like Chevalier, Dickens, and Olmsted, then, Twain struggled to locate the steamboat 
within the process of the industrialization of spatiality. For Twain, the steamboat was both a 
self-sufficient, moving extension of eastern industrial efficiency and vigor, and a space where 
such power encountered an inherent limit. The steamboat was both an agent of capitalist 
spatial rationality and a space which registered the irrationality, the illusoriness, the stubborn 
conservatism of antebellum spatiality as a whole; it was a historical instrument of 
industrialized space, but not fully integrated into it. Moreover, while the steamboat system 
inaugurated the takeover of the West by the Northeastern capital, serving as both apparatus 
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and site of this process, American hybrid geographic spatiality was materially and multiply 
reproduced within the steamboat itself. Not only did the twin functions of the steamboat as 
“floating palace” and industrialized transport system come into conflict, but because the 
technical system of the steamboat evolved in the economically undeveloped conditions of the 
West, it could not be further developed without first improving its technosocial 
infrastructure—a development which, in turn (as the second part of Life on the Mississippi 
demonstrates), would render the steamboat obsolete.  
But if Twain saw the material disorganization of the western steamboat as an effect of the 
“piecemeal” human geography of the antebellum frontier, that same disorganization can by 
implication be read as a figure for the political contradictions of American spatiality before the 
war. Steamboats could ascend as well as descend the rivers of the Mississippi system, and 
thereby could exploit the natural routes of the Mississippi much better than the flatboats and 
keelboats that preceded them; but since the southbound trip was the primary profit-producing 
one when the steamboat system was inculcated, these routes were only profitable as long as 
capital investment was kept minimal. Steamboat traffic and tonnage increased rapidly up until 
the late 1840s, when development of the system stalled because further development required 
greater investment—investment of capital the steamboat operators lacked precisely because 
the steamboat system produced only meager and inconsistent surplus-value in the first place.9 
Consequently, the steamboat enterprise—along with ambiguously mediating the developed 
East and the underdeveloped West, as well as the domestic and international economies—also 
stood ambiguously between industrial capitalism and merchant capitalism. The steamboat, 
although superceding the keelboat and flatboat because of its industrially-enhanced speed and 
versatility, subtracted profits from the simple and unorganized arbitrage of haphazard, 
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varying, and fortuitous differences in geographically-dispersed surpluses. Olmsted’s anecdotes 
about the chaotic and inefficient scheduling and routing of the steamers attests to this 
dependence of the boats to arbitrage.  Similarly, Erik F. Haites, James Mak, and Gary M. 
Walton’s discussion of the steamboat’s “backhaulage problem” caused by “the unused space 
on the upstream voyage” (in turn caused by underdeveloped demand in the hinterland) (42) 
contrasts instructively with William Cronon’s elaboration of the many ways railroads, thirty 
years later, actively fostered both new industries and the capitalist rationalization of older ones 
in order to solve a similar predicament. Industrialized meat packing and refrigeration, the grain 
elevator and grading system, and the nationwide system of lumber distribution and 
standardized house construction all developed to exploit differential rates in eastbound and 
westbound traffic; these enterprises, however, presupposed a degree of both spatial flexibility 
and technical regularity impossible for the more environmentally-constrained steamers. 
But why, after all, did the steamboat system survive during the antebellum years? Why 
did it not simply develop, in the West, into a more unified rails-and-rivers system before the 
war, instead of afterward? One answer is that the reciprocal development of markets, transport 
systems, and industrial production were deliberately obstructed by the southern slaveowning 
oligarchy. Charles Sellers has written on the often paradoxical and incoherent matrix of 
aligned and opposed economic interests of southern planters and farmers at mid-century, 
writing that “planters supplemented cotton production for market with corn and hogs for 
plantation subsistence” while smallholders “supplanted production for subsistence with a few 
bales of cotton for taxes and modest store purchases” (408). Large planters, therefore, 
depended much more on advanced transportation systems, and, consequently, on the state-
funded “internal improvements” that supported them, than did upcountry white farmers. 
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However, there is a certain unity in this apparent opposition, which itself is not reducible to the 
simple one of bourgeois commodity producer and prebourgeois peasant. Despite their 
Jacksonian hostility to “internal improvements,” upcountry farmers became more and more 
dependent on reliable systems of transport as they moved to cheaper lands in the southwest; on 
the other hand, while slaveowners needed a way to get cotton from the alluvial interior to 
international ports without incurring prohibitive transaction costs, they strongly resisted the 
development of free labor, and hence any development of an internal commodity market or 
system of industrial production. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene D. Genovese argue that 
while middling antebellum whites occasionally produced cotton for sale, they resisted being 
drawn permanently “into the cotton economy at high social risk without [ . . . ] much in the 
way of financial returns” (256) and consequently “even resisted railroad development despite 
its apparent economic advantages” (253). The planters, for their part, “built their transportation 
systems colonial-style: it bound the staple-producing plantation districts to the ports and 
largely bypassed the upcountry. In general and by design, the system did not facilitate 
commodity exchange within a national or regional market” (50).  Both smallholders and 
planters, then, required precisely the kind of technosocial system represented by the 
steamboat—robust and fast enough both to facilitate the turnover of slaveowner’s capital and 
to serve the limited and intermittent needs of the smallholders, yet (as Cronon suggests) 
wholly unfitted to serve the needs of industrial development. Hence, although both Sellers and 
Adam I. Kane insist that the steamboat system accompanied and fostered a vast expansion of 
both immigration and commerce in the trans-Appalachian West (Sellers 131-132; Kane 16-
24), their analyses concur that (barring shipbuilding and associated trades) the production in 
the West under the steamboat regime was almost completely dominated by agriculture and 
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pre-capitalist and purely local or regional craft enterprises such as “gristmills, tanneries, and 
distilleries” along with the work of “blacksmiths, coopers, shoemakers, tailors, doctors, and 
lawyers” (Sellers 132). For both Kane and Sellers, the steamboat brought the “market 
revolution” to the West, but failed to bring either large-scale industrial production or the 
necessary influx of what Marx calls vogelfrei landless labor10. Conversely, railroad 
development in the North spurred the movement of both capital and free labor; as Sellers 
succinctly puts it, compared to the close technosocial fit between industrialized transport and 
vogelfrei labor, “[m]achinery agreed less well with slavery” (394). Like Fox-Genovese and 
Genovese, he points out that while subsistence practices “sustained southern resistance to 
market culture, scattered one-crop plantations generated much less year-round freight than 
diversified northern production” (392). If the steamboat was, as Sellers suggests, a courtier to 
King Cotton, the railway was allied to the “universal Yankee nation” (392-393); and while 
both systems were instruments in the conquest of the West by the East, the contest between the 
two in many ways was a foreshadowing of the American Civil War, fought on the terrain of 
technology. 
Spatiality under the domination of merchant capital, like merchant capital itself, appears 
simultaneously as one of the most advanced and anti-feudal elements of early capitalism and 
as one of the most arbitrarily intractable and archaic elements to be confronted by advanced 
industrial capital11. In “Old Times on the Mississippi,” the steamboat and its enlightened pilot 
seem like transitional phenomena and heralds of the future; but in Life on the Mississippi as a 
whole, they seem like a historical dead-end and failed experiment. If the steamboat was an 
agent of capitalist spatiality but not part of it, it was even more so because it was part of, was 
proper to, a régime of merchant capital—specifically, that of the cotton South. The cotton 
75  
 
 
South, dominated by the political preservation of chattel slavery and obstruction of “internal 
improvements” was, in turn, a place without a “place” in industrial capitalist spatiality, an 
absurdity integral to one stage of “rational” capital, but standing in the way of its further 
development. Accordingly, Twain’s own description of the antebellum South evokes the same 
kind of archaic, irrational heterogeneity as that of the steamboat itself: In the South,  
the genuine and wholesome civilization of the nineteenth century is 
curiously confused and commingled with the Walter Scott Middle-Age 
sham civilization and so you have practical, common-sense, progressive 
ideas, and progressive works, mixed up with the duel, the inflated speech, 
and the jejune romanticism of an absurd past that is dead, and out of charity, 
ought to be buried. (327)  
For Twain, if the steamboat, as a technical system, registered the heterogeneity and chaos of 
the antebellum East’s encounter with the antebellum frontier, it also stands as a metonymy of 
the South’s political resistance to both the deterritorializing power of industrial capital, broadly 
speaking, and “internal improvements” specifically12. And if the steamboat acted as a 
progressive—but flawed—instrument in the East-West encounter, it was flawed precisely 
because it mixed up “progressive works” and “jejune romanticism,” reflecting, in turn, the way 
antebellum economic spatiality was contaminated and paralyzed by the political interventions 
of the South. 
Accordingly, while the first part of Life on the Mississippi—or, rather, the parts 
constituting “Old Times”—deals largely with the steamboat, celebrating it but also revealing 
its grotesqueries and flaws, much of the second part is devoted to Twain’s critique of the 
artificiality and puerility of southern culture. Rather than seeing this difference as obstructing 
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the “unity” of the final book, I argue that this apparent heterogeneity encodes a resonance 
between the representation of the steamboat in the first half with the polemics against the 
South in the second. On one hand, the troubling and inherent flaw in the steamboat system, the 
intractable paradox that obstructs the heroic steamboatman’s struggle for simultaneous 
production, speed, and efficiency, turns out to have been not only the underdevelopment of the 
technosocial infrastructure, but also the underlying specifically southern political strategy of 
spatial underdevelopment. Scraping off the steamboat’s gilt to enhance its speed only reveals 
that, in its very materiality, the steamboat’s “genuine and wholesome” deterritorializing power 
is “curiously confused and commingled” with a political strategy of enforced territoriality. 
Conversely, the second part’s unrelenting attack on southern humbuggery and sham can be 
seen as an attempt to scrape the gilt off a system that in its very spatiality—like a disordered 
house, haphazardly built but ostentatiously decorated—irrationally and artificially impeded the 
development of the built environment of nineteenth-century America.  
 
Printing’s no bagatelle, I can tell you 
In Roughing It, Twain’s account of his time on the Far Western frontier, he writes of a 
nineteen-year-old telegraph operator who 
made himself rich by watching the mining telegrams that passed through his 
hands and buying and selling stocks accordingly, through a friend in San 
Francisco. Once when a private dispatch was sent from Virginia announcing 
a rich strike in a prominent mine and advising that the matter be kept secret 
till a large amount of the stock could be secured, he bought forty “feet” of 
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the stock at twenty dollars a foot and afterward sold half of it at eight 
hundred dollars a foot and the rest at double that figure. (330) 
Twain also narrates the story of another telegraph operator who, having been “discharged by 
the company for divulging the secrets of the office,” makes a deal with “a moneyed man in 
San Francisco to furnish him the result of a great Virginia mining lawsuit within an hour after 
its private reception by the parties to it in San Francisco.” The ex-telegrapher poses as a 
teamster and loiters around a “little wayside telegraph office in the mountains.” Finally he 
hears the encoded news about the disposition of the suit,  
and as soon as he heard it he telegraphed his friend in San Francisco,  
“Am tired waiting. Shall sell the team and go home.”  
It was the signal agreed upon. The word “waiting” left out, would have 
signified that the suit had gone the other way. The mock teamster’s friend 
picked up a deal of the mining stock, at low figures before the news became 
public, and a fortune was the result. (331) 
Despite the superficial resemblance these schemes bear to those of Silas Hawkins and Bariah 
Sellers in The Gilded Age, they have the distinguishing characteristic of being successful. 
Moreover, Twain himself seem to approve of these stratagems, asserting that “the community 
at large was as much benefited by their riches as [the men who planned and performed them] 
were themselves—possibly more, in some cases” (327). Arguably, what separates these 
“nabobs” from mere charlatans like Hawkins and Sellers is not so much personal merit as 
technosocial competence. The telegrapher’s special skill in coding and decoding, implicitly 
contrasted with credulous reliance on rumor or custom, legitimately makes them rich even if 
the specific path to wealth is illicit. Furhtermore, coding and decoding Morse Code is itself 
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labor; it materially participates in the work of the communications network. As a 
communications worker, the telegrapher’s function contrasts with Hawkins’s position as 
postmaster, which interrupts the propagation of information to the extent that it makes postal 
clients come to him for their mail. Twain, then, figures the difference between confidence 
game and what we might now call insider trading as a technosocial distinction between 
parasitism and mutualism. Twain approves of the ethics of the insider bonanza because it is a 
legitimate reward for having participated in the circulation of knowledge, rather than hoarding 
it. In the process, Twain’s nabobs also effect the spatial advance of technosocial networks of 
communications and transportation; men like Hawkins and Sellers, conversely, merely drift 
from point to point within it. 
Arguably, then, the racket that most clearly contrasts with the machinations of the 
telegraphers is Sellers’s comically elaborate plan for building the Salt Lick Extention of the 
Pacific Railroad. More accurately, Sellers plans to built a city ex nihilo in the route of the rail 
line being built by his crony Jeff Thompson. Twain’s joke, as it plays out throughout the 
novel, is that the success of the town depends on the arrival of the railroad, while the railroad 
itself has been layed out haphazardly so that it runs through every hamlet in which subscribers 
to the railroad can be found: 
[Thompson] did not bother himself much about details or practicabilities of 
location, but ran merrily along, sighting from the top of one divide to the 
top of another, and striking “plumb” every town site and big plantation 
within twenty or thirty miles of his route. In his own language he “just went 
booming.” (124) 
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This farcical way of planning railroads reflects Silas Hawkin’s fanciful, unscientific attitude 
toward spaces of mobility in the novel’s beginning. It also recalls the dismissive attitude 
Charles Francis Adams takes toward the South Carolina Railroad in Railroads: Their Origin 
and Problems. This is a kind of cargo-cult version of mobility, a burlesque in which people 
(like the real-estate speculators who are the implicit villains of The Plan of Chicago) scramble 
chaotically to make places important, rather than, like the wily telegraphers of Roughing It, 
profiting cannily from the new fluidity of spaces. Again, the Salt Lick scheme is both less and 
more than mobility: It proceeds from gross ignorance about technical “details or 
practicabilities,” but it booms along ludically nonetheless. Even Twain’s description of 
Thompson, whose main traits are bonhomie and drunken companionableness, evokes the name 
of the doomed South Carolina locomotive the Best Friend: 
There was nothing that Jeff wouldn’t do, to accommodate a friend, from 
sharing his last dollar with him, to winging him in a duel. When he 
understood from Colonel Sellers how the land lay at Stone’s Landing, he 
cordially shook hands with that gentleman, asked him to drink, and fairly 
roared out, “Why, God bless my soul, Colonel, a word from one Virginia 
gentleman to another is ‘nuff ced.’ There's Stone’s Landing been waiting 
for a railroad more than four thousand years and damme if she shan’t have 
it.” (117) 
If this portrait of the “engineer” were not enough of a regional grotesque, Twain goes to the 
very limit in making him a preposterous hybrid of thespian and scientist, of southerner and 
Yankee: As the railroad surveyors make camp for the evening, Thompson sings “the Star 
Spangled Banner from beginning to end” (121). Here, Twain makes Thompson a veritable 
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double of Twain’s own image of the steamboat in Life on the Mississippi, writing that “[i]t 
proved to be his nightly practice to let off the unexpended steam of his conversational powers 
in the words of this stirring song.” 
In the satire of the Salt Lick railroad plan, Twain equates failed mobile consciousness 
with inauthentic or incompetent literate practices. Perhaps the most sustained comic passage in 
the novel, one that comes literally in the middle of the book, is Sellers’s recherché slapstick 
explanation of the railroad scheme to his wife Polly. Sellers, calling the plan a “dead moral 
certaint[y]” to soothe her doubts, constructs an elaborate map for Polly out of various 
household utensils and tchotchkes: “‘For instance, call this waiter St. Louis.’” 
“And we’ll lay this fork (representing the railroad) from St. Louis to 
this potato, which is Slouchburg:  
“Then with this carving knife we’ll continue the railroad from 
Slouchburg to Doodleville, shown by the black pepper:  
“Then we run along the—yes—the comb—to the tumbler—that’s 
Brimstone: 
“Thence by the pipe to Belshazzar, which is the salt cellar: 
“Thence to, to—that quill—Catfish—hand me the pin-cushion, Marie 
Antoinette: 
“Thence right along these shears to this horse, Babylon:  
“Then by the spoon to Bloody Run—thank you, the ink:  
“Thence to Hail Columbia—snuffers, Polly, please—move that cup 
and saucer close up, that’s Hail Columbia:  
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“Then—let me open my knife—to Hark-from-the-Tomb, where we’ll 
put the candle-stick—only a little distance from Hail Columbia to Hark-
from-the-Tomb—downgrade all the way.  
And there we strike Columbus River—pass me two or three skeins of 
thread to stand for the river; the sugar bowl will do for Hawkeye, and the rat 
trap for Stone’s Landing—Napoleon, I mean and—you can see how much 
better Napoleon is located than Hawkeye. Now here you are with your 
railroad complete, and showing its continuation to Hallelujah, and thence to 
Corruptionville.  
“Now then—there you are! It's a beautiful road, beautiful. Jeff 
Thompson can out-engineer any civil engineer that ever sighted through an 
aneroid, or a theodolite, or whatever they call it—he calls it sometimes one 
and sometimes the other—just whichever levels off his sentence neatest, I 
reckon. But ain’t it a ripping road, though? I tell you, it’ll make a stir when 
it gets along. (194) 
This discourse continues along these line for the remainder of the chapter, Sellers continually 
putting forward ad hoc justifications for such things as spending a fortune for bridges over the 
Columbus River, even thought the railroad itself elsewhere meanders like a river. Much of the 
comedy here, though, comes from the equally arbitrary and heterogeneous material form of 
Sellers’s map. This, after all, is a spurious map of a spurious railroad. Like much of what 
Sellers, Thompson, and Brierly do here, it is theater posing as writing; and, inasmuch as this 
“map” contrasts directly with the mining maps that Philip Sterling uses in the Warner-penned 
chapters—prepared according to “the opinion of the best geologist [Sterling] could consult” 
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(361)—it also represents a specious kind of reading, based in fancy and wishful thinking, 
rather than science. 
If we read the critique of spatiality here in the light of the telegrapher anecdotes, we can 
provisionally observe a certain resonance between Twain’s ideas about writing—or what more 
accurately, following Lisa Gitelman, we should call inscription13—and contemporaneous 
discourses about mobility. Mobility, again, was for Twain’s contemporaries not just a matter 
of movement, but of “efficient,” reliable, and consistent movement. As I have argued, mobility 
is opposed both to stasis and to random, uncontrolled, or dangerous motion; in fact, mobility 
renders these two extremes as approximately the same thing. Twain seems to have a similar 
attitude toward mass inscription; material forms of writing can be vitiated either through 
privation or through spuriousness and excess. Writing of this link between mobility and 
inscription, Gitelman has examined the fact that Life on the Mississippi was one of the first 
book-length texts prepared entirely from either previously printed material or typescript. In 
Gitelman’s reading, Twain struggled to reproduce textually the experience of river navigation; 
she argues that typescript itself became a way for Twain to double the representational 
comprehensiveness of the painted panorama while simultaneously communicating the 
cognitive complexities of piloting steamboats. According to Gitelman, although Twain learned 
that “[t]he spatial literacies required by authors and printers are much different than those 
required of a riverboat pilot,” the former—unlike the theatrics of the panorama lecturer—were 
a legitimate way of making the latter fungible, of putting steamboat mobility into circulation 
after the historical fact of the steamboat (“Mississippi” 336). The textual encoding of 
typescript, that is, directly doubles the technical work of river transportation in a way that 
images (or at least images like the panorama whose material form depends on the fixity of the 
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theatrical backdrop) cannot. According to this logic, we might see the novel The Gilded Age as 
implicitly representing itself as a legitimate version of Sellers’s own illegitimate map; to the 
extent that the novel encodes on paper the distinctions between deceptive and truthful 
inscriptions in the years after the Civil War, it is, as it were, a true map of a false map. Because 
the novel makes such an issue of maps, however, it’s worth mentioning that the first 1873 
edition included a specially-printed centerfold insert illustration of Sellers’s kitchen diagram of 
the Salt Lick Branch (fig. 2). The map images are apparently taken from stock engravings or 
woodcuts, and there is no attempt to reconcile the scale of the various images or imply any 
sense of verisimilitude to their spatial organization. The “map” resembles a rebus, but an 
exaggeratedly heterogeneous one; hence, it is itself neither a true cartographic representation 
nor a meaningful text. The shift from narration to pictorial reproduction here presents a 
problem for any proposal that makes authorship—especially authorship as literally or 
figuratively typographic (or technologically mediated, in any case)—a means of doubling and 
even surpassing mobility. On one hand, the fold-out map moves the primary site of literary 
production from the author’s desk to the printer’s composing room; it circulates inscription 
even more directly than the process that moves manuscript to editor, back to author, back to 
editor, and finally to press. To that extent, it materializes the ideal of inscription as mobility. 
As an artifact that only exists in the world of inscription, it directly anticipates the means by 
which Gitelman says Twain submitted the manuscripts for Life on the Mississippi: “corrected 
tear sheets of his Atlantic Monthly articles as chapters 4 through 17, and for everything else [. . 
.] eight ‘batches’ of typescript” (“Mississippi” 329). Yet, to the extent that this image is a 
traditional illustration, it undermines the absolute authority of the printed text, giving us, as it 
were, a theatrical staging of the map scene. The difference between image and text, that is, 
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interrupts precisely the textual seamlessness that Gitelman argues Twain struggled to realize in 
Life on the Mississippi. Even the facts that the map is printed on special heavier stock, and that 
must be unfolded to be read, underscore the gross materiality of the book, reminding us that it 
is a thing that moves through the world, not—like the messages of the clever telegraphers—
merely encoded information. Arguably, then, the book, by materially doubling what it wants to 
satirize, becomes the kind of thing it is satirizing. Thereby, it challenges the idea of an 
authorship based purely on the navigation of the spatiality of texts. 
The problems of mobile competence as a model for authorship appear again in the final 
installment of the original memoir “Old Times on the Mississippi.” Even as Twain comes to 
the conclusion of his original memoir, he also encounters another limit—that of the nostalgic, 
picaresque, and comic Bildungsroman. In the last Atlantic Monthly essay, much of the 
narrative of personal experience and tutelage under men like Brown and Bixby disappears, 
replaced by a much more distanced historiographic, journalistic, and ethnographic kind of 
writing. More specifically, the qualitative shift in the mode of narratorial distancing in the 
essay “Racing Days” implies and adumbrates the shift between the original Atlantic Monthly 
articles and the chapters added to form the book Life on the Mississippi. For not only does 
Twain begin to abandon either direct experience or the tradition handed down by Bixby in 
favor or reporting what “was said” anonymously by steamboatmen and river dwellers in 
general, but he also begins to rely much more on historical research and textual citation. For 
most of “Old Times,” Twain’s experience as a pilot authorizes him as a narrator, and the 
mixture of admiration for, and ironic distance from, the steamboats and their workers arises 
from the contrast between the perspective of the young, naïve Clemens and that of the older, 
experienced one. “Racing Days,” conversely, anticipates the later writing by deriving its 
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authority from textual competence, as Twain either confirms or challenges what “was said” by 
appealing to what was written; more importantly, while Twain’s authority as a pilot derived 
from his direct filial connections to Bixby (a filial alliance, by implication, against Brown), 
Twain’s new recourse to inscription allows him to play one printed source against another, as 
when in chapter XXVII, “Some Imported Articles,” he uses various passages from earlier 
travel narratives to demonstrate that although personal aesthetic impressions of the river may 
differ, “in certain of its aspects the Mississippi has undergone no change” since the colonial 
and antebellum periods. Accordingly, Lawrence Howe has suggested that this process of 
shifting “value from actual to textual experience” allows Twain to perform a form of authorial 
self-invention in the mode of Franklin or Douglass by establishing his own voice as a literary 
author in opposition to those of the experienced pilots (421). I would argue that the book, 
however, also anxiously wrestles with the possibility that the material forms of inscription in 
the nineteenth century—writing as such, the institutional apparatus of the publishing industry, 
and the actual circulation of printed material—tend to undermine the very possibility of 
authorial self-fashioning. Even in some of his earliest works, that is, Twain often finds that the 
very networks of circulation that challenge the antebellum craft model of authorship also 
fragment and undermine all claims to authority about any spatiality at all. 
In the second half of Life on the Mississippi, Twain makes a generic switch from 
memoirist to travel writer, recounting his return to the river as a passenger in the spring of 
1882. If Twain establishes his authority on “textual experience” here, he also focuses on 
textuality itself as evidence of the way the South in particular has overcome its feudal, 
merchant-capital, spatially-limited past. For example, Twain is at pains to praise the 
newspapers of New Orleans. Writing that newspapers were “not a striking feature” of 
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antebellum New Orleans, Twain insists that New Orleans now “get[s] the new, cost what it 
may” and that an 1882 contained “forty pages; seven columns to the page; two hundred eighty 
columns in all; fifteen hundred words to the column; an aggregate of four hundred and twenty 
thousand words”—almost, Twain adds, “three times as many words” as in Life on the 
Mississippi itself (303). Yet, Twain also contends that postbellum New Orleans “editorial 
work is not hack-grinding, but literature.” This claim on the part of “literature” and against 
“hack-grinding” would seem incongruous alongside his praise of the purely quantitative and 
economic fecundity of New Orleans’s news industry, if it were not for the implicit argument 
throughout Life on the Mississippi that “hack-grinding” is to be condemned not for its 
industrial or capitalist origins, but for the way it hijacks textual productivity in the name of 
shopworn rhetoric and cant. The glowing praise of New Orleans’s journalists in the second 
part of the book can be contrasted with the first part’s odd depiction of the distribution of 
“religious tracts” by antebellum steamboat clerks (103-104). Clerks, writes Twain, exploited 
the scarcity of printed matter on the river to propagate the faith to “small-fry rascals,” the 
crews of keelboats and flatboats taking advantage of the spring floodwaters. Scarcity of text, 
resulting from the backward state of production and distribution, turns this scene into a parody 
of medieval religion, the clerks disseminating religious doctrine ex cathedra, as it were, and 
playing jackleg bishop to the pilot’s king. Here again, the grotesque comedy arises from the 
archaic and premodern “mixed up with” the progressive and enlightened, from medieval and 
superstitious practices imposed on nineteenth-century literacy by spatial underdevelopment.  
Twain, then, praises textual productivity as an antidote for the persistence of literary 
commonplace and cant while hailing the abolition the privilege of place (both literally and 
socially speaking) by technical means; hence the fulsome acclaim for the coming of the 
87  
 
 
railroad, which, along with streetcars and sanitary sewers, has simultaneously inaugurated a 
more national spatiality in such places as St. Louis, Natchez, and New Orleans and begun to 
flush out the last remains of stagnant premodern culture. Twain makes this linking of 
inscriptive and spatial fluidity and fecundity even more explicit with his attack on the railway 
pass in Chapter XL, “Castles and Culture.” The passage criticizing the of distribution of 
“dead-head passes” as (tacit) bribes to influential passengers revives, once again, the specter of 
a rigidly hierarchical and inefficient medievalism by labeling the bribe-takers “objects of 
charity,” “chattel,” and the “railroad company’s pauper[s]” (298). Decrying the “quite 
common” practice of “(otherwise) respectable Americans [begging] for passes, Twain then 
conjures a railway image of “one, or two, or half a dozen, well-dressed and well-appearing 
persons exhibit[ing] to the conductor” their passes, all the while abjectly enduring the 
official’s “searching questions.” Evoking the earlier scene of the distribution of religious tracts 
by the river clerks to the wretched boatmen, this passage portrays railroad passengers as 
debased recipients of the scarce paper held by the railroads. Seemingly going against the grain 
of the book’s stark contrasts of pre- and postwar spatiality, it suggests that railroad passes 
reinscribe an archaic and foreign social hierarchy within the otherwise inherently progressive 
railroad system.  
However, in The Gilded Age, Twain made the railroad itself a metonymy for both 
corruption and the kind of humbug associated in the later book with antebellum spatiality, and, 
by implication, with the “gilded” steamboats. Much of the satire in The Gilded Age, in fact, is 
aimed at corrupt “internal improvements” schemes designed to swindle the federal 
government. Moreover, textual production figures much more ambiguously here. Besides 
ridiculing both the railroad pass and religious journalism as vehicles for corrupt politics—used 
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respectively as bribes and pious “uplift” whitewash for pork and boondoggles—Twain 
explicitly singles out the proliferation of printed material as a corrupt practice. When the 
wayward and incompetent “engineer” Henry Briarly—who has already made good use of 
fraudulent and fanciful maps, charts, petitions, and “a copper-plate card with ‘Engineer-in-
Chief’ on it” (197) to help secure a Congressional appropriation for his river improvement 
scheme—visits the offices of the Columbus River Slack-Water Navigation Company in an 
attempt to draw funds for the operations at Stone’s Landing, he is told that the funds have been 
used up by printing costs. Among the printed materials used to swindle Congress and investors 
are “‘your maps, your tinted engravings, your pamphlets, your illuminated show cards, your 
advertisements in a hundred and fifty papers at ever so much a line” (200). Likewise, when an 
imperious railroad conductor ejects Henry’s virtuous friend Philip Sterling from a train for the 
offense of coming to the aid of an insulted woman passenger, a local paper’s report about 
incident seems preposterously skewed in favor of the railroad, calling the unassuming Philip a 
“young sprig from the East” and describing the boorish conductor as “gentlemanly and 
efficient” (209). The polemic against railway passes in Life, then, resurrects the earlier text’s 
broad skepticism about the railroads. Moreover, if Life seems to treat literary production as a 
kind of corrosive against the corrupting gilt of humbug and medievalism, Age finds no 
contradiction between the two; in the earlier book, sham and theater are everywhere the 
printed word is—not just in the pages of Sir Walter Scott.  If the railway pass diatribe comes 
as an exception to the general optimism of the second part of Life, it fits perfectly with the 
tenor of Age, which treats corruption and fraud as atavistic evils unmitigated by the 
progressive teleology of the later writing. 
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However, the markers of realist authenticity in Twain’s own textual practices in Life on 
the Mississippi also differ somewhat from those of The Gilded Age. In spite of its collaborative 
production, The Gilded Age represents itself as a unified fiction; the novel is a Dickensian 
social-realist satire with a clear beginning, middle and, end. Life on the Mississippi, 
conversely, is an autobiographical memoir putatively dominated by a unified narratorial voice; 
yet unlike The Gilded Age, it fairly revels in its own formal heterogeneity. Not only was the 
text as a whole produced piecemeal over a period of years, but the individual parts—especially 
in the second half—rely largely on quoted voices and texts. Arguably, this strategy of citation 
and documentation finds both its ultimate and most paradoxical expression in the inclusion of 
a “fac-simile” of the railroad pass itself. Here, Twain goes beyond the authority of citation, 
documentation, and textual interpretation and dissemination. The image of the railroad pass is 
not text about the pass, or even a pre-existing text cited and brought into combination with 
others; the image, on one level, is the thing itself. Yet, a “fac-simile” is by definition not the 
thing itself, but a reproduction—a mechanical reproduction and not a representation. The 
image of the pass in “Castles and Culture” is neither a writing about passes, nor a legitimate 
pass, nor a counterfeit pass; like the fingerprints that figure so prominently in both an earlier 
chapter of Life and Pudd’nhead Wilson, it is a material trace—emphatically printing and not 
writing—that blurs the distinction between text and thing. In fact, Twain’s use of the 
productivity of the printing press to disseminate the image resembles the way an attorney or 
reporter might distribute an incriminating photo among the public or a jury as evidence of a 
criminal or corrupt act. Not only do material traces provide direct evidence of hidden crimes, 
but the very act of reproducing the trace retrospectively establishes a distinction between the 
honest inscriptive labor of the reproducer and the covert and shamming practice of the author. 
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Just as Warner has the celebrity lawyer Braham in The Gilded Age introduce the letters of 
Major Lackland as material evidence in support of his otherwise sensationalistic and 
sentimental insanity defense of Laura Hawkins, producing a material trace can establish good 
faith, demonstrating that impartial, objective, and rational detective work has led to an account 
of events (397). Moreover, the image of the pass, is freely available, like a ticket, to anyone 
who has the cover price of a copy of The Gilded Age. Conversely, the pass itself, marked, as 
Twain points out, “‘Account of Supreme Court,’” is also explicitly marked as not transferable, 
and good only “when countersigned by J.H. PHYFE” (298). These proper names, which overtly 
attest to the infungible character of the pass, also make the pass a contract establishing a covert 
and personal yet hierarchic relation between the railroad operator and the bearer.  But image of 
the pass, like a copy of Life on the Mississippi, is infinitely fungible, which means that no 
imperious agent of Twain will ask the reader “a string of searching questions” establishing the 
right to either the book’s use value or its exchange value. 
In simply exhibiting the trace of the paper instrument of the corrupt railway pass, then, 
Twain reaches the ne plus ultra of his authorial strategy in the 1882 chapters of Life on the 
Mississippi. For, as Twain goes beyond producing a rhetorical text to producing the evidence, 
the trace, of the thing itself, he simultaneously seems to announce his own labor as the honest 
production of a fungible good and as not (corporeal) labor at all. In simply placing before our 
eyes the image of the railway pass, Twain makes his own work infinitely available, as if to 
ensure his own personal accountability for the value of the book; on the other hand, Twain’s 
labor, to the extent that it is not rhetoric, does nothing more than divert the material trace from 
its normal and otherwise automatic path from printing plate to bearer. More properly speaking, 
the trace usually follows an automatic path, like a regular ticket; but when such a path is 
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interrupted by the intervention of the railway official J. H. Phyfe, who arbitrarily determines 
who can and cannot be a bearer of the pass, a personal, artificial, and feudal hierarchy is 
imposed on what ought to be a matter of markets and exchange. Twain, then, merely restores 
the inherent and “natural” iterativity to the image, returning it to free circulation; he therefore 
performs the ideology that he wants to advocate—that, as we would say today, information 
wants to be free (even if books and tickets want to be paid for). It is a game of one-upsmanship 
with printing presses, with Twain cannily performing the keen detective work of sorting the 
data into signal and noise and transmitting the former.  
Here, the space of textual production becomes the “control room”—the antecedent to the 
hacker’s workstation, the spy’s listening post, the scientific crime lab—that the steamboat’s 
pilot house ought to have been, but could not be because of the limits to the pilot’s control 
over the apparatus as well as the physical limits to the steamboat’s speed and geographical 
range. Michel de Certeau calls this space the “nowhere of paper” (135) in front of which 
“every child is put in the position of the industrialist, the urban planner, the Cartesian 
philosopher” (134). But while de Certeau writes of “trac[ing] on the page trajectories that 
sketch out words, sentences, and finally a system,” Twain in his railway pass polemic 
experiments with going beyond composing words and sentences to directly presenting the 
things that bear the “compositions” of others—directly intervening in the system by reordering 
it materially. This idea, then, presupposes not just the “paper nowhere” of generalized literacy 
or even the mercantile basis for the dissemination of printed matter, but the technical means 
for the mass production of texts. Moreover, since this control-room labor simply intervenes in 
a process that is otherwise fully automatic (save the corrupt intervention of the railway 
official), it becomes a kind of reading that is immediately writing; it is intellectual labor with 
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immediate material consequences. It becomes precisely the kind of work that characterizes 
Lukacs’s specialized virtuoso, a kind of cybernetic mastery that imagines itself as somehow 
both utterly outside the system of fixed hierarchies (like that between the pass’s bearer and J. 
H. Phyphe) and infinitely able to act within it. Finally, this kind of labor goes beyond the labor 
of the steamboat pilot by occupying a virtual social place that is itself infinitely fungible; 
conversely, while the pilot contributes to the production of motion, his place in the division of 
labor is doubly limited by the same factors that limit the steamboat itself. Howard Horwitz has 
written that in the first part of Life, this kind of automaticity is in fact ascribed to piloting 
itself: “Piloting interpretation is work that is not work, mastery that is ease, power that is 
effortlessness” (256). However, as we have already seen, Life challenges this very ideology, 
showing pilot’s labor to be automatic interpretation that fails to realize itself as production; the 
pilot’s reading is automatic, but it is not automatic writing. Twain’s detective work in the 
matter of the railroad pass, however, overcomes this limitation. If, as Edgar J. Burde writes, 
“writing is [Twain’s] substitute for piloting” (881), he also seems not only to want to give his 
readers an imaginative steamboat surpassing the real one, but he also seems to strive to 
produce a book—with is name inscribed upon it—that can do things and go places the 
steamboat could not. In fact, what Twain wants is to make a book that, unlike the inscriptive 
productions of some contemporary southern authors, will have more than a “slight 
currency”—with all of that word’s implications of both exchange and fluency (Life 328). 
Twain, that is, wants to have his name affixed to a book that will “[go] upon crutches no 
longer, but upon wings” which will “carry it swiftly all about America and England, and 
through the great English reprint publishing houses of Germany” (328-329), like the books of 
Joel Chandler Harris and George Washington Cable. The well-written book—the book 
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stripped of “mediæval chivalry-silliness”—will work on its own, or in conjunction with the 
presses, without any help from the author himself, who works by paring away and combining, 
not by adding material. Twain’s language of mobility and speed facilitated by the literal 
operation of the printing press here suggests that scraping away the drag and friction—the 
gilding—from writing will streamline inscription itself, allowing its iteration to become 
authentically productive. 
For a moment, at least, it seems as if Twain has found a way to resolve the problem of 
inscriptive proliferation as it appears in The Gilded Age; the humbug and counterfeit 
propagated by means of paper are to be countered by yet more paper. Not simply text instead 
of experience, nor merely a pragmatic and objective way of reading instead of a romantic and 
sentimental one—but a kind of efficiency and automaticity of textual production itself, an 
authorship located more in the virtual space of the flowchart than the imaginary space of 
theater. Invention rather than dramaturgy, and scientific management more than either, seem to 
be Twain’s models. By a kind of reflexive turn, Twain works here not only to represent, but to 
instantiate, the replacement of the production of spectacle by the spectacle of production. 
However, problems nonetheless begin to appear later in the book, anticipating the resurgent 
skepticism of A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court and, especially, Pudd’nhead 
Wilson.  Much of the time, this skepticism is only hinted at, and even disavowed. An example 
is one of the first chapters added to the original “Old Times” sketches for the 1883 book, 
Chapter XXIV, “My Incognito Is Exploded.” Here, Twain poses as an eastern naïf in order to 
elicit from the pilot of the Gold Dust the kinds of tall tales he himself must have told 
passengers as a pilot. Twain writes in knowing judgment of the young pilot’s “tranquil spool 
of lies” (178), wondering patronizingly if the pilot “was going to rupture his invention” but 
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admitting that his pretense “always stood the strain, and he pulled through all right” (179). If, 
in the first part of the book, Twain pits the pilot as the cosmopolitan against the overawed 
rubes of the backcountry, here he tries at first to preserve the scheme by inverting it. Twain, as 
a new kind of privileged interpreter, takes the pilot himself as a quaint rustic whose speech can 
be profitably converted into regional humor. However, the Gold Dust pilot turns the tables on 
Twain by revealing that he has known all along about Twain’s imposture:  
“Here!” (calling me by name), “you take her and lie a while—you’re 
handier at it than I am. Trying to play yourself for a stranger and an 
innocent!—why, I knew you before you had spoken seven words; and I 
made up my mind to find out what was your little game. It was to draw me 
out. Well, I let you, didn’t I? Now take the wheel and finish the watch; and 
next time play fair, and you won’t have to work your passage.” (183) 
The humor of the pilot’s re-reversing the positions of Twain’s “game” is not the whole story, 
however. Certainly, Twain is upstaged by the pilot; but Twain’s mistake is in underestimating 
both the pilot’s literary competence and the ubiquity of his own reputation. In an uncanny way, 
his literary product has, by iterating itself beyond all limits, obstructed his ability to perform 
the masquerade that allows him to gather the raw material for his next book, a masquerade 
now necessary because he is neither an anonymous eastern journalist nor (any longer) a pilot. 
However, the game of one-upsmanship here cannot be settled by recourse to a privileged place 
of knowing, because both men are equally well positioned to benefit from “textual 
experience.” A literate regional subject like the Gold Dust pilot, who can parody the expected 
role of the exaggerating steamboatman precisely because this stereotyped has been so 
thoroughly disseminated by the book industry, has already combined the competencies of 
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direct experience and ironic citationality. Moreover, while Twain derives literary value from 
the anecdote, he does so only by ironically representing his own distance from “life on the 
Mississippi” and irrevocably and indefinitely perpetuating the process by which his authority 
shifts from “direct” to “textual” experience; paradoxically, he thereby continues the erosion of 
his privileged place as a local informant among his (potential) market competitors, even as 
textual competence itself was to have compensated for the loss of the value of his 
steamboatman’s knowledge. 
The game of one-upsmanship here ends in a stalemate that threatens Twain’s own 
position as a privileged interpreter of both the frontier and antebellum American history. Not 
long after his encounter with the Gold Dust pilot, Twain sees a steamer named for himself; the 
incongruence of this observation and the half-hearted attempt at humor by which he tries to 
justify it highlight Twain’s ambivalence about “this species of honor” and amplify the ironic 
flavor of the earlier episode. Here we see Twain’s name being “carr[ied] all about America,” 
proliferating seemingly automatically. The steamboat bearing his name is both evidence and 
agent of the marketplace success of Twain’s books. At the same time, however, the material 
form of the name also literally associates the name “Twain” with the riverboat, and hence to 
the antiquated riverboat system. The steamboat rewrites Twain’s nostalgia while diluting the 
force of his satire, suggesting that the market success of a book is not the same thing as 
communicative effectiveness. As the anecdote of the Gold Dust pilot shows how Twain’s role 
as a privileged realist interpreter has been undermined by the widespread dissemination of 
realist ways of knowing, the story of the steamboat Mark Twain reveals the degree to which 
market success can work to limit the ways a book can be read. 
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We know Twain was ambivalent about these possibilities. Although he frequently and 
vigorously polemicized against the power of public opinion, even arguing that (in contrast to 
the steamboat pilot) “writers of all kinds are manacled servants of the public” (Life 122), he 
also embraced the theatricality and notoriety of his public authorship, indeed earning much of 
his celebrity as a man of letters not from the books themselves, but from the lecture circuit. 
Twain’s fictions, however, reveal a great deal of anxiety about the literary mode of presenting 
the body and voice as a trace of experience, as opposed to producing textual traces of the 
world. After Twain praises Joel Chandler Harris’s fiction for its potential to go “upon wings,” 
for example, he nevertheless recounts that Harris “deeply disappointed” a group of children at 
a public appearance by being white—that is, by not being Uncle Remus (330). On the other 
hand, Twain himself repeatedly calls Harris “Uncle Remus” in Life on the Mississippi and 
points out what an “easy trick” it was for him and Cable to vocally perform their own texts for 
the young audience. The choice Twain, Cable, and Harris face here is either to perform to 
public expectations or to be effaced in favor of those expectations. These authors, who strive 
to overcome the institutional and spatial limitations of a theatrical model of authorship by 
adopting the Lukac’s ideal of the specialized (texual) virtuoso—the journalist-detective-
technician—find themselves trapped by their audience’s reception, and by the need to have a 
reception which marks their textual competence as successful, thereby confirming the market 
value of their work.  
As early as The Gilded Age, Twain hinted at the difficulty of keeping these two models 
apart, of distinguishing between success in the “nowhere of paper” and the social world of 
fixed roles, theatricality, and traditional narratorial techniques. In Age, the scheming ingénue 
Laura Hawkins uses a fragment of Congressman Trollop’s own speech—supposedly written 
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by her covertly, but in fact written by her friend Mr. Buckstone—to procure the congressman’s 
cooperation in the Knobs Industrial University bill. Much as Twain uses the railroad 
company’s own paper ephemera to confront the railroad’s practices, Laura turns the 
congressman’s hired speech against him, threatening to embarrass him by simply 
disseminating the incriminating fragment. However, only Laura’s successful performance as 
bonne vivante and coquette gives her access to the inner workings of Congress in the first 
place, and her inscriptive schemes, in the end, seem to serve no other purpose than to allow her 
to continue that performance; if Laura works almost effortlessly to expose humbug, to turn its 
traces back on itself, she herself is almost as much of a fraud as her sponsor, Beriah Sellers. In 
The Gilded Age, writing is so corrupt that even the mere production of traces, even while 
performing its corrosive work on sham and humbug, must, in the last instance participate in 
the economy of fraud. Hence, even when the newspapers reporting on Laura’s shooting of her 
betrayer, the Confederate Colonel Selby, confine themselves to the simple collation of facts of 
the crime—including “diagrams illustrating the scene of the shooting, and views of the hotel 
and street, and portraits of the parties” (333) along with “encyclopaedic information about 
other similar murders and shootings” (334)—they serve the purposes of hokum, which in this 
case means the refiguring of this information onto sentimental, theatrical, or mythic and 
pseudo-erudite narratives. This contradiction extends to the courtroom scenes themselves; for 
if the theatrical celebrity lawyer Braham must produce the traces of the Lackland 
correspondence in order to demonstrate his theory of Laura’s congenital madness, his 
presentation to the jury must rely on sensationalism and the topos of “tragedy” to convince the 
jury (391-392). Consequently, the meaning of the clearest material evidence produced by 
Braham—the Lackland letters suggesting a congenital (as we would say, genetic) 
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predisposition to madness—is actually obscured in his presentation to the jury. In other words, 
the letters make inherited insanity a plausible material cause of Laura’s behavior, but the 
proliferation of “efficient” causes for the murder—explosion of the steamboat Amaranth that 
separated her from her parents, her betrayal by Selby, the encouragement of the jealous Harry 
Brierly—reduce the letters to one element in a confusing mix of the plausible and implausible, 
retrospectively seeming to have confirmed, to the satisfaction of the law, the implication that 
Laura inherited madness from her natural father, but making the insanity defense itself rely on 
a narrative that makes Laura a melodramatic heroine.  
The problem for the jury in Laura’s trial is to determine whether madness drove Laura 
Hawkins to kill Col Selby; the equally vexing problem for the reader, on the other hand, is 
teasing out the knots of reasoning and imagination that actually convinces the jury to acquit. 
Courts of law, writes de Certeau, are precisely the kind of place where the “paper nowhere” 
intersects the real social world: 
In order for the law to be written on bodies, an apparatus is required 
that can mediate the relations between the former and the latter. From the 
instruments of scarification, tattooing, and primitive initiation to those of 
penal justice, tools work on the body. [ . . . ] Today the instruments range 
from the policeman’s billyclub to handcuffs and the box reserved for the 
accused in the courtroom. These tools compose a series of objects whose 
purpose is to inscribe the force of the law on its subject, to tattoo him in 
order to make him demonstrate the rule, to produce a “copy” that makes the 
norm legible. This series forms an in-between; it borders on the law (it is 
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the law that provides it with weapons) and it aims at the body (in order to 
mark it). (141) 
De Certeau, however, might have added that this corporeal inscriptive process itself mediates 
between the social imaginary of winners, losers, victims, and villains, and the purely symbolic 
realm of circulation, equivalence, and accumulation of things. Writing itself bears an operation 
in both these registers and intervenes on both sides, as inscription and as well as narration; 
writing is also intervened in from both sides. It can either be interpreted, troped, summarized, 
explained, or it can be encoded, edited, concealed, displayed, copied, and recorded; it can be 
made to both mean differently and do differently. According to de Certeau’s reasoning, trials 
“[refer] on one side to the symbolic corpus and on the other to carnal beings”; but trials also 
make “carnal beings,” by either imprisoning them or by setting them free, refer on one side to 
facts and, on the other, to narrations. Nor can this process come to an end; for the real 
“arbitrary” choice to either set free or incarcerate—a choice based on ascribing a coherent 
interpretation to the inconclusive facts—becomes, in turn, a fact caught in a fantasmatic net. 
This is, in fact, exactly what happens in The Gilded Age. The jury’s choice to set Laura free 
retrospectively validates Braham’s insanity defense; the trail also produces the immediate 
transference of the audience’s positive imaginary identification to Braham himself, to his 
heroic defense. It is as if the public imagination of Laura as a woman driven mad by Selby’s 
villainy is cancelled by her public acquittal—an acquittal based, at least technically, on her 
unsound mental state, not her victimization. This cancellation simultaneously bars Laura from 
resuming her career as a manipulative ingénue (because the “fact” of the madness behind the 
performance has been exposed) and makes her guilt an open question again (because the “real 
meaning” of those facts is open to interpretation). As far as the law is concerned, Braham’s 
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defense robs Laura of her capacity for either guilt or innocence because it “essentializes” her 
captivating mercuriality as pathology (if not guilt); at the same time, the theatricality of this 
defense allows this mercuriality to persist in the public imagination as an oscillation between a 
judgment of guilt and one of innocence. As Twain has really become a quaint relic of the 
steamboat era, as Harris has really become Uncle Remus, Laura has really become either a 
scheming murderess or a helpless victim, the oscillation between the two now completely out 
of her control.  
Laura Hawkins’s story in The Gilded Age demonstrates the risk of being arrested in the 
social, hierarchical world, despite exercising inscriptive competence in the “nowhere of 
paper”—precisely because value only becomes property in the social imaginary. The 
possibility of owning what is “won” presupposes the risk of being “owned,” of being assigned 
a place, of becoming fixed and named. Laura’s fate reflects, perhaps, Twain’s anxiety over 
being associated too closely , through a kind of typecasting, with the very rubes and 
confidence men he satirized. On the other hand, if Laura represents the possibility of becoming 
limited by celebrity, a possibility suggested by the encounter with the steamboat Mark Twain 
in Life, the steamboat episode in the later book also evokes the opposite problem—that of 
being unable to realize the value of literary labor, not because of the limits of its agency, but 
because of the dilution of its value by the fecundity of inscriptive production. In one case, the 
author and inscription are too closely and irrevocably tied; in the other, the restless motion of 
inscription, the logic of its political economy, obliterates its ties to authors.  This second case 
is illustrated by “The Pilot’s Monopoly,” Chapter XV of Life on the Mississippi. Here, Twain 
explains how river pilots sought to ameliorate the rigors of their work by training “cubs,” or 
apprentices, to share the work of steering riverboats. This practice, in turn, led to a glut of 
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trained labor on the Mississippi: “[T]his growing swarm of new pilots presently began to 
undermine the wages [of pilots] in order to get berths. Too late—apparently—the knights of 
the tiller perceived their mistake” (129). The proliferation of noisy information—characterized 
by ominously catastrophic language like “swarm” and “undermine”—resembles the similar 
proliferation of facts about the Selby murder in Age, and the pilots’ difficulty in interpreting 
those facts repeats the problem of Laura’s jury. Moreover, the rhetoric of the pilots’ realizing 
their predicament “[t]oo late” suggests the atavism of the epistemological techniques of the 
“knights of the tiller,” undermining the sense of the pilots as privileged interpreters. The pilots 
disastrously misread the economic currents that both resemble and differ from the river 
currents.  
Much as hard-won experience teaches the pilot how to read the river, however, this 
experience has a similar heuristic effect on the way they read their own economic 
circumstances. Twain recounts a scheme executed by the boatmen to found a trade union—a 
union that initially seems to fail until the end of the slow summer shipping season, when 
“business doubled and tripled, and an avalanche of Missouri, Illinois, and Upper Mississippi 
boats came pouring down to take a chance at the New Orleans trade,” and shipping companies 
are forced to hire affiliated pilots (130). “The laugh was beginning to turn the other way, now” 
(131), writes Twain, and although some shippers continue to uses cheaper unorganized labor, 
the pilots’ “association” eventually enact “a rule that its members should never, under any 
circumstances whatever, give information about [the condition of the river] channel to any 
‘outsider’” (131-132).  The promulgation of this rule means that if the “association” cannot 
immediately monopolize labor, they can pool their resources in a way the unorganized pilots 
cannot: “The [affiliated] pilot who had formerly been obliged to put up with seeing a shoal 
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place once or probably twice a month, had a hundred sharp eyes to watch it for him now, and 
bushels of intelligent brains to tell him how to run it” (133). By reducing wages, ship owners 
used their better understanding of the shifting labor market to subordinate the pilots and their 
craft knowledge of the vicissitudes of the river and its channels. The pilots, in turn, turn the 
tables on their employers—who are taken off guard by the “avalanche” of traffic in the 
summer season—by developing an informational network—“a hundred sharp eyes” connected 
to “bushels of intelligent brains”—to distribute knowledge of the river, essentially socializing 
and industrializing their erstwhile purely local and personal knowledges. According to a 
standard reading of this passage, the pilots temporarily beat the owners at their own game, but 
at the cost of (again) undermining both the feudal structure and the corporeal immediacy of the 
pilot’s craft. According to Horwitz, “[s]ince it organized informal cooperation into an efficient 
network of communication, and thus streamlined communication between water and pilot, the 
Association insured individual control over property, thereby enabling Twain to imagine the 
pilot as an absolute monarch, or even a super-regal authority” (259). However, unlike the 
authority of the traditional, guild-like, and filiative piloting institution, writes Burde, “the 
power of the association is collective and economic rather than personal and moral”; 
moreover, the Association “depend[s] upon a power greater than theirs to defeat the boat 
owners—that of the insurance underwriters” (884). Consequently, “[w]ith individual talent 
having thus been replaced by economic institutions as the chief source of authority in 
piloting,” the celebrated independence of the pilot is itself defeated by a necessary 
collectivization of steamboat labor. Where Horwitz sees the matter of the Association as the 
location of an aporia in Twain’s rhetoric—ascribing independence promiscuously to 
techniques of collectivization—Burde sees the passage as expressing anxiety over the 
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confounding of “the power of intuitive knowledge and the corresponding sovereignty of the 
individual” (884). 
Burde and Horwitz, then, have identified the fundamental ambiguity in this passage—
Twain’s simultaneous praising of the Association as an instrument of independence and 
description of it as corrosive of the traditions that had hitherto maintained that independence—
as either a personal ambiguity or a rhetorical inconsistency. In fact, however, whatever 
inadvertent contradictions we ascribe to Twain, Twain himself identifies the textual strategies 
of the Association as both technically and socially contradictory, and even implies that these 
contradictions were partially to blame for the making the “association and the noble science of 
piloting [ . . . ] things of the dead and pathetic past” (137). Burde and Horwitz both overlook 
the fact that the game of privileged information had two technical components: the ruled and 
columned “blanks” used to record pilots’ observation as formalized data, and the system of 
locked strongboxes, to which only Association members possessed keys, in which these forms 
were cached. The first element of the scheme, by inaugurating a “nowhere of paper,” 
deterritorializes the pilot’s interpretive work—first by splitting the place of interpretation 
between the busy pilot-house and the tranquil wharfboats where the strongboxes were kept, 
and secondly by breaking down the interpretation itself into the material production 
quantitative data—inscriptions—and qualitative observations. The “‘report’ system” (134) 
thereby not only collectivizes “a hundred sharp eyes” and “bushels of intelligent brains,” but in 
practice trains eyes and brains to work in new ways, allowing brains to sort out the work of 
other brains and eyes and reinterpret the information anew. This element of the “‘report’ 
system” facilitates the technical mastery of piloting; the strongboxes, however, reterritorialize 
the data, limiting the number of eyes that can read the forms. The strongboxes perform the 
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same function as the “countersignature” on the railway pass: It makes infungible, scarce, and 
unique something that ought to be—and is, in its very materiality—fungible and iterable. The 
belief that this system of locked strongboxes would reterritorialize data as property by 
confining the iteration of inscriptions was, however, arguably the downfall of the system. For, 
although Twain writes that “when it came to forbidding information about the river,” the 
strongbox system effectively excluded non-Association pilots (132), Twain surely knew very 
well that combined methods of mathematical formalization and mechanical inscription had 
been in use on the river for some time when he became an apprentice pilot in 1857. Louis C. 
Hunter points out, for example, that “[b]y 1850 the expanding telegraph network had joined 
the larger river cities in the West, and by making available up-to-the-hour information on the 
stage and condition of the river at the numerous steamboat centers it proved great value in the 
planning of trips” (246). Additionally, in conjunction with the telegraphs— which further 
deterritorialized inscription and made its dissemination at the speed of electric current 
possible—antebellum western newspapers published “reports on the stage of the river and 
related weather conditions with occasional reference to obstructions and channel conditions,” 
even further deterritorializing inscription by making it public and infinitely iterable. By 1871, 
reports Hunter, all pilots used the strongbox system, demonstrating the futility, in an era of 
industrialized inscriptive practices, of extracting value from information by locking it away. 
 The historical irony here is that the turn to textualization inaugurated by the pilot’s 
association anticipates the technical rationalization of river work lamented in the second part 
of Life. However, as Twain points out, the advent of war, the growth of railroads, and 
introduction of the towboat-barge combination—all events reflecting both the inexorable 
development of industrialized transport and the conquest of space by time by industrial 
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capital—together bring about the collapse of the Mississippi steamboat industry itself, and the 
pilot’s association along with it: “[A]nd behold, in the twinkling of an eye [ . . . ] the 
association and the noble science of piloting were things of the dead and pathetic past” (84). 
The textualization of the pilot’s experience, the conversion of his knowledge of the river into 
traces operating in the symbolic, escapes the propertarian, reterritorializing techniques of the 
pilots; the boxes in which formalized inscriptions are contained become Pandora’s boxes when 
opened by capital. For, the same techniques by which the steamboat owners not only 
collectivized and industrialized their information about the river, but did so on a mass scale 
and thereby countered the Association’s monopoly on information, are those by which the 
railroads accomplished their unseating of the steamboat system. The railroad train, for 
example, because it is always in contact with its artificial right-of-way, formed what Wolfgang 
Schivelbusch has called a “machine ensemble” (24), a single continent-spanning apparatus 
incorporating interchangeable technical and technosocial elements; because of the railroad’s 
thoroughly technical nature, the telegraph could, in turn, be yoked to it not merely as a means 
of disseminating text, but, as Armand Mattelart points out, as means of technical control (51-
52). As the telegraph intervenes directly in the control of the railway, greatly enhancing both 
speed, safety, and regularity of its operations, so text itself, in the form of timetables, rate 
schedules, and route maps, becomes an essential part of the total machine ensemble. In turn, as 
Janice A. Radway has written, the rail-dominated system of commodity production 
revolutionized the way texts themselves were disseminated. As material commodities began to 
“circulate more rapidly, so too did the increasing quantities of information necessary for the 
coordination of the previously distinct processes of manufacture and distribution” (131). 
consequently, the production of this information became more industrialized itself: 
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By the early years of the nineteenth century, the pen had long been as a 
technology of information reproduction and distribution. [ . . . ] As new 
technologies made their way into manufacturing, however, they were also 
adapted to the processes of print production and thus to the task of 
information dissemination as well. [ . . . ] At that point the speed of 
information production, reproduction, and distribution was fully mediated 
by machine and thereby magnified substantially, dialectically enabling and 
fostering the market integration taking place elsewhere in the American 
economy. 
The report system, then, participates in both the development of the steamboat system and 
its demise. Within the horizon of the steamboat system, it seems like a revolution in both the 
way the worker manages his own labor-power and the way capital organizes its division of 
labor; from the perspective of postbellum industrialized railroad spatiality, however, the report 
system seems trapped by the limits of its petit-bourgeois, merchant-capitalist reliance on 
individual possession and scarcity. Like the steamboat system itself, the report system fails to 
establish a permanent market advantage because it mixes progressive deterritorializing and 
archaic reterritorializing spatial strategies; the deterritorialization it inaugurates literally 
overflows the reterritorialization that it tries to impose. To this extent, then, the historical 
demise of the pilot’s power inverts the path of Laura Hawkins’s fall from influence and 
mastery. In the case of the pilots, capital’s power drives a continual process of 
deterritorialization—a process which, in turn, drives all reterritorializations in the direction of 
surplus-value extracted by capital itself, obliterating the propertarian claims of the pilots based 
on “feudal” craft-labor  This process means that, in the last instance, when the heroic or 
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“knightly” independent producer renounces humbug and fraud in favor of reason and 
productivity, he then must face the consequence of a rationalized division of inscriptive labor. 
The transportation worker loses his feudal privilege and takes up a kind of labor somewhere 
between that of an amanuensis (or scrivener) or advertising copywriter and the purely 
managerial labor of Lukac’s specialized virtuoso, of the editorial compiler and collator. The 
Gilded Age, however, insists upon the pitfalls of not entering into this system, of remaining 
trapped in the theatrical, specular, imaginary, fraudulent, and feudal spatiality of the 
antebellum period; for if the steamboatmen face the choice of either a proletarianizing process 
of deskilling or, preferable but fraught with its own risks, a kind of virtual bourgeoisification 
as a competitor on the market for “immaterial labor,” those who resist this choice risk 
becoming no producers at all, of being turned into representations themselves. The choice, in 
either case, is to be subsumed by the restless movement of capital, to end up as a mere 
functionary in the technical service of that movement, or, worse still, as a mere function of that 
movement, a living stereotype, a figure of what has been left behind in the imaginary drama of 
capital’s progressive advance. 
 
The nigger roosting on the safety valve 
Scholars have observed that both the public imaginary and scientific practice in the 
nineteenth century struggled to make sense of steamboat explosions. Hunter writes that “[t]he 
steamboat gave the predominantly rural population of the western country its first experience 
not only with industrial machinery but with the hazards that have always accompanied the 
introduction of machinery” (271); moreover, “[t]he unexpected suddenness and devastating 
force of steamboat explosions held a morbid fascination for the public, attracting greater 
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attention and arousing more concern than other disasters on an equal and even larger scale” 
(282). In his extensive study of the antebellum rhetoric of exploding steamboats, R. John 
Brockmann suggests that in the years before the American Civil War “American were caught 
in a paradoxical feeling that steamboats were simultaneously one of the first technological 
breakthroughs of the 19th century [ . . . ] —yet they were also instruments of unprecedented 
destruction and death” (2-3). On one hand, according to Brockmann, people saw the steamboat 
much as Uncle Dan’l (and not only Uncle Dan’l) sees it in The Gilded Age—as both a 
promethean and all-but “almighty” machine and a metonymy for the beneficent and inexorable 
progress of machines in general. Simultaneously, they saw it much as Braham portrays it in his 
defense of Laura Hawkins in the same novel—as a site, symbol, and cause of upheaval, 
catastrophe, contingency, and trauma. However, Brockmann’s most intriguing thesis is that 
this very dichotomy in the public imaginary entered into the scientific and legislative 
discourses, and the associated inscriptive productions, that attempted to intervene in the 
problems of steam navigation in general and boiler explosions in particular.  If journalistic, 
literary, and popular oral discourses sensationalized and sentimentalized both the technological 
power of the steamboat and the hazards of explosions, congressional inquiries were supposed 
to objectively investigate these matters, collect facts, and make rational conclusions. 
Brockmann argues however, that the haphazard and conflicting proliferation of interview 
transcripts, lab reports, and collations of historical data were quite quickly converted into a 
narrative which minimized the inherent technical shortcomings of the ships, and of high-
pressure steam engines in particular, preserving the technical omnipotence of the steamship 
and placing blame on the recklessness and incompetence of ship crews. Brockmann’s reading 
suggests a vicious rhetorical circle in which the public’s exaggerated fears of steamboat 
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explosions prompted scientific and governmental intervention, which in the face of general 
ignorance of the fine details of the thermodynamic, metallurgical, and hydraulic principles 
involved in steam power, attributed boiler failures to a deficiency on the part of the crew; since 
legislation enacted on the basis of such narratives failed to address technical problems, it 
generally also failed to prevent explosions (which, however, were never as frequent as they 
were believed to be); this failure, in turn, enhanced the mystery of explosion and further 
exaggerated anxieties about them. 
Brockmann does not argue that antebellum lawmakers and scientists were unaware of 
steamboats’ purely technical problems; instead he claims that they simply failed to understand 
these problems well enough to intervene in them, and in the absence of understanding, relied 
on a narrative that was understandable—one that placed blame on the poor work of the pilots 
and engineers. Brockmann points to Andrew Jackson’s contrast between the “great 
improvements which are everywhere being made in the machinery employed” in steam 
navigation and “the criminal negligence on the part of those by whom the vessels are 
navigated” (qutd. in Brockmann 44) in his 1833 State of the Union address to demonstrate 
how “the complexity of the problem” as presented in the original reports “was simplified and 
made a case of criminal negligence” (44-45). In Brockmann’s reading of the rhetoric of 
steamboat explosions, the purely scientific inscriptive project of collating data and 
disseminating measurements fails to produce meaning; on the other hand producing meaning 
means finding a villain, ascribing “negative” credit or debt, for a failure—even if this meaning 
is known very well to be almost useless in materially intervening into the problem. The 
scapegoating of steamboat workers by legislators, then, oddly repeats and inverts the way 
Twain treats steamboat labor in The Gilded Age and “Old Times on the Mississippi.” While 
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antebellum legislators took the view of Uncle Dan’l, reading the illegible complexity of the 
steamboat as sublime power and consequently seeing workers’ incompetence as a source of 
disorder, Twain sees the boats and their operations as sublimely disordered and intractable, 
thereby underscoring the heroic aspects of steamboat labor, which tamed the unruliness of the 
flawed and archaic apparatus. 
Arguably, the second half of Life critiques this very process of displacing the ambiguity 
of the steamboat, and in particular the high-pressure steam engine, onto an oscillation between 
celebrating and condemning the steamboatmen. In the second half, the fate of the pilots is 
revealed as nothing more than the result of relentless and ineluctable historical and material 
forces, illegible and unpredictable but nonetheless deterministic. In other words, the demise of 
both the steamboat’s dominance and the romantic aura of piloting is effected by a process not 
unlike the operation of the steamboat itself—force driving inexorable forward motion, but also 
producing unpredictable and catastrophic change. Twain’s later perspective, then, adumbrates 
“naturalism’s” concern with implacable and mysterious forces, both social and natural, while 
attempting to model a kind of authorship that paradoxically escapes entrapment by these forces 
precisely by willingly and knowingly inserting itself into their operations. The contrast 
between specular antebellum theatricality and the disinterested formalized scientific inquiry 
that, instead of responding to the shock of steamboat disasters with sensational narration, 
merely coordinates and sorts traces, would seem to also parallel the distinction in Age between 
the sensational and theatric career of Laura Hawkins and the progressive and untraditional 
medical vocation of Ruth Bolton. 
However, I want to argue that The Gilded Age fails to resolve this problem, that it is 
impossible to see either Ruth’s story or Laura’s story as an allegory of the kind of authorship 
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implicitly advocated in Life on the Mississippi. Moreover, this failure in Age spills over into 
Life, not in the least because the compulsive return to representing steamboat explosion also 
spills over from the earlier book into the later. In fact, when the lawyer Braham opens his 
defense of Laura, he rhetorically all but transforms her into a steamboat herself. First, Braham 
recalls to the jury the explosion that changed Laura’s life, separating her at childhood from her 
eastern parents and delivering her into the custody of the Hawkinses: “‘There [was] an 
explosion, one of those terrible catastrophes, which leave the imprint of an unsettled mind 
upon the survivors. Hundreds of mangled remains are sent into eternity. When the wreck is 
cleared away, this sweet little girl is found among the panic stricken survivors, in a scene of 
horror enough to turn the steadiest brain’” (391). In keeping with his usual confused and 
commingled rhetoric, Braham makes the spectacular imagery of the Amaranth’s explosion 
serve as both material catalyst and metaphor for Laura’s madness, supplying the jury with the 
details of how Laura’s life has been “‘the sport of fate and circumstances, hurried along 
through shifting storm and sun, bright with trusting innocence and anon black with heartless 
villainy, a career which moves on in love and desertion and anguish, always hovered over by 
the dark spectre of INSANITY” (390-391). Braham, calling the shooting of Selby “one of those 
fearful accidents which are inscrutable to men and of which God alone knows the secret,” 
exculpates Laura according to two inconsistent principles. On one hand, Selby’s death is itself 
nothing more than a consequence of Laura’s accident; when Braham continues by arguing that 
“‘in this condition of affairs it needed but a spark—I do not say suggestion, I do not say hint—
from this butterfly Brierly, this rejected rival, to cause the explosion” (392), he turns Selby 
into the victim of a powder explosion that is the material consequence, however indirect, of a 
boiler accident. And yet, on the other hand this rhetoric also emphasizes the “villainy” of 
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Selby and the partial culpability of Brierly; in spite of the multiplication of material causes 
(“fate and circumstances”), Braham must nevertheless also introduce a multiplicity of moral 
justifications, rather plausibly calling the shooting “‘the just vengeance of Heaven’” against 
Selby (392), but just as implausibly assigning blame to Brierly. 
I want to emphasize that most of the satire here is directed to the theatricality of these 
moral arguments, to the way they are rhetorically mixed with the clinical question of Laura’s 
madness. Braham knows that despite the judge’s final instructions to the jury—that Laura is 
either guilty or innocent by reason of insanity—the jury will make its judgment based on its 
perception of her as villain or victim. Arguably, however, while Twain and Warner reject the 
sensationalism of the defense’s case, their story about Laura in fact embraces the imagery that 
renders her life as nothing more than a series of aftershocks of that steamboat explosion. 
Indeed, Laura herself, as the very corporealization of both deceptive, arresting humbug, and 
sublime motion, stands as an equivalent figure to the steamboat. From the very beginning, or 
at last since adolescence, Laura mixes and mingles the modes also combined in the steamboat. 
Her response to the rumors of her uncertain parentage consequent on the epistolary exchange 
between Major Lackland and Squire Hawkins is a combination of detective work—searching 
and sorting traces—and flights of “romantic” imagination. She uncovers the truth—or, 
importantly, only a partial truth—by “rummag[ing] long among boxes of musty papers relating 
to business matters of no interest to her” (74) and by “piec[ing] together” “[r]andom remarks 
here and there” (76); yet she also imagines herself “a heroine, now, with a mysterious father 
somewhere” (77). Twain explains the bifurcation of Laura’s subjectivity into, on one hand, 
relentless investigator and, on the other, sentimental heroine, by writing that Laura “had more 
than her rightful share of practical good sense, but still she was human; and to be human is to 
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have one’s little modicum of romance secreted away in one’s composition” (77). Humanity is 
here posed as the romantic flaw in a composition otherwise “practical”; Laura—human, all to 
human—is arguably much better off after her betrayal by Selby, when she takes on “a beauty 
in the knowledge of evil, a beauty that shines out in the face of a person whose inward life is 
transformed by some terrible experience,” when she takes on “a devil in her heart” (137). 
According to Twain’s formula, Selby’s betrayal inculcates a daemonic cynicism in Laura’s 
“heart”; but such cynicism is the foundation (until the reappearance of Selby) of her capacity 
to manipulate symbols, as opposed to merely being manipulated by narrations. 
Susan K. Harris has argued that in ascribing such demonic characteristics to Laura, Twain 
and Warner “mandate that that Laura be interpreted as a fallen woman” (144). In fact, Harris 
argues that Twain employs four thematic modes in his portrayal of Laura: “as a figure of fallen 
innocence, as a victim, as a rebel, and as an alter-ego” (147). However, by making Laura’s 
project of self-making lead inexorably to her death, Harris writes, Twain “precluded self-
creating female protagonists.” Moreover, “[i]f, Twain’s ideology implies, an ambitious female 
protagonist gets out of hand, kill her off” (150). Therefore, she concludes, 
Beginning with a protagonist created as a type of fallen womanhood, in The 
Gilded Age Mark Twain proceeded to create a female outlaw who 
responded to male domination by herself assuming a male ethos. Within the 
male gestalt thus created, he relaxed his guard and let her become one of his 
literary alter-egos. He found, however, that in doing so he created a literary 
monster—a passionate dark woman who threatened to take over his text. [ . 
. . ] But Twain never allows her to violate the male preserve. Rather, he uses 
his narrator’s omniscience to reverse the thrust of Laura’s development, 
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revoking her independence and re-invoking the innocence of her pre-
pubertal days. (151) 
Harris’s reading assigns to Twain the very imaginary intervention that I have already ascribed 
to the lawyer Braham—a character, as I have argued, who is himself ambiguously satirized for 
his dependence upon hackneyed and sentimental regional rhetoric in his defense of Laura. 
Arguably, the fallen woman and authorial ego Harris argues for are, if not one and the same, 
inextricably entwined; the struggle between being arrested in the social narrative imaginary 
and continuous circulation in a textualized world is, for Twain, the basic question of 
authorship. Harris is nevertheless quite correct to call Laura’s end a reversal of thrust, and an 
inevitable one, too, because once she is brought into the public eye by murdering Selby she is 
doomed to have her “thrust”—her being as a trickster, an interiorless void, an accident waiting 
to happen—deflected into the social imaginary, which is the precondition for either conviction 
or acquittal at the trail. But this interruption of thrust is brought about, even before Laura’s 
trial, by another contingent reterritorialization in the social imaginary—namely the national 
“reunion” which not only brings Selby to Washington, but which Selby is in the process of 
effecting by pursuing his cotton claims—which, as propertarian claims, seek to recuperate 
value which otherwise would have been liberated by the war. Selby’s very reappearance, then, 
signifies a dyad of liberation and recuperation that also marks both the possibilities and limits 
of Laura’s agency. Selby, after all, plies his claims on the grounds of being on one hand, as 
congressman’s wife Mrs. Schoonmaker says, not “‘unlike other people’” (272), but, on the 
other, of claiming a very peculiar kind of property, undergirded by a very peculiar institution, 
now outlawed everywhere, but formerly flourishing (but doomed) precisely because of its 
legality in one section of the US and illegality in another. Selby, in other words, depends on 
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reacquiring a portion of the value of his slaves’ labor because, the geographic upheaval of the 
Civil War having served the needs of capital, regional difference has become no longer an 
obstacle, but once again a part, of the operations of capital. 
Laura’s spatial momentum evaporates because the same frontier which, in it closing, 
marked the end of the romance of the steamboat was also superceded by a new one in which 
North and South no longer competed for domination of western land, but cooperated in the 
industrial organization of western space. Selby, then, may be considered the last victim of the 
explosion of the Amaranth, a mangled body sent into eternity; Laura, on the other hand, is an 
early victim of the recrudescence by which old hierarchies have begun to reestablish 
themselves, mutatis mutandis, by the early 1870s. Selby’s appearance in Washington marks a 
historical moment when the possibilities of eternal remaking opened up by the Civil War begin 
to close down again, the moment at which emancipation begins to give way to national assent 
to Jim Crow, at which capital investment as a corrosive to the rule of southern Bourbons 
begins to give way to an alliance with New South boosters, at which progressive antiracism 
begins to give way to imperialist adventure abroad. Laura’s life, the very trajectory of her 
subjectivity, traces a pattern of that could be called one of desouthernization followed by 
resouthernization. When her regional identity, along with her family connection, is erased in 
the Amaranth explosion, Laura becomes the vogelfrei subject, the subject sent into eternity, 
both free to remake herself and free to be remade by others; adoption by the Hawkins family, 
as Braham’s rhetoric emphasizes, southernizes her and places her in jeopardy of becoming a 
representation herself, while her (first) betrayal by Selby sets free the “demon” of 
placelessness again—a demon whose operations are signaled by the end of Laura’s 
manipulation by texts and the beginning of her manipulation of them. Finally, falling under 
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Selby’s spell in Washington again southernizes Laura, and this southernization is marked by 
her resorting to gunplay—a cultural practice, in the form of the duel, condemned in Life on the 
Mississippi in the same passage that critiques the railroad pass (299-300). 
The language of both motionlessness and death dominates the representation of Laura 
after the murder. Laura “[makes] no resistance” (331) after shooting Selby; she afterward sits 
“shivering on her cot-bed in the darkness of a damp cell in the Tombs” (334); she enters the 
courtroom on the day of her trial “dressed in simple black” (382); and—after a brief promise 
of a “rapturous intoxication” on the lecture stage in the midst of “homelessness” (428-429)—
she dies of heart failure, frozen and “framed” by the moonlight (431-432). If Harris sees 
Laura’s pathetic ruin and death registering Twain’s refusal to allow Laura fully to rehearse 
Huckleberry Finn’s “flight from entrapment and echoes” (145), then, the process of 
resouthernization, as both literal entrapment and spatial arrestment by and within the 
imaginary register, anticipates what happens to Jim in Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. 
Locked in Silas Phelp’s shed—which is marked, like a tomb, with a skull and crossbones—
after escaping slavery, only to find that the currents of escape have taken him further south, 
Jim has been the object of so many southernizing narrations of both the propertarian and 
“feudal” kinds that, in the end, he has been captured, as it were, by moonshine; and it is not 
difficult to imagine him in his moonlit stillness, framed by the shadow of the shed’s “square 
window-hole” (Adventures 293). Both Laura and Jim have stories told about them, and both of 
them wind up in locked boxes; their problem is that they cannot get out, while the pilot’s 
sovereignty in “The Pilot’s Monopoly” is destroyed because the technical information he kept 
in his strongbox cannot be kept in. 
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Hence, beyond suggesting how the satire of race discourse in Huckleberry Finn parallels 
the treatment of gender discourse in The Gilded Age, this resemblance also points to a link 
between the rhetoric of race that appears only on the margins of both The Gilded Age and Life 
on the Mississippi and the figure of the steamboat that haunts both texts. The exploding 
steamboat, as narration or reflexive allusion to narration, reappears compulsively in The 
Gilded Age and Life on the Mississippi; but enslaved African workers rarely appear anywhere 
in either book, and when they do it is often in relation to steamboats. In The Gilded Age, after 
we have seen Uncle Dan’l not only worshipping the glory of the steamboat but tutoring his 
young white charges in this fetishism, we discover that his and his wife’s fate is to “pass from 
the auction-block into the hands of a negro trader and depart for the remote South to be seen 
no more by the family” (54). He who lives in the shadow of the technical almighty is doomed 
to die by it also; Uncle Dan’l’s fate merely anticipates the less brutal and more ambiguous, but 
equally irrevocable, resouthernization of Washington Hawkins and Beriah Sellars in the 
novel’s denouement. Uncle Dan’l may have been betrayed by his “white family,” but his fate 
is roughly the same of the rest of the Hawkinses; their failures all spring from a religious awe 
for the steamboat—an awe conditioned by the viewpoint of petit-bourgeois merchant capital 
which sees value as a consequence of arbitrage, and hence of the inherent value of locations. 
Uncle Dan’l and his wife wind up, like Jim, Laura, and the Hawkinses, boxed in, motionless, 
ineluctably tied to places. 
I have already argued that the passage from The Gilded Age to Life on the Mississippi, 
and in the passage from “A Daring Deed” to “Racing Days,” Twain’s view of the steamboat 
moves from the theological fetishism of Uncle Dan’l (which really both mirrors and works to 
reproduce the fetishism of his white owners, as well as the young Clemens in “A Boy’s 
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Ambition”) in the opening chapters of Age, to the petit-bourgeois romanticization of the pilot’s 
skill in “A Daring Deed,” to the sublime spectacle of theatricality itself being sacrificed for 
speed in “Racing Days.” The second appearance of African-Americans in The Gilded Age, I 
argue, anticipates this very development; for if black men and women characters are mostly 
invisible and silent in the earlier book, black workers nevertheless figure prominently in one of 
its most sublime passages, and in circumstances that will be repeated in the later book. The 
explosion of the Amaranth which orphans Laura Hawkins occurs during its desperate race with 
the Boreas, and the passage rehearses the sublime yet comic representation of the steamboat 
race in “Racing Days”: 
Soon the [Boreas] was plunging and quivering and screaming more 
madly than ever. But the Amaranth’s head was almost abreast the Boreas’s 
stern: 
“How’s your steam, now, Harry?” 
“Hundred and eighty-two, sir!” 
“Break up the casks of bacon in the forrard hold! Pile it in! Levy on 
that turpentine in the fantail—drench every stick of wood with it!” 
The boat was a moving earthquake by this time: 
“How is she now?” 
“A hundred and ninety-six and still a-swelling!—Water below the 
middle gauge-cocks!—carrying every pound she can stand!—nigger 
roosting on the safety-valve!” 
“Good! How’s your draft?” 
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“Bully! Every time a nigger heaves a stick of wood into the furnace he 
goes out the chimney with it!” (33-34) 
The black steamboat workers, to be sure, are portrayed with a degree of racist grotesquerie; but 
the humor of the image of the “nigger roosting on the safety-valve” reverses the specific way 
racism is used in the Uncle Dan’l passage. Uncle Dan’l, after all, misrecognizes the steamboat 
as “de Almighty”; conversely, there really is something Promethean about these men laboring 
with fire, turning it into speed, becoming themselves fire, and connecting their bodies to the 
material apparatus of the engine and thereby becoming the steamboat. The image of the 
enslaved black laborer augmenting the action of the safety valve works as both a grotesque 
racist image—a black body used a weight, as property, by the reckless white steamboatmen—
and as a corrosive to racism, since the only advantage in racing for using a black laborer 
instead of a weight is that the weight on the safety-valve is literally a “dead” weight, incapable 
of self-adjustment, and hence unable to respond to fine and potentially catastrophic changes in 
the performance of the engine.  
The black laborer’s enchainment with the steamboat machinery, at once abject and 
deliriously technophilic, registers the double ambivalence inherent in the steamboat as a 
historically-situated artifact. The steamboat itself is an agent of both slavery and individual 
mobility, making the enslaved worker’s technosocial situation curiously confused and 
commingled. As Thomas C. Buchanan writes, steamboats “carried the tentacles of slavery and 
racism, but they also carried liberating ideas and pathways to freedom” (5). Yet, as Buchanan 
also points out, 
Steamboats were products of the industrial revolution, yet the organization 
of their work crews owed much to the basic divisions of labor that were 
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inherited from Atlantic maritime culture. Maritime capitalists had long ago 
decided that the mass movement of materials demanded rigid discipline and 
hierarchical management. Thus the disparity in power between the mostly 
native white officers and [. . .] cabin crews reproduced enduring conflicts. 
But while steamboats at once looked backward to the age of sail, they also 
reflected contemporary trends in the organization of labor. For many 
Americans, in a world where plantations were thriving and the factory 
system was starting to take root, steamboats were a visible expression of the 
increasing divisions between rich and poor. The small-scale farmer who 
floated his crop to market on a flatboat, the craftsman who produced goods 
for his neighbors, and the slave who labored shoulder to shoulder were all 
being transformed by the capitalist ethos that defined the era. (79) 
The steamboat, that is, materially manifests the co-existence of the mercantile and the 
industrial. For enslaved black steamboat workers, however, this liminality of the steamboat 
represented not only a mixed state between mercantile bondage and capitalist freedom, but 
also the paradoxes of “freedom” itself under capitalism. In turn, Twain’s image of an enslaved 
black man perched on the safely apparatus of the steamship boiler represents, like Charles 
Francis Adams’s “negro” fireman on the Best Friend, the underdeveloped and hybrid character 
of antebellum technoculture; arguably, though, it also evokes the way postbellum Americans 
retroactively imagined the process of their own immersion in machine space. In the Neider-
edited Autobiography, Twain refers to his former mentor as “my owner, Mr. Bixby” (128), 
humorously to be sure, but thereby identifying the position he had formerly called princely 
with that of enslaved African labor. Nor is it clear that Twain—who knew very well that black 
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men and women were, in practical terms, could as easily be enslaved in 1883 as 1858—
thought of himself as liberated in 1858. In his notoriously brief and perfunctory transitional 
chapter sandwiched between the original Atlantic Monthly writings and “I Return to My 
Muttons,” Twain writes that after he became a pilot, 
[t]ime drifted smoothly and prosperously on, and I supposed—and hoped—
that I was going to follow the river the rest of my days, and die at the wheel 
when my mission was ended. But by and by the war came, commerce was 
suspended, my occupation was gone.  
I had to seek another livelihood. So I became a silver miner in Nevada; 
next, a newspaper reporter; next, a gold miner in California; next, a reporter 
in San Francisco; next, a special correspondent in the Sandwich Islands; 
next, a roving correspondent in Europe and the East; next, an instructional 
torchbearer on the lecture platform; and, finally, I became a scribbler of 
books, and an immovable fixture among the other rocks of New England. 
 In so few words have I disposed of the twenty-one slow-drifting years 
that have come and gone since I last looked from the windows of a pilot-
house. (166) 
Here, Twain makes his lighting out for the territory in the years during and after the War seem 
rather like the aimless wanderings of Sellar’s Salt Lick spur, or perhaps a (terrestrial) 
steamboat set adrift and finally getting caught on the snags of the New England literary 
landscape. It’s as if, in becoming a satirist of men like Beriah Sellars, he became a bit like 
Sellars himself. The paratactic rhetoric, the lack of narratorial teleology, also evoke Braham’s 
portrayal of Laura Hawkins as “the sport of fate and circumstances.” Twain’s own account of 
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his development as a textual producer suggests that, like the enslaved worker on the safety 
valve of the steamboat boiler, he became a mere object of technosocial mobility in the very 
moment he became a mobile subject.  
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Chapter Two: 
Quick Enough to Interpret the Cipher Message of the Eye: The Octopus and Railroad 
Perception 
 
A vague, slow-moving whirl of things 
Although the actual process of agricultural production is largely invisible in Frank 
Norris’s 1901 novel The Octopus, the narrator does, in a simultaneously restless and rhapsodic 
passage, give us a series of images of the plowing of the fields at the Quien Sabe Ranch: 
The ploughs, thirty-five in number, each drawn by its team of ten, 
stretched in an interminable line, nearly a quarter mile in length […]. They 
were arranged, as it were, en echelon, not in file—not one directly behind 
the other, but each succeeding plough its own width farther in the field than 
the one in front of it. Each of these ploughs held five shears, so that when 
the entire company was in motion, one hundred and seventy five furrows 
were made at the same instant. At a distance, he ploughs resembled a great 
column of field artillery. (128) 
Here, despite the narrator’s later sexualized rhetoric which interprets the scene as on of “the 
vast primal passion, the two world-forces, the elemental Male and Female, locked in a colossal 
embrace” (131), the process of production appears as a military campaign, as mathematically-
ordered and artificial technē putting only male (but desexualized) bodies into productive 
action, rather than as the elemental masculine meeting the chthonic feminine. The passage 
emphasizes the “taking” of the field—the conquest of space—less than the fecundation of the 
passive ground. In fact, the process of industrialized agriculture here seems much like the 
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expansion of railway transport to which it is contrasted throughout the novel: less an irruption 
of violent nature than the subsumption of nature by technics, less an act of co-creation with the 
environment than a vast and collective remaking of geographic space. 
Moreover, the resemblance of the plowing operation to writing—a resemblance 
underscored later when the rancher Buck Annixter has an epiphany of the San Joaquín Valley 
landscape as a “gigantic scroll [unrolling] from edge to edge of the horizon” (368-369)—
suggests that textual production itself must resemble mass industrial activity in order to make 
its mark, to intervene in either nature or history. If drawing furrows in the earth resembles both 
a sexual act and a textual act, the mental labor involved in operating a plow involves both an 
instinctive, almost unthinking, activity as well as a calculation and judgment. The former 
shepherd Vanamee, now working as a plowman for Annixter, “lapse[s] to a sort of pleasing 
numbness, in a sense, hypnotised by the weaving maze of things in which he found himself 
involved. […] But while one part of his brain, alert and watchful, took cognizance of these 
matters, all the greater part was lulled and stupefied with the long monotony of the affair” 
(129). It is the “stupefied” and daydreaming side of Vanamee’s mind, abstracted from the 
technical details of plowing, that gazes and speculates, that from the intermittent hilltops 
“overlook[s] a wider horizon” and sees elemental tumult and mythic violence (130). To the 
extent that Norris’s narrator focalizes on Vanamee here, then, his overwrought and rhapsodic 
language could just as well be that of Vanamee himself. In any case, both narrator and 
character take a perspective on the agricultural work of the San Joaquín Valley that erases 
details; this perspective tropes, interprets, and allegorizes—but while it takes in the whole of 
the valley, it remains a personal and isolated vision. Moreover, although it observes labor, it in 
itself gets no work done. 
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On the other hand, the narrator’s representation the actual labor of plowing registers the 
social and organized nature of the work, while also underscoring the physical dispersion of the 
task of plowing—not only among the workers, but among the instruments of work themselves. 
If the narrator begins by giving us a labor process that looks a lot like industrialized warfare, 
or the railroad system, or like writing itself writ large (and hence also like the process of mass 
inscription made possible by the web-fed offset press, the typewriter, the stock ticker, and the 
cash register), his rhetoric almost immediately swerves from metaphor into the complex 
proliferation of sensuous detail: “the click of buckles, the creak of straining leather, the 
subdued clash of machinery, the cracking of whips, the deep breathing of nearly four hundred 
horses, the abrupt commands and cries of the drivers, and, last of all, the prolonged soothing 
murmur of the thick brown earth turning steadily from the multitude of advancing shears” 
(128). The narrator’s version of the “weaving maze of things” in which Vanamee is directly 
enmeshed is both broader and less rhetorically mediated than Vanamee’s own vision of the 
social and natural world that appears when he crests the shallow hills of the san Joaquín 
wheatfields. Vanamee’s mode of knowing his environment is split between a poetic and 
elevated yet “stupefied” perspectival view and an “alert and watchful” dispersed, shifting, non-
perspectival perception. To the extent that Vanamee is conscious at all, his consciousness 
seems to arise from the yoking-together of these modes, neither one of which itself seems fully 
to constitutes cognition.  However, while Vanamee is certainly both working and daydreaming 
here, he is not, as it were, authoring a text; his labor, otherwise a seemingly instinctive activity, 
proceeds guided by the commands of his foremen, while his apocalyptic visions remain a kind 
of reading of the landscape that, without the intervention of Norris’s narrator, would never 
materially convert itself into writing. 
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Both Vanamee and Norris’s narrator, then, divide their attention between the detailed, the 
immediate, and the grossly material and the distant, the mediated, and the aesthetic. But while 
Vanamee’s divided attention participates in labor while not itself being authorship, the narrator 
oscillates between the two modes in order to establish his authority over the scene. The 
narrator follows the plowmen in their back-and-forth motion over the wheatfields while also 
following Vanamee’s gaze over the horizon—but also weaves his own path between these two 
frames of perception in a kind of textual montage. In this passage, and many other like it, the 
narrator accomplishes what many of the actors in The Octopus fail to do: he finds a way to 
avoid the trap of falling into an overly aestheticized and reductive view of the world while, at 
the same time, not getting mired in William James’s “great blooming, buzzing confusion,” the 
purely instinctive view of the untrained, unsocialized sensorium. Importantly, the narrator does 
not establish his perception on some immediate synthesis of these two extremes, but navigates 
a tortuous path between them; the space of the technical detail and the spiritual vision is 
mediated, that is, in a new space, a purely notional idea-, data-, or even cyber-space. 
The problem of seeing, of how to organize sensuous data, is arguably the main problem in 
The Octopus. If Vanamee simultaneously employs two modes, distanced and enmeshed, and 
remains “stupefied,” the problem of finding a via media between them is what stops the poet 
Presley from writing a text that can represent what he encounters among the ranchers, workers, 
and capitalists of the Far West of the late nineteenth century. At the novel’s outset, we are told, 
the “material, sordid, deadly commonplace” conflict between the ranchers and the Pacific and 
Southwestern Railroad undermines and vitiates “the picture of that huge romantic West that 
[Presley] saw in his imagination” (12). “But, however he strove to shut his eyes or ears to it, 
the thing persisted and persisted. The romance seemed complete up to this point. There it 
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broke, there it failed, there it became realism, grim, unlovely, unyielding.” While Vanamee 
divides his consciousness and achieves a kind of productive unconsciousness, Presley remains 
over-conscious of the fact that the “sordid” details cannot be separated from his grand, 
aestheticized vision, and therefore is paralyzed as a textual producer.  
Likewise, readers of The Octopus have often been baffled or dissatisfied by the way the 
novel itself reads the space of late nineteenth-century capital, by how it reconciles its rhetoric 
of detail and broad impression, of specific things and the world as a whole, of the serial and 
the synoptic. “When a novelist speaks largely of Truth in fiction,” writes Walter Fuller Taylor, 
“we may reasonably expect of him, at least, that he relate […] facts to ideas that are significant 
in themselves, and that are sufficiently in agreement with one another to make up a coherent 
view of life. Now, it is in just this matter of philosophical consistency that Norris, in The 
Octopus, falls short” (299). Taylor’s main objection, though, is not so much to the novel’s 
“flurry of hectic action without meaning” (300) as to the ad hoc and unearned “large optimism 
of the concluding pages” (299). For Charles Child Walcutt, similarly, the need to make the 
story of the wheat growers literary, to make it dramatic, makes the novel overly rhetorical and 
bombastic, and this bombastic style ultimately undermines its panglossian optimism; the 
novel’s “incoherency” is directly tied to “a love of power and size which, an end itself, sweeps 
careful ratiocination aside” (151). Walcutt’s argument is that rhetoric gets the last word in The 
Octopus, leaving much of the novel’s represented world “unmastered”; the “chief weakness” 
of The Octopus “can be traced to a certain feebleness of intellectual grip, and this feebleness is 
reflected in the inadequacy of his grasp on the ideology—naturalism—through which he chose 
to work.” The “larger view” the novel urges, for Walcutt, never comes into view because 
Norris never learned to properly manage what Walcutt, like Martin, takes to be the function of 
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“naturalism” for understanding the world: an optic for reconciling largeness and smallness, for 
achieving a bird’s-eye view of turn-of-the-century capital in the US West that doesn’t ignore 
its technical, contradictory, complicated details. 
Other readers, however, have questioned whether the novel’s various statements of grand 
philosophy, by its narrator or by its characters, really express its own point of view. Donald 
Pizer, for example, argues that most of the generalizations in the book stand for stages in 
Presley’s development, not final and authoritative statements of the book’s thematics. In 
Pizer’s view, the novel’s final statement of “cosmic” optimism in no way—for the novel or 
Presley—“solves” its ethical problems, and that this realization is the novel’s unifying 
epiphany. For Pizer, moral “freedom on the personal level [and] determinism on the 
‘cosmic’[…] are not incompatible in Norris’s mind, and he would feel no need to resolve them 
(“Another Look” 223). Pizer argues, then, that the “small” world of individual responsibility 
and the “large” one of cosmic process are neither incompatible nor resolvable, and that this 
condition is the focus of the novel itself. Barbara Hochman also sees the novel’s thematic 
problems as resolved by the realization, and embrace, of the value of “the irrepressible flux of 
life itself” (Art 98). For Hochman, the “incoherence” of The Octopus is no stylistic or 
cognitive flaw, but a reflection of its real stance: that narrative (not propositional truth) is itself 
the authentic mode of philosophical insight. Moreover, Hochman sees Annixter, not Presley, 
as the “character who comes to recognize the inevitability of process, yet who nonetheless 
comes to affirm life and even to risk himself in human relationships” (Art 18). For both Pizer 
and Hochman, then, the story of individual development—indeed the very possibility of such a 
story—is itself the “larger view” that redeems the novel’s violence and injustice. In these 
reflexive readings, it’s not that all things always work together for good, but that recognizing 
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the chance of such a hopeful outcome is the first step toward making them happen. For them, 
the novel doesn’t “fail” by not reconciling its details with its optimistic grand narrative; it’s the 
inadequacy of grand narratives that ensures the possibility of any optimism at all. 
Although I align myself with Pizer’s and Hochman’s emphasis on the novel’s treatment 
of flux, contingency, and multiplicity, their readings nevertheless, by excluding the historical 
specificity of the crises narrated in The Octopus, beg the very question at hand. If the “large 
view” the novel urges is not so much a cosmic optimism, but a kind of petit-bourgeois 
stoicism—a transcendence of the anxiety and stress of the world’s vicissitudes through taking 
an unflinching and honest view of those vicissitudes—what are we to make of Norris’s 
specific historical material? Do we read The Octopus, in the last instance, by bracketing the 
very concrete circumstances that produce the vicissitudes were are supposed to come to 
embrace? If so, why is this particular story at this particular time and place so apposite for 
these particular thematics? I argue that the problems that have vexed the novel’s readers 
concerning its “coherence” can be productively addressed by revisiting the questions of the 
railroad’s expansion at the turn of the century—especially in its historical roles as a material 
political intervention into history, as a concrete technical apparatus that reorganized and 
disciplined the way capitalist subjects read their worlds, and as a material product and signifier 
of the contradictions in early American capitalism. The railroad in The Octopus, that is, both 
mataphorizes and materially produces a crisis in seeing the world; yet it also often stands for a 
kind of seeing that Pizer and Hochman perceive as the solution to such crises. Morover, the 
novel participates in a constellation of turn-of-the-century discourses that linked authorship, 
literacy, rail passengerhood, and railroad management practices in a web of mutually-
reinforcing and multiply mediated techniques of knowing. In the context of these discourses, 
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The Octopus often implicitly calls for a kind of passengerial subjectivity, characterized by 
what I will call railroad perception, as the optimal subjective stance for reading—and acting 
within—its historical moment. 
 
Merely the part of an enormous whole 
More recent readings of The Octopus have insightfully focused on the historical 
determination of social and geographical space in turn-of-the-century California; but these 
readings have not particularly sought to tie their conclusions to the question of Norris’s 
putative philosophical “incoherence.” Moreover, these interpretations have primarily been 
interested in The Octopus as a document responding to the advent what is now called 
“globalization,” seeing in the novel an engagement with capital’s tendency to “nestle 
everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere” (Manifesto 17)14. My own 
concern, however, is less to demonstrate the ways the novel traces the geographic expansion of 
capital than to examine its treatment of the perception of spatiality under just these historical 
conditions. The scene of the Quien Sabe plowing, for example, is only one example of an 
enchaining of a “larger view” with the “grim, unlovely, unyielding” facts which seem both to 
constitute and to undermine the possibility of any larger view whatsoever. In contrast to the 
plowing scene, where production gets done, even if Vanamee’s conscious thought seems not to 
enter into it, the office in the Derrick ranch house is appears as a space of mental labor, of 
symbolic production: 
The office was the nerve-centre [sic] of the entire ten thousand acres of 
Los Muertos, but its appearance and furnishings were not in the least 
suggestive of a farm. It was divided at about its middle by a railing, painted 
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green and gold, and behind this railing were the high desks where the books 
were kept, the safe, the letter-press and letter-files, and Harran’s typewriting 
machine. A great map of Los Muertos with every water-course, depression, 
and elevation, together with indications of the varying depths of the clays 
and loams of the soil, accurately plotted, hung against the wall between the 
windows, while near at hand by the safe was the telephone. 
But, no doubt, the most significant object in the office was the ticker. 
This was an innovation in the San Joaquín, an idea of shrewd, quick-witted 
young Annixter, which Harran and Magnus derrick had been quick to adopt, 
and after them Broderson and Osterman […]. The offices of the ranches 
were thus connected by wire with San Francisco, and through that city with 
Minneapolis, Duluth, Chicago, New York, and at last, and most important 
of all, with Liverpool. Fluctuations in the price of the world’s crop during 
and after harvest thrilled straight to the office at Los Muertos, to that of the 
Quien Sabe, to Osterman’s, and to Broderson’s. During a flurry in the 
Chicago wheat pits in the August of that year, which had affected even the 
San Francisco market, Harran and Magnus had sat up nearly half of one 
night watching the strip of white tape jerking unsteadily from the reel. At 
such moments they no longer felt their individuality. The ranch became 
merely the part of an enormous whole, a unit in the vast agglomeration of 
wheat land the whole world round, feeling the effect of cause miles 
distant—a drought on the prairies of Dakota, a rain of the plains of India, a 
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frost on the Russian steppes, a hot wind on the llanos of the Argentine. (53-
54) 
The trope of the “nerve center” was both widespread and multiply inflected in late nineteenth-
century culture, and Norris’s use of it is notable not least because The Octopus participates in 
almost all of the facets of the era’s discourse of networks—physiological, technological, and 
supernatural15. The Los Muertos office is called a nerve center not only because information 
flows into and out of the space through a diverse and heterogeneous array of channels—
textual, pictographic, and audile; “natural” and technologically mediated; traditional and 
newfangled—but also because plans are made and commands are issued here. But calling the 
office a nerve center also obscures the fact that these two functions—technical and 
administrative—while of necessity yoked together in one space, do not coincide perfectly. The 
office’s conspicuous “wire railing, painted green and gold,” for example, divides the “high 
desks” from which the landowning capitalists issue their commands from the rest of the space; 
in a space into which material signifiers flow and are combined, interpreted, and transformed, 
the wire railings—painted the colors of money—perform no productive work. They are 
produced and they signify, but not only do they not model or represent any part of the work of 
growing wheat, they actually interrupt the otherwise “rationalized” way in which the office, as 
a nerve center, serves as part of the means of production. These railings, like the barbed-wire 
property dividers separating one ranch from another, only both signify and materially 
instantiate the role of the landowner as an expropriator of surplus value. Yet, these markers 
and apparatuses of hierarchy also, paradoxically, are what establishes the office as a nerve 
center, since, after all, a nerve center detached from the process of exploitation is, under 
capitalism, no center at all. 
133  
 
 
If the heterogeneity of the office’s technosocial apparatus seems to undermine its very 
purpose—to reconcile and put into productive enchainment the various flows of information 
which enter into it—the most rationalized and technically advanced machine in the office, the 
telegraph ticker, seems nevertheless to be also of little productive use. Norris’s narrator tells us 
that “[d]uring a flurry in the Chicago wheat pits in the August of that year […] Harran and 
Magnus had sat up nearly half of one night watching the strip of white tape jerking unsteadily 
from the reel” (54); he does not say what use, if any at all, the Derricks put the stock-ticker 
data. Moreover, since we are specifically informed that Magnus and Harran anxiously watched 
the ticker during August, when their fields are already planted and the crops are ready to 
harvest, we must conclude that their anxiety is due to their very inability to intervene in the 
“fluctuations” in wheat prices. Stock tickers are far more useful as instruments in the 
allocation of capital, in speculation or so-called finance capital, than as tools in production, 
and they are almost useless in agricultural production16. Unlike the pictographic information 
provided by the wall map—information which is nonetheless textualized, as in the case of the 
soil types and depths, where the necessary knowledge is unavailable to natural human vision, 
even “elevated” vision—the information flowing in from the ticker cannot be converted into 
outgoing instructions, at least not by Harran and Derrick, who clearly have no excess money 
capital to throw into speculation. If the railings demarcating different spaces in the Derrick 
office signify the direction of diverted flows of value from production, the information coming 
through the ticker can only signify whether value will, or will not, be diverted toward Los 
Muertos in the first place. As Henderson writes, “[T]he ticker signifies […] that capitalist 
space on this grand scale cannot be seen, it can only be represented. But such a representation 
is only possible if capital produces the mechanisms for its own representation. There will be 
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no successful representation from ‘above’ or ‘outside’—only a representation that is of the 
capitalist industrial juggernaut” (141). Henderson suggests here that The Octopus is well aware 
of the limits of any panoramic overarching “vision”—including the limits of the kind of any 
“larger” view putatively advocated by the novel itself.  Moreover, not only does reading the 
chaotic, indeed somewhat mysterious, inscriptions on the ticker tape suggest to the Derricks a 
phantasy of the ranch as “part of an enormous whole, a unit in the vast agglomeration of wheat 
land the whole world round,” but this apocalyptic vision itself necessarily appears in the 
absence of the possibility of any material agency arising from those inscription. The ticker 
keeps Magnus and Harran awake half the night and hunts their imaginations precisely because 
it signifies their impotence in the face of market vicissitudes. 
Finally, there is another channel through which information circulates around and through 
the Los Muertos nerve center: the “stone-paved hallway with a glass roof” (53) that both 
connects and separates the Derrick house proper from the office. This corridor, ambiguously 
enclosed and exposed itself, keeps the sordidness of business distinct from the Gemütlichkeit 
and dignity of the domestic space, while also serving a means for convenient and quick access 
to the machinery of administration. Of course, if the office’s function of bringing 
heterogeneous information flows together for a single purpose is countered by the fact that that 
purpose it itself riven between production in sensu stricto and exploitation, then the ranch 
house is also spatially divided between its role on one hand as the seat of preindustrial 
patriarchical power and, on the other, as the site in which use values are produced and 
consumed. In this case, the division is also gendered, since the house is also the center of 
Annie Derrick’s attempts to reproduce the coziness and gentility of both her eastern Ohio 
childhood and the “the State Normal School” at which she matriculated (58). Annie copes with 
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“the monotony of the ranch” by “retir[ing] within herself” and “surround[ing] herself with 
books” (60). Annie’s space, too, is textualized; the texts themselves surround her and the 
aestheticizing, nostalgic images of her favorite authors—Pater, Lamb, Ruskin—inhabit her 
imagination as much as the images of the Nebraska plains and the Argentine pampas inhabit 
Magnus’s and Harran’s. On the other hand, the house proper is also where the members of the 
growers’ committee, in an all-male all-night session, begin to plan their takeover of the 
California Railroad Commission. If Annie is lost in daydreams inspired by the “flaccid 
banalities” of British art-worshipping aesthetes, the wheat growers here surround themselves 
with the performative signifiers of their own gender and class position: “The whiskey bottle 
and the syphon of soda-water reappeared. The mean eased themselves in their places, pushing 
back from the table, lighting their cigars, talking of the beginning of the rains and the prospect 
of a rise in wheat” (103). When “at length, Magnus, who was at the head of the table, move[s] 
in his place, assuming a certain magisterial attitude” (103), we see the wheat growers enacting 
a kind of sacramental ritual that reassures them of the stability of traditional hierarchies based 
on age, wealth, and learning. Lyman’s betrayal, and later the chaotic disintegration of the 
ranchers’ mass meeting, demonstrate, nevertheless, precisely how ephemeral Magnus’s social 
position is17. 
The domestic space of the Derrick house, like the office, accumulates and circulates texts 
and signs, and whether they are echoes of other places (the Italy of Ruskin, the antebellum 
South of Calhoun) or ritual spatializations of ideological constructs (the all-male dining room 
with the posturing Magnus at the head of the table), they tend to obscure and mystify the work 
of writing. Yet, again, just as these two spaces are both separate and conjoined, the two 
functions of the office and the house—ideologizing and rationalizing—cannot be kept strictly 
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separate. On one hand, both Annie’s fetishes of culture and Magnus’s trappings of 
patriarchical largesse and hospitality are purchased by the flows of value that are 
simultaneously produced and siphoned off in the office; on the other, the structures of 
precapitalist modes of production reproduce themselves in the office in the excess signification 
of the gold-and-green railing that demarcates the ritual and theatrical “proper” space of 
Magnus and Harran as property owners. The Derrick ranch house is a space in which other 
spaces are represented, produced, imagined, and staged; simultaneously, its own material 
spatiality echoes the spatial histories that have produced it. However, most readers of the novel 
have overlooked the rather unsubtle way the house itself models a kind of late-nineteenth-
century American national geography; the office, tenuously but irrevocably connected to the 
house proper, stands for both the unsentimental realism of western business while the living 
space “with its white picket fence, its few flower beds, and grove of eucalyptus trees” (7) 
literally contain the “East” as an awkward (and aging) marriage of South and North. The 
Yankee Annie, with her love of picturesque neatness and order, and the Carolinian Magnus, 
who (we are told twice) resembles “the later portraits of the Duke of Wellington”—that is, he 
looks like a likeness of an aristocrat—are so much associated with visuality and the order of 
visual differences and similarities, that it should come as no surprise that both the geography 
and the history of the United States are coded up in the spatial ordering of their living space. 
Moreover, although the Derricks and their house stand for an “East” that has invaded the west 
for the dual purposes of settlement and exploitation, the unseverable umbilicus to the office 
marks the ineluctable nearness of an alien and sublimely unsettling West, and hence the degree 
to which the West has colonized them, their hopes, their imaginations, their nightmares. It is 
worth mentioning here, on the other hand, that Annie and Magnus fall short of being the 
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“ideal” Yankee or Southerner of regional literature. As Ohioan and (North) Carolinian, they 
are neither New England Brahmin nor Virginia Cavalier, and Annie’s youthful poverty and 
Magnus’s early political defeats in the antebellum South mark both of them as veritable 
refugees from the economic contradictions of prewar capitalism. If the “West” is always a 
economic and political hinterland of a central “East,” then Annie and Magnus, who find 
themselves out of place in the West of the Gilded Age, have always been westerners of a sort. 
Therefore, if the formal design of the house reproduces Gilded Age geography, it also 
recapitulates and is materially informed by the fluidity and evanescence of that geography, 
including the contradictions of antebellum space that gave rise to the equally contradictory 
spatiality of the West. 
 
Blood on the tracks 
Clearly, my argument is at odds with Michael Davitt Bell’s contention that Norris’s 
representations of “habitations and their decoration […] are almost uniformly without either 
irony or point” (128). Indeed, it is precisely my point that Norris himself seems to go out of his 
way to make meaningful spaces that, ironically, his characters—and even his narrator—cannot 
always read clearly. But even this irony would be conventional and uninteresting were not 
these enigmatic and contradictory spaces themselves often either are dedicated to the 
production of spatial knowledges or presuppose a high degree of artificiality and intentionality, 
of “produced-ness,” of space itself. For example, the very beginning of Book II finds the 
treacherous Lyman Derrick in his San Francisco law office; and, while the Los Muertos office 
is a site of moribund and passive watching (at least as we see it in Book I), Lyman’s office “on 
the tenth floor of the Exchange Building, a beautiful, tower-like affair of white stone” (287) is 
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characterized by efficiency and quiet bustle: We first encounter Lyman “dictating letters to his 
typewriter”—in 1901, a name for both a machine and a worker who was intended to work 
efficiently as a machine18—in a voice “regular, precise, businesslike,” the stenographer 
afterward departing and “closing the door behind her, softly discreetly.” Lyman’s office 
doubles the Los Muertos office—but with distinct differences. The spatial organization of the 
Los Muertos office tries (but fails) to keep the technical side of production separate from the 
social result of exploitation—separate, that is, from both property and propriety, from 
landownership as a precapitalist economic form and from Magnus’s “character” as 
performative role. Conversely, Lyman’s office metonymizes the rationalization of command 
itself. Although both spaces indulge in ostentation, Magnus’s ostentation—the water sprinkler, 
greyhounds, whisky and soda water, special chair for the cat Princess Nathalie, the house’s 
other gemütlich trappings—serves to mask the office’s roles as a space of production. On the 
other hand, Lyman’s office décor emphasizes the office’s function as both museum and 
administrative space—a space, that is, both from which geographic space is organized and 
within which the metonymic traces of the organized territory are contained. To this extent, 
Lyman’s office represents both a rival control center and a rival mode of representing space.  
Pacing the office, Lyman sees neither the trappings of domesticity nor the signifiers of his 
own landownership, but a 
Few choice engravings—portraits of Marshall, Taney, Field, and a coloured 
lithograph—excellently done—of the Grand Cañon [sic] of the Colorado—
the deep-seated leather chairs, the large and crowded bookcase (topped with 
a bust of James Lick, and a huge greenish globe), the waste basket of woven 
coloured grass, made by Navajo Indians, the massive silver inkstand on the 
139  
 
 
desk, the elaborate filing cabinet, complete in every particular, and he 
shelves of tin boxes, padlocked, impressive, grave, bearing the names of 
clients, cases, and estates. (286) 
While Magnus’s house tries to preserve the domesticity of an antebellum past, Lyman’s office 
attempts to represent the fluidity of the present through metonymy. The décor, both the 
furnishings and bric-a-brac, of Lyman’s office is characterized by material heterogeneity; yet, 
the very arbitrariness of the items alludes to the imperial, omnivorous character of the railroad, 
both as capital and as technical system. But another ambiguity marks this collection of 
souvenirs; for neither the railroad as technē nor the railroad as capital needs souvenirs, since 
the railroad is interested in neither “authenticity” nor memory. As Susan Stewart has pointed 
out, souvenirs (properly speaking) both “authenticate a past or otherwise remote experience 
and […] discredit the present” (139). For Stewart, the antiquarian, or collector of souvenirs, 
seeks both to establish a tie to the past and to repress the very rupture that putatively gives 
value to the souvenir: “[T]he impulse of such souvenirs [as ‘old-fashioned’ artifacts] is to 
simultaneously transform nature into art as they mourn the loss of ‘pure nature’ at a point of 
origin” (143). As a collector of souvenirs, then, Lyman not only signals a spurious connection 
with the authenticity of both the natural and the historical, he also unintentionally signals a 
wish to remain connected to his father and his world of “great men” and heroic undertakings. 
On the other hand, these objects are all “souvenirs” of the railroad, of its economic operations, 
not of Lyman personally; they allude not to what was known directly and now only 
remembered, but to what has been subsumed by an objective and “alien” social process, a 
process in which Lyman merely plays the role of a bureaucrat. In the spatial context of, say, 
Magnus’s farmhouse, these objects may legitimately function as souvenirs, but in Lyman’s 
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office they become, in essence, a series of specimens in a railroad museum. Hence, both of 
these spaces contain the spaces controlled therein as representations. But while the 
arrangement Magnus’s office spatially figures the traditional and fixed relationship of 
proprietor and territory, Lyman’s office defies traditional spatial meanings; textual inscription, 
mathematization, and a kind of deterritorialized metonymy take the place of a hierarchical 
symbolic arrangement of space. What’s more, this very deterritorialization points to the way 
Lyman’s status and power, dependent as they are on the railroad’s restless conquest of more 
spaces, are both ephemeral and—to a great degree—spurious.  
Yet, the office, as the place where both railway rates and land ownership are managed, 
doubly mediates between the spatiality of the railroad and the spatiality of the ranch. On one 
hand, landownership requires legal mediation—in the form of the assignment and recording of 
deeds—between the fixed physical character of land itself and its fungibility as an economic 
good. Such mediation allows land to be bought and sold and thereby integrated into the logic 
of capital. On the other hand, the judgments of the California Railroad Commission, of which 
Lyman is a member, mediate the function of the rail system as both “common carrier”—that 
is, as a joint project of the bourgeoisie as a class for the rationalization of production in 
general—and as a set of separate and competing productive capitals seeking to extract surplus 
value directly. In other words, the office is both a place in which land is converted into 
something like a commodity and one in which the driving-down of the turnover time of 
capitalist production is overseen and regulated. Moreover, the law is also supposed to 
intervene impartially between the claims of the ranchers and those of the railroad. The office 
makes itself a center of power at the expense of all preexisting fixed political spatialities, then, 
precisely by turning real space into representations of space. For example, among the 
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inscriptions crowding together in Lyman’s law office is the “commissioner’s official railway 
map of the State of California” showing “a vast, complicated network of red lines marked P. 
and S.W.R.R.” (288). As Leigh Ann Litwiller Berte has pointed out, this map both echoes the 
one in Magnus’s office and differs significantly from it, focusing on “two types of force—
economic and political—that circulate at the state level,” instead of on local agronomic data 
and property boundaries; for Berte, “each [map] offers a contradictory reading of the same 
landscape, each one emphasizing another layer of ownership and control of the lands in 
question” (208). Yet these maps, as they move from smaller to larger spatial scales, also 
paradoxically ascend in both degree of abstraction and artifactuality. That is, unlike the 
representation of the complex and contingent mixing of soil types, the Railroad Commission 
map can represent the differences among railroad capitals with only four colors—red green, 
yellow, blue—because it stands for the railroads not as technical systems, but as capital. These 
two maps, then, not only represent two different views on the political spaces of California; 
they are also rival instruments for the control—and hence the production—of those very 
spaces. The maps in Lyman’s office materially participate, that is, in the political and 
technosocial subsumption of the processes represented in the map hanging in Magnus’s ranch 
office. 
But if the map itself is simultaneously representation of, metonymic representative for, 
and element within the processes of economic production and reproduction, it also appears to 
Lyman as a kind of apocalyptic window onto the sublime shapelessness, the uncanny vitality 
of those same processes. Lyman imagines the map as 
a veritable system of blood circulation, complicated, dividing, and 
reuniting, branching, splitting, extending, throwing off feelers, off-shoots, 
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tap roots, feeders—diminutive little blood suckers that shot out from the 
main jugular and went twisting up into some remote country, laying hold 
upon some forgotten village or town, involving it in one of a myriad of 
branching coils, one of a hundred tentacles, drawing it, as it were, toward 
that centre from which all this system sprang. (289) 
Here, although San Francisco is itself the “centre from which all this system [springs],” Lyman 
imagines this “system” as something alien, monstrous, and excessive—that is, paradoxically, 
as “decentered.” Moreover, Lyman’s vision, like that of Magnus and Harran, is itself 
excessive. It interrupts the work of the railroad commissioner, and hence of the Commission; 
as an interpretive act it obstructs agency instead of converting itself into new writing. Even the 
narrator uses both spatializing metaphors and metaphors of corporeal sublimnity, but they are 
largely confused and clumsy metaphors. A circulatory system, after all, does not “throw off” 
feelers or tap roots, and certainly not tentacles.  The narrator tells us that Lyman sees the rail 
network as a “huge, sprawling organism, with its ruddy arteries converging to a central point” 
(289), but arteries, strictly speaking, diverge from a central point, nourishing the extremities 
which are arguably parasitic on this center. And in any case, the jugular, which the narrator 
had originally called the central channel of this network, does carry blood toward the central 
coronary muscle, but away from the brain—the “nerve center”—which is the implicit analogy 
for Lyman’s office.  In short, the very metaphors that mean to imagine the establishment of a 
totalitarian, vampiric center are nevertheless haunted by polycentricity; the evocation of the 
organic and hierarchic body nonetheless conjures the asignifying aspect of corporeality, the 
literal acephaly of much of the body’s processes. Moreover, by confusing the relations of 
priority and dependence of the railroad as property, the railroad as capital, and the railroad as 
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technosocial system, the rhetoric here undermines the sublimnity of the vampire trope by 
recalling the ephemerality and vulnerability of parasitism itself. 
It is impossible to have both the world of fixed spatial meaning and that of the railroad; 
but this also means it is impossible to “have” the railroad at all. Lyman’s attempt to reproduce 
the “authentic” in his office fails because the signs of both his filial alignment and his rivalry 
with his father even more surely signify the omnivorous extent of the railroad system and the 
degree to which Lyman himself has already become as much the consumed as the consumer. 
The more the world is drawn into the rail network, the more human agency and intentionality 
are excluded from their central place in that network. But by no means is intentionality 
obliterated; rather, it is subsumed. We have already seen how some spaces—the pilot-house of 
the western steamboat, Harran and Magnus’s office at the Los Muertos ranch—are doubly 
“decentered” by technosocial forces. They first fail to become really central because of their 
technical limitations—limitations that render the centrality of such spaces specular, and not 
functional. Then, they become caught in an endless and often catastrophic struggle over 
control and power which dissolves all spatial relationships. In the antebellum world, no place 
can be central because so much escapes the rationalization of space; in the postbellum world, 
conversely, no place can remain central because nothing escapes the rationalization of space. 
In The Octopus, however, the rationalization of space does not so much supercede older codes 
of spatial meaning as retain them as fetishes. What Lyman glimpses in his apocalyptic vision 
is the conversion of fixed places into liquid assets for the rail network. But the very 
incoherence of that vision reveals not simply that Lyman is a hypocrite for his nostalgic 
despair over the work of the railroad, but that nostalgia itself is both product and factor of that 
144  
 
 
very work. Lyman’s central place of authority has been produced by the same processes that 
threaten to undermine all central places.  
Lyman sees the cultural life of Northern California’s geographic center as reflecting and 
reproducing the same flux which undoes the centrality of farms and small towns of the 
California backcountry. From his office vantage, he sees in San Francisco “a continuous 
interest in small things, a people ever willing to be amused at trifles, refusing to consider 
serious matters” (287). In perpetual motion but without direction, “the city swarm[s] 
tumultuous through its grooves” in a kind of polymorphous perversity of commerce, its 
“grooves” always folding it back on itself and frustrating the possibility of any escape beyond 
its own limits. Lyman’s disapproval echoes the industrialist Cedarquist’s opinion that fin-de-
siècle San Francisco is “not a city” at all, but “a Midway Plaisance” (303). And, since 
Cedarquist’s contempt for the city’s (feminine-gendered) festivals and pageants seems to echo 
the narrator’s own condemnation of “the Fake, the eternal, irrepressible Sham” (314) as waste 
and decadence, it might seem reasonable to take these musings as a straightforward expression 
of the novel’s own stance. Yet in the very same chapter, Cedarquist himself argues that 
overproduction is inevitable, insisting that while “the great word of the nineteenth century has 
been Production,” the “great word of the twentieth century will be […] Markets” (305). Thus, 
while Cedarquist laments the decadence of mere consumption, along with its demand for 
works of art and other such feminized products, he nevertheless understands the limits of 
production considered as the mere intensification and rationalization of social labor. Neither 
moralistic disdain for waste nor practical preference for parsimony over excess, but anxiety 
over getting stuck in the same grooves, of spatial containment and the threat of catastrophe 
that accompanies it, motivates Cedarquist’s remarks. Moreover, as if to reinforce his point, 
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Cedarquist later points out that his shipping business will be funded by “the sale of the plant 
and scrap iron of the Atlas Works,” Cedarquist’s failed industrial venture (648). The transport 
infrastructure, in the form of its most “liquid” capital, is reborn from the ashes of spatially 
fixed capital, while in contrast, the aesthetes of San Francisco continue to reterritorialize—
literally and vulgarly—surpluses, in the form of “a figure of California—heroic size—[made] 
of dried apricots.” Cedarquist, then, both reiterates and reframes the problem of Lyman’s 
apocalypse of the vampiric proliferation of railroad spatiality. Cedarquist’s conclusion seems 
to be that resisting the flux and catastrophe of capital is futile, a conclusion that, in turn, seems 
to sum up the novel’s “large view”; paradoxically, though, “taking a view,” even the large one 
that Lyman takes, seems everywhere in The Octopus to be aligned with stasis and, hence to 
vulnerability. 
 
Now they were to see the real thing 
Much of Book Two’s Chapter IV narrates a raid by the ruined former engineer and hop 
farmer Dyke on a Pacific and Southwestern passenger train; this is one of the few passages in 
The Octopus actually concerned with the railroad as technology and the only one which 
represents the actual experience of railway travel. To some degree, the train carriage that the 
newly-married Buck and Hilma Annixter ride upon mirrors the Los Muertos farmhouse’s odd 
and uneasy mixture of the domestic and the industrial-managerial. After Hilma sits “up in bed 
to say her prayers,” she “[goes] to sleep with the directness of a little child” (412) in her berth, 
in a scene which allows her to remain the “angel in the house” even when the “house” is a 
massive steam-powered industrial machine; meanwhile, Buck, like Magnus and Harran 
staying up half the night watching the stock ticker, “dozed and tossed and fretted for hours, 
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consulting his watch and time-table whenever there was a stop.” Likewise the Annixters’ 
company of fellow passengers—“a lady with three children, a group of school-teachers, a 
couple of drummers, a stout gentleman with whiskers, and a well-dressed young man in a plaid 
traveling cap”—bring into contact both the commercial and the familial, the foreign and the 
local, the experienced and the callow. 
The claustral, straitened space of the railway carriage makes even the kind of imperfect 
spatial separations of Los Muertos house impossible, even if the passengers manage to persist 
in performing their class and gender roles. Yet, even these performative differences begin to 
break down when the train is attacked. Certainly, Norris writes that the group of 
schoolteachers “huddled together like sheep, [and held] on to each other, looking to the men, 
silently, for protection” (416); but nevertheless, 
the lady with the children looked out from her berth, smiled reassuringly, 
and said: 
“I’m not a bit frightened. They won’t do anything to us if we keep 
quiet. I’ve my watch and jewelry all ready for them in my little black bag, 
see?” 
If the women on Norris’s train begin to sort themselves according to their panicked or calm 
reaction to the hold up, so do the “drummers” vociferously call down one of their colleagues 
who, “flourishing a pocket revolver,” proposes to leave the railcar and confront the bandits: 
[H]e was going out. he didn’t proposed to be buncoed without a fight. he 
wasn’t any coward. 
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“Well, you don’t go, that’s all,” said his friend, angrily. “There’s 
women and children in this car. You aren’t going to draw the fire here.” 
(417) 
If at first, the rail carriage had seemed like a kind of middle-class tenement, in which late 
nineteenth-century subjects struggled to perform their identities within the confines of the 
rationalized and “efficient” railway technosocial system, it now seems like a pressure vessel in 
which those very roles are neither abolished nor reinforced, but reorganized and refined. 
Women are still silently dependent on men, and men must maintain their agency, but there is 
no room in the railcar for either simpering or bravado.  
While theatricality recedes in the confines of the carriage, what emerges is close 
attention, the individual and collective transformation of sensory signals into a coherent 
narrative about the robbery. The train-robbery passage, in fact, focuses as much of its attention 
on the sensations of the robbery as the passengers do themselves. The narrator meticulously 
reports the “hideous ear-splitting rasp” produced by the trains airbrakes (414), the lull during 
which the “stillness of the night outside was so profound that the rain, dripping from the car 
roof upon the road-bed underneath” (414-415), the “four pistol shots” of the gun battle 
between Dyke and the trainmen (416), and the “sound of a heavy explosion” as Dyke 
dynamites the train’s cashbox (418). The train’s passengers, in turn, comment on each of these 
sounds, making guesses (as often wrong as right) about the events beyond the walls and 
windows of the carriage. This anxious speculation echoes the way Magnus and Harran wait by 
their stock ticker throughout the night during harvest season; the passengers, moreover, are as 
helpless to stop the robbery as the Derricks are to affect wheat prices. Indeed, the sense of 
impotence is even intensified after the robbery; as the train stands abandoned, “bereft of its 
148  
 
 
engine, a huge decapitated monster,” the passengers despair more than they had “when the 
actual danger threatened” (419). However, the point here is that in the moment of crisis what 
distinguishes the “shriek[ing] and cower[ing] schoolteachers and the nervous drummer from 
the young mother, the “well-dressed” doctor, and Annixter himself, is the fact that the latter 
interpret the sounds and sights of the robbery with a degree of reserve, as if they have already 
been prepared for it. When the passengers hear the sounds of the gun battle, the narrator tries 
to make sense of their anxiety, their state of watchfulness that is neither outright terror nor 
tranquility: “It had come to them at last, this, they had so often read about. Now they were to 
see the real thing, now they were to face actuality, face this danger of the night, leaping in 
from out the blackness of the roadside, masked, armed, ready to kill. They were facing it now. 
They were held up” (416). The passengers are almost all familiar with “this,” the train holdup, 
from the proliferation of robbery narratives in sensational journalism, popular drama, and the 
dime novel. Of the passengers who keep their heads, on the other hand, we know that for 
Annixter “there were only Dickens's works” (26) and that the well-dressed doctor reads 
Alphonse Daudet’s Tartarin de Tarascon on the train.  The scene in the sleeper car, then, 
differs revealingly from that of the stock ticker; although both scenes are of anxious attention, 
here something close to a sense of ennui—literally, of annoyance—replaces the sublime terror 
of being swallowed up utterly by titanic forces. Moreover, textuality here—what the 
passengers have “so often read about”—has already rehearsed the scene for the passengers, 
instead of masking it, as Magnus’s Calhounian rhetoric or Annie’s aestheticist poetics provide 
an imaginary refuge from the world of shocks and collisions. 
Several other differences between Buck-Hilma and Magnus-Annie, if not absolute, are 
equally illuminating. For example, if the former pair find themselves at home on the train in a 
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way that the latter cannot in the industrializing West, the Annixters also make their literal 
home in the thoroughly modern fashion—by spending a “most delicious week” scouring “the 
department stores of [San Francisco], the carpet stores, the furniture stores” (406), a process 
that Hilma explicitly calls “be[ing] serious and get[ting] to work.” The Annixters’ shopping 
spree is a kind of labor, a labor making use of the most advanced tools: As Buck sends 
telegraphs to Quien Sabe to have the ranch house made ready for the new consumer goods, 
Buck and Hilma begin dispatching the spoils back to the San Joaquín—via the Pacific and 
Southwestern. For, if the train cars are themselves outfitted with the trappings of the Victorian 
household—“their nickelled fittings, their plate glass, their upholstery, vestibules, and the like” 
(419)—they are also the conduits by which this kind of household can be materially 
propagated across the continent, and the railroad thus acts as an instrument for the 
industrialization of domesticity outside the space of the rail carriage. Such scenes register not 
so much the abolition of antebellum class and gender arrangements than the enchainment of 
these arrangements in industrialized space, an enchainment that nevertheless transforms these 
arrangements as if from within.  In fact the same kind of luxury and abundance found in the 
Derrick house is found once again in the P&SW rail carriage and in the department stores of 
San Francisco; only the spatial relations, both imaginary and real, change. If by cordoning off 
the space of industrial production from the space of domesticity, the Derricks believe they can 
also hold capitalist subsumption with its contingencies and catastrophes at bay, the Annixters 
are happy merely to disavow the fact that they are themselves really subsumed, to play, as it 
were, with the conventions of “separate spheres” even though they know very well that their 
own mode of consumption both presupposes and furthers the historical torsioning of this 
separation. Buck and Hilma insist that “their new home should be entirely equipped by San 
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Francisco dealers,” not because these furnishings restage the illusion of the orderly eastern 
farmhouse, but precisely because they are acquired by the paradoxically ludic work of buying 
and bargaining. Their purchases can be “bought everywhere” yet are “wonder[s]”—and, 
indeed, perhaps, are wonders just because they can be bought everywhere, because they are 
infinitely fungible. Buck and Annie’s treatment of homemaking recalls, if half a century early, 
Jean Baudrillard’s distinction between “[t]he typical bourgeois interior” (13) and “the 
externalized atmosphere of modern ‘interiors’” (23). For Baudrillard, the use value of 
furnishings and décor in “modern” homemaking arises “neither in appropriation nor in 
intimacy but in information, in inventiveness, in control, in a continual openness to objective 
messages—in short, in the syntagmatic calculation which is […] the foundation of the 
discourse of the modern home-dweller.” The homemaker, that is, finds a degree of 
“transcendence,” not in inhabiting the relatively fixed symbolic space of the home, but in 
negotiating, arranging, and supervising the syntagms of things. Baudrillard writes, “The 
subject is himself the order he [sic] put into things, and this order excludes redundancy: man 
has simply to remove himself from the picture” (25); the homeowner “removes himself” as the 
rail dispatcher stands above and outside the operation of trains, as the manager in his glassed-
in office inserts himself into the production process by removing himself from it. Here, in fact, 
is a kind of industrialized consumption, where calculation and productive enchainment take 
the place of sentimentality and “authenticity”—even if the goods themselves are little different 
from the ones that furnish the Derrick house. 
The most striking difference between the stock ticker passage and that of the train 
robbery, however, is less one of real spaces than of the imagination of these spaces, of their 
outsides and insides. Magnus (prophetically, as it turns out) imagines himself facing not only 
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subsumption by capital, but even consumption by it, the state of being like his ranch, a “part of 
an enormous whole, a unit in the vast agglomeration of wheat land the whole world round” 
(54); the coming of universalized exchange—the advent of risks based not on the weather or 
social vicissitudes, but on the success or failure of millions of other enterprises—seems like a 
thing, something very like an octopus. Moreover, since the Derricks are already “feeling the 
effects of causes thousands of miles distant,” the vision of the approaching monster comes too 
late; they are already consumed, already assimilated. In contrast, the Annixters take for granted 
the state of being—literally—already inside capital, with the railroad as both its instrument 
and metonym. Telegraphing overseers, buying and bargaining, consulting watches and 
timetables—the Annixters at first seem to be cognitively and physically integrated parts and 
users of the railroad apparatus, as Buck makes clear to Hilma when she worries that the train 
will arrive in Bonneville in the early hours of the morning: “‘Never mind,’ [Buck] declared, 
‘we’ll go home in Pullman’s, Hilma [sic]. […] No sir, it is Pullman’s or nothing. When it 
comes to buying furniture, I don’t shine, perhaps, but I know what’s due my wife’” (408).  
Buck’s boast shows he understands the new sexual division of labor in terms of the new spatial 
division of labor: department stores are for women to understand, railway carriages are for 
men. At the same time, since these two spaces are themselves parts of an integrated and 
rationalized spatiality, it also illustrates the degree to which gender roles themselves have been 
“rationalized.” Only when the passengers encounter the “interminable period of silence,” when 
the train is left “[h]elpless, bereft of its engine” (419), do they begin to feel the kind of “fear” 
and “terror” that Magnus and Harran had felt in their vigil around the ticker. What terrifies the 
Derricks is the phantasy of assimilation, of the collapse of their private space in the midst of, 
but outside, capital; conversely, what appears to the train passengers is a void beyond the
152  
 
 
space of capital itself. While the image of a voracious, formless, limitless economic organism 
figures the triumph of the rationalizing tendency of capital over individuality and the 
entrepreneurial sprit—thereby registering the paradoxical fact that this tendency is itself 
founded on violence and “original accumulation”—the endless “night and rain” of the stranded 
passengers suggests that only nothingness lies beyond the space subsumed by this process. If 
the forces of capital seem inhuman to those trapped by them, what lies outside these processes 
is radically not-human, elemental, almost pre-organic. 
If the railroad passage equates the space of the rail carriage with the historical forces 
pressuring the gendered “separate spheres” of the nineteenth century, while simultaneously 
representing it as machine that remakes gender as function instead of place, then, it also paints 
this rationalized space as nevertheless subject to violence, accidents, jolts, explosions, 
confusion, and rupture. Moreover, these traumas mark the limit of the passengers’ ability to 
make themselves at home in the cars; even Buck and Hilma find that there are shocks to the 
system for which they have not rehearsed. The railroad carriage, both in its claustral yet vitally 
heterogeneous spatiality, and in its vulnerability to traumatic irruptions, metonymizes the way 
the second half of The Octopus shifts to a great extent from the outdoor spaces of the San 
Joaquin Valley to the indoor spaces of San Francisco, from an agricultural scene of uncluttered 
vistas to urban (or railway) scenes dense with bodies, machines, and writing. 
 
The old instinct for the familiar levers 
When Magnus and Harran fearfully read the global roil of commodities in the sigils of 
their ticker tapes, when Lyman ruefully observes the excesses and inefficiencies of capital 
while also dimly perceiving the obsolescence of his own role as privileged interpreter of 
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capitalist spaces, when Annixter’s fellow passengers encounter the spatial void penetrated by 
railroads but beyond the signification of railroad maps and timetables, we ourselves encounter 
both the power and the limits of the elevated and panoramic—yet place-bound—mode of 
perception that the novel consistently links to landowning propertarian capital and its 
associated superstructural formations. Capitalism not only assigns landowning capitalists and 
their allies a place of power that is nonetheless always-already under threat, it also produces in 
them a mode of perceiving space that both blinds them to the nature of their vulnerability and 
renders that vulnerability sublimely yet spectrally ubiquitous. 
Neither landowning nor industrial capital as such represents the novel’s only point of 
view, however. Much of the second half of the narrative focuses on the struggles of the 
erstwhile locomotive engineer Dyke, his attempt to establish himself as a hop farmer, and his 
subsequent economic collapse and failed armed conflict with the P. and S.W. Of all the 
novel’s characters who struggle against the railroad, Dyke seems the least attached to place 
and the most adaptable to change, and at first Dyke is marked by the absence of any tendency 
to apocalyptic visions or brooding fantasies about capitalist spatialities. On the other hand, this 
means that Dyke, compared to the novel’s other characters, is both generally unreflective and 
naïvely optimistic about the way those very spatialities work. With the exception of 
Cedarhurst, only Dyke consistently tries to prosper from the fluidity of capitalist spatiality 
instead of in spite of it. And in fact, he eventually fails not because overproduction drives 
down the price of his commodities, but because he fails to anticipate the rise in freight rates 
due to the underproduction of those very commodities; instead of being cheated by the 
railroad, Dyke cheats himself by setting his prices to cheaply in advance. Dyke, whose plan at 
first seems to take advantage of the same upheavals that threaten the wheat farmers, is in the 
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end undone not by the leviathan of globalizing production but by the speed at which the 
information of prices is propagated. His situation, then, inverts that of Magnus and Harran 
earlier in the novel: While the Derricks imagine themselves as helpless before the advance of a 
rationalized spatiality that threatens to obliterate the agricultural proprietor’s spatial autonomy, 
Dyke—whose thinking seems to have already adapted to industrialized space—finds himself 
on the other side of this advance, facing the condition of Vogelfreiheit that obtains everywhere 
within the space of capitalist subsumption. If much of the novel suggests the impossibility of 
hiding, of finding a refuge from spatial flux, Dyke’s story seems to imply that it is equally 
impossible to identify directly with the roil and shock of industrialized space. 
As one of the novel’s few examples of a productive laborer, in fact, Dyke seems rather to 
overidentify with spatial fluidity. We first see him “leaning on his folded arms from the cab 
window of [his] freight engine” like some steam-era centaur, and the narrator describes him as 
“a heavy built, well-looking fellow […] with great shoulders and massive, hairy arms, and a 
tremendous, rumbling voice” (16-17). Dyke is both like and a part of the rail apparatus; he 
literally has no distance from it. Hence, when Dyke chances upon an idling locomotive as he 
flees from a pursuing posse, he treats the encounter as a kind of homecoming: “[H]is eye fell 
upon the detached locomotive that lay quietly steaming on the up line, and with a thrill of 
exultation, he remembered that he was an engineer born and bred” (474). We read, “His pistol 
was in his hand, as once more on foot, he sprang toward the lone engine [and he] swung 
himself up, dropping his pistol on the floor of the cab and reaching with the old instinct for the 
familiar levers” (474-475). The rhetoric of birth, breeding, and instinct, along with language 
suggesting self-coordinating corporeality—the eye, hand, foot, all work together without the 
mediation of mind or consciousness—contrasts sharply with the language of interiority and 
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imagination the novel associates with most of its other characters. And yet, this language itself 
only further identifies Dyke with the locomotive, itself troped as a titanic organism: 
The engine moved, advanced […] and gathering speed, rolled out on the 
track beyond. Smoke, black and boiling, shot skyward from the stack; not a 
joint that did not shudder with the mighty strain of steam; but the great iron 
brute […] came to call, obedient and docile as soon as ever the great pulsing 
heart of it felt a master hand upon its levers. It gathered its speed, bracing its 
steel muscles, its thews of iron, and roared out upon the open track, filling 
the air with the rasp of its tempest-breath, blotting the sunshine with the 
belch of its hot, thick smoke. (475) 
If the locomotive is an organism, then Dyke would seem to be the ghost in the machine, the 
mind within the body; but even here, Dyke is metonymically troped as body himself: a master 
hand. The implication is that Dyke is a thinking body, one born and bred to merge with the 
railroad system. Hence, the merging of Dyke and the locomotive becomes the perfect 
perceiving, thinking, speed-producing, space-annihilating assemblage. 
Magnus and Annie Derrick’s house is designed to efface fluidity and ephemerality. 
Meanwhile, Lyman Derrick and Buck Annixter try to strike a compromise with spatial flux. 
Knowing very well that spaces can only be occupied ephemerally, their fetishistic practices 
nonetheless both participate in and seem to master spatial flux. Dyke, in contrast, is both 
physically and directly involved in the production of spatial change itself. He tries neither to 
isolate himself from railroad spatiality nor to recreate his “own” space within that spatiality; 
rather, he is already at home in that spatiality. In the locomotive cab, escaping from the 
railroad agents, 
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He was back in his old place again; once more he was the engineer; once 
more he felt the engines quiver under him; the familiar noises were in his 
ears; the familiar buffeting of the wind surged, roaring at his face; the 
familiar odours [sic] of hot steam and smoke reeked in his nostrils, and on 
either side of him, parallel panoramas, the two halves of the landscape 
sliced, as it were, in two by the clashing wheels of his engine, streamed by 
in green and brown blurs. (477) 
Here, the chaotic and turbulent information of the senses is not only converted immediately 
into action, but this action is immediately of both body and machine. And when the posse tries 
to derail Dyke by opening a rail switch ahead of his locomotive, he “[sees] the trick” 
immediately—his engineer’s “instincts” unthinkingly interpreting the messages of the rail 
semaphore system—in stark contrast to his pursuers, who “[have] been clever enough, quick-
witted enough, to open the switch, but had forgotten the automatic semaphores that worked 
simultaneously with the movement of the rails” (477). At first, Dyke eludes the posse precisely 
because their relation to the railroad is one of property and law, not production; consequently, 
they simply don’t have the instincts to catch him. On the other hand, the instinct for spatial 
fluidity is not itself enough to beat the railroad; Dyke is, of course, finally caught precisely 
because the railroad is not an infinite space in which his paradoxically finely-trained 
“instincts” can operate. Because the railroad is materially, and not simply formally, property, 
the railroad men can fence Dyke in: They control the telegraphs, which they use to signal 
ahead to the switchman to open the switch that cuts Dyke off, and they can enlist the power of 
the sheriff, who can himself commandeer a locomotive in the “‘Name of the State of 
California’” (476). Consequently, although capital both provides avenues of escape and hones 
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the “instincts” for rebellion, it also wields the political power of reterritorialization. Dyke’s 
story and Magnus Derrick’s story are not really schematic opposites, but the difference 
between them suggests that if a naïve attempt to evade or disavow spatial fluidity always leads 
to a trap, so does any naïve embrace or accommodation of it. Subjectivity characterized by a 
affinity, whether learned or “instinctive,” for technosocial change and physical motion, can be 
just as much a kind of false consciousness as a subjectivity marked by a sentimental or 
narcissistic attachment to place.  
Dyke’s failed bid for independence from railroad control doubles the ranchers’ mass 
rabbit hunt on the eve of the fatal confrontation between them and the US marshal who has 
been sent to dispossess them. The panicked retreat of the swarm of rabbits before the 
organized (and mechanized) ranchers allegorizes the hapless resistance of all the residents of 
the San Joaquin: 
Their antics were infinite. No two [rabbits] acted exactly precisely alike. 
Some lay stubbornly close in a little depression between the two clods, till 
the horses’ hoofs were all but upon them, then sprang out from their hiding-
place at the last second. Others ran forward but a few yards at a time, 
refusing to take flight, scenting a greater danger before them than behind. 
Still others, forced up at the last moment, doubled with lightning alacrity in 
their tracks, turning back to scuttle between the teams, taking desperate 
chances. (499) 
The rabbits’ futile and “stubborn” stillness, their retreat into “hiding-places,” may be 
appropriate metaphors for the Derricks’ stance toward the conflict with the railroad; but once 
in flight, the rabbits seem to figure Dyke’s final attempt at escape from the railroad and its 
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agents. They appear as a mass of bodies that are themselves aggregates of ears and eyes, tails 
and legs. Here, the rabbits’ instinct for speed, their keen senses—along with their legendary 
fecundity—which make them an easy match for an individual hunter, are turned against them 
by the organized ranchers. Unthinking, the rabbits cannot see the “larger picture” of the hunt, 
and the spatial strategy of the ranchers overwhelms their natural affinity for speed and agility, 
forcing them to “[double] with lightning alacrity in their tracks, [turn] back to scuttle between 
the teams, [and take] desperate chances,” instinctive tactics that, again, echo those taken by 
Dyke as he runs from the law. 
Both Dyke’s flight from the agents of the law and the scene of the rabbit hunt, then, also 
parallel the fate of Minna Hooven, who moves to San Francisco with her mother and little 
sister Hilda after her father is killed in the armed confrontation at the Los Muertos irrigation 
ditch. Turned out of their rooming house, Mrs. Hooven and the Hilda are endlessly harassed 
by policemen who demand that they keep moving (593).  The pair, first out of paralyzing 
anxiety, then out of “lassitude,” resist the way the enforcers of the law constantly urge them 
forward, continually returning to the same street corner, then remaining for days in a public 
park; finally, Mrs. Hooven die of hunger. It is as if Mrs. Hooven cannot, lacks the “instinct,” 
to obey the policeman’s tautological demand—“Move along, or be arrested!” Minna, on the 
other hand, seems to fare much better than her mother and sister at first; she seeks refuge in 
flophouses and churches, but eventually she becomes quite adept at using the city’s network of 
ferries and streetcars in her search for work. Out of money and exhausted, however, she finds 
herself on the University of California campus, described by the narrator as “some sort of 
public enclosure” (586), where she is at last recruited by a pander.  
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While Mrs. Hooven and Hilda travel in tight circles, going no further than Nob Hill, 
Minna traverses much of San Francisco and Berkeley; yet Minna’s literal escape from 
reterritorialization is just as short-lived. The unctuous and ostentatious procuress who enlists 
Minna is not just Minna’s final spatial destination, but with her “certain droop of fatigue in her 
eyelids” and “indefinite self-confidence of manner,” she corporealizes the same abject 
combination of theatricality and merely mechanical energy that also seems to be growing in 
Minna herself. And Minna, when Presley encounters her days later, seems—like the Magnus 
house or the interior of railway carriage in which Annixter rides—like a mere accretion of 
ornaments: 
Meanwhile, Presley had been taking in with a quick eye the details of 
Minna’s silk dress, with its garniture of lace, its edging velvet, its silver 
belt-buckle, Her hair was arranged in a new way and on here head was a 
wide hat with a flare to one side, set off with a gilt buckle and a puff of 
bright blue plush. (588). 
Her body virtually effaced and constrained by her own clothing, working in the interstices of 
capital, Minna is both parody and ultima ratio of what she sought to become in her search for a 
job. As she had sough refuge in the precapitalist world of personal service—a refuge the 
narrator explicitly characterizes as a “little niche” (584)—she has become spatially arrested; no 
longer at the advancing wave-front of capital, she has fallen, like flotsam caught in a steam’s 
backwater, into the lowest levels of the capitalist order. 
Minna’s fate, like Dyke’s, suggests that capitalist spatiality eventually either destroys or 
assimilates everything in its path. However, the trajectories of these two characters also 
suggest that capitalist spatiality does not itself propagate merely spatially. That is, what these 
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stories reveal—and what the novel’s many fantasies of octopus-like invasion and enclosure 
cannot quite see—is that capital doesn’t merely control space; rather capital is also both a way 
of seeing space and an axiomatic by which all other ways of perceiving space are put to work 
for the propagation of capital. Characters like Minna and Dyke—and, in the end, Magnus, 
too—are assigned their places in the division of labor according to their own instinctive-yet-
learned ways of seeing and knowing places. If it is meaningful to speak of the inherent 
tendency of capital to develop unevenly—and of this tendency’s essential function in capitalist 
accumulation—we can also see in The Octopus the narration of various trajectories founded on 
the uneven development of spatial consciousness as well. In The Octopus—as, in McTeague, 
McTeague’s atavistic precapitalist lust for gold determines his actions so much that he even 
bears it with him into the empty spaces of the alkali deserts—characters’ lives are determined 
by their underdeveloped and partial ways of knowing spaces. They are not just in space; they 
are always-already contained, as it were, by their space-suits, perceptional interfaces that both 
hinder and facilitate their emplacement in capitalist spatiality. 
 
The cipher message of the eye 
So far I have shown how The Octopus does not simply use the California land conflicts of 
the late nineteenth century in general, or the Mussel Slough riot particularly, as an occasion for 
some kind of broad naturalist parable; rather, the novel thinks specifically and purposefully 
about the railroad—as institution, as technical device, and as technosocial system—and its 
spatiality. In fact, the late nineteenth-century spaces captured Norris’s imagination in much of 
his writing outside The Octopus; often, indeed, the railroad figures in his critical writing as a 
simultaneously significant and ambiguous trope. In the collection of critical essays The 
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Responsibilities of the Novelist, for example, Norris writes: “If the novel were not something 
more than a simple diversion, a means of whiling away a dull evening, a long railway journey, 
it would not […] remain in favour [sic] another day” (5). Later, he again associates the 
ephemerality of the popular novel with the railroad, calling such books “a flippant paper-
covered thing of swords and cloaks, to be carried on a railway journey and to be thrown out 
the window with the sucked oranges and peanut shells” (26). The novel, argues Norris, must 
be neither a “diversion” nor disposable; it must stand apart not only from the spiritual vacuity 
of popular entertainments, but it should shun the material excess of industrial production. 
Norris’s metaphor evokes an image of rights-of-way strewn with used books, resembling the 
tracks littered with sheep carcasses and demolished steel plants in The Octopus, and suggests 
that popular texts are part of the intellectual waste-product of industrialized transport. Norris 
also links the worthlessness of popular literature to the spaces of industrial production 
themselves, writing that “the great presses of the country are for the most part merely 
sublimated sausage machines that go dashing along in a mess of paper and printer’s ink 
turning out the meat for the monster” (80). These words, published a mere three years before 
Charles Edwards Russell’s The Greatest Trust in the World (1905) and four years before 
Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle (1906), not only trade on the public’s consciousness of the 
meatpacking industry’s adulterated and unwholesome products, but also implicitly resonate 
with Norris’s earlier dismissive railroad metonymy; for turn-of-the-century city planners, 
railways and slaughterhouses were alike places that were shunned, placed out of view, and 
hence hidden from public inspection19. 
Elsewhere, however, Norris emphatically embraces the industrialization and 
industrialized proliferation of literature, often praising both the literal and figurative mobility 
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and spatial evanescence of industrial-age life: “Instead […] of deploring the vast circulation of 
mediocre novels, let us take the larger view and find in the fact not a weakness but a veritable 
strength. The more one reads—it is a curious consolatory—the more one is apt to 
discriminate” (82). More importantly, Norris repeatedly invokes the rigor and efficiency of 
industrial production as the model of what he calls the “training” of the literary producer: 
“Given the ordinarily intelligent ten-year-old and, all things being equal, you can make 
anything you like out of him—a minister of the gospel or a green-goods man, and electrical 
engineer or a poet, or […] a novelist” (98). Moreover, he writes, if “all this modern, all this 
gigantic perfected machinery—all this restless trend of a commercial civilization were set in 
motion in favor of the little aspirant for honours in artistic fields, who is to say […] he would 
not in the end be a successful artist, painter, poet musician, or novelist” (99). Here, the 
“restlessness” of capital, its “motion,” stands not only for the productive power of capital, but 
for its capacity to produce the authentically new, even in the midst of repetition and fraud. But 
without such intensive, industrialized, technical formation, the aspiring writer will inevitably 
be a product of the restlessness and fluidity of capitalism—but a shoddy one: “Other men’s 
books take the place of imagination for the young man; creation for him is satisfied by dramas, 
horse races, and amusements. The newspapers are his observation and oh, how he assumes to 
be above any pleasure in simple, vigorous life!” (100). The trick for Norris, it would seem, is 
to be fully of the restless world of railyards and meatpacking plants without becoming 
subsumed—or consumed—by it. For, in pairing the rhetoric of “other men’s” writing “taking 
the place” of the potential writer’s productive powers with the failure of “vigor,” he equates 
immobiliazation with cuckoldry. The fixed place of the mere spectator—especially that of 
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such traditional spaces of spectatorship as the racetrack or theater—here represents a place of 
vulnerability. 
On the other hand, if the rhetorical mileage Norris gets from denouncing the literally 
trashy books ejected from trains by bored and restless passengers seems to clash with his claim 
that literary “truth” must be “as practical as a cable car” (Responsibilities 38), Norris’s 
metaphors are arguably neither as ambivalent nor as incoherent as they at first appear. The 
only excess of capitalism to which Norris really objects, seemingly, is the excessive tendency 
to disavow its own excessiveness. Hence, not the litter-strewn right-of-way, but the 
passenger’s sentimental obliviousness to it—and the texts’ complicity with that 
obliviousness—is what Norris condemns. “For the Million,” writes Norris, “Life is a 
contracted affair, is bounded by the walls of the narrow channel of affairs in which their feet 
are set. They have no horizon. They look today […] to the writer of fiction to give them an 
idea of life beyond their limits” (7). However, if this rhetoric of the bounds, walls, and limits 
surrounding the literary consumer suggests that authors should always provide a kind of 
panoramic, totalizing, view of the world, Norris also condemns “Realism” for its overly 
distancing stance: “For [realism], Beauty is not even skin deep, but only a geometrical plane, 
without dimensions and depth, a mere outside” (Responsibilities 164). And Norris’s solution to 
the presentation of “mere outsides” in fiction? “Romance.” “Romance,” he writes, should be 
“upstairs with you, prying, peeping, peering into the closets of the bedroom, into the nursery, 
into the sitting room; yes, and into that little iron box screwed to the lower shelf of the closet 
in the library; and into the compartments and pigeonholes of the secretaire in the study” (166). 
The literary detective work of “Romance” is always probing the very spaces that Norris 
condemns as bounded—and then moving on. Hence, Norris’s answer to the limited lives of 
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“the Million” is not a literature that represents spatial vastnesses, but a literature that organizes 
and represents the hitherto claustral, circumscribed, and hidden—on a heroic scale. Norris 
calls not for vistas, not for the painterly “geometrical plane,” but for sequences or constellation 
of well-chosen details. As he writes elsewhere, “There is no such thing as imagination. What 
we elect to call imagination is mere combination of things not heretofore combined” 
(“Selection” 125-126).  
Some scholars have consequently seen in Norris’s critical works a technophilic 
conception of authorship that anticipates the industrial modernism of, for example, Ezra 
Pound, Marcel Duchamp, Sergei Eisenstein, Dziga Vertov, and William Carlos Williams20. 
For example, Paul Young has suggested that the recent invention of the cinematographic 
apparatus profoundly informed Norris’s “notion of the forms and roles the traditional arts must 
take in the new century” (646). For Young, Norris’s ideal author does not create spectacles 
like a scenographer, but “collect[s], frame[s], and juxtapose[s] frozen fragments of real events” 
like a filmmaker (651). Arguably, however, the railway’s domination of the fin-de-siècle’s 
spatiality leaves its traces even more indelibly in The Octopus than does the cinema. After all, 
as Jonas Larsen has pointed out, trains are themselves “vision machines” (5). Like cinema, 
argues Larson, the “travel glance” of the rail passenger reinforces “modern ideas about the 
subordination of nature as landscape, the privileging of a seeing over the other senses, and not 
least the power of the observer over the perceived” (89). Wolfgang Schivelbusch maintains 
that travel educated the senses in what he calls “panoramic perception,” a kind of reduction of 
the distant landscape to a quasi-cinematic image, which “in contrast to traditional perception, 
no longer belonged to the space of the perceived objects: the traveler saw the objects, 
landscapes, etc. through the apparatus which moved him [sic] through the world” (64; 
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emphasis in original). Similarly, Michel de Certeau writes that on the train, 
The windowpane is what allows us to see, and the rail, what allows us to 
move through. These are two complementary modes of separation. The first 
creates the spectator’s distance: You shall not touch; the more you see, the 
less you hold—a dispossession of the hand in favor of a greater trajectory 
for the eye. The second inscribes, indefinitely, the injunction to pass on; 
[…]—an imperative of separation which obliges one to pay for an abstract 
ocular domination of space be leaving behind any proper place, by losing 
one’s footing. (112; emphasis in original). 
But if de Certeau’s “greater trajectory for the eye” seems to echo Norris’s call for an 
authorship that goes beyond the “limits” of turn-of-the-century reader, the “spectator’s 
distance” of rail passengerhood would also seem to correspond to the overly distanced view of 
realism, and the way in which de Certeau says the passenger “is pigeonholed, numbered, and 
regulated in the grid of the railway car” (111) further evokes the kind of enervated, produced 
rather than productive, imagination at the mercy of “[o]ther men’s books.” Hence, if 
nineteenth-century rail passengerhood provides an ambivalent figure for Norris’s ideal, it 
seems to be because passengerhood was itself ambivalent—as de Certeau writes, “at once 
incarcerational and navigational” (113).  
However, the ambivalences of rail practices have their own history. Rail-travel narratives 
of the late nineteenth century do not give a consistent or transparent picture of passengers 
“organized by the gridwork of technocratic discipline” (de Certeau 113), nor did such 
passengers always successfully use trains as “vision machines.” For, while Michel Foucault 
has convincingly argued that the nascent proletariat resisted the integration of their bodies into 
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the discipline of machine systems, the writings of genteel Gilded Age authors—both American 
and European—suggest that the nineteenth-century middle class resisted railroad spatiality 
precisely because they saw it as indisciplined, chaotic, and disorderly21. For example, both 
native critics and British travel writers complained bitterly of what they saw as the mixing of 
classes in the cars. Writing in The Atlantic Monthly in 1867, the poet Bayard Taylor lamented 
the way that “the refined and the brutal, the clean and the filthy, the invalid and the swearing, 
tobacco-squirting rowdy, are packed together” in American railway carriages (479); three 
years later, a pseudonymous “Cosmopolitan” called the American railway car a “wandering 
caravanseraï, in which eighty or a hundred persons of all classes and colors and ages are 
assembled together (200). The “mixing” of the genders—or, more accurately, the failure to 
segregate the genders in the expected way—also caused consternation. In 1884, British 
traveler Emily Faithfull complained of being “packed up this promiscuous fashion” in the 
berths of a Pullman sleeper, writing that “the idea of a stranger occupying the berth above you, 
enclosed within the shelter of your own curtains, is distasteful to most people” (46). Despite 
recognizing the de facto grading of passengers in standard coach carriages, Pullman sleepers, 
and “immigrant” cars, genteel Gilded-Age passengers saw the subdivision and parceling-out of 
spaces on trains as crude and haphazard. It is as if, for these observers, a spatial order driven 
by the technical needs of the railroad rather than the social need of the middle class was no 
order at all. In essence, what troubled them was not the rigor of “the principle of elementary 
location or partitioning” (Foucault 143), but the lack thereof. 
When travelers objected to the social promiscuity of the cars, they usually blamed the 
undisguisedly industrial nature of the railcar space for failing to register genteel codes of class 
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and corporeal propriety. Like many writers, for example, British visitor William Saunders 
complained of the dearth of space for the individual traveler’s body:  
On measuring the seats in several of the American railways, I found that the 
space allowed for two passengers varied from two feet nine inches square to 
three feet square. […] If both passengers are of moderate size they will find 
it a very tight fit to squeeze themselves into the space. If their legs are of the 
usual length it will be very difficult to know how to dispose of them. At 
every movement their limbs come in contact with sharp angles of iron or 
wood; even the armrests are made of polished iron with sharp corners. The 
tops of the seats do not reach above the middle of the back, and thus it is 
impossible to rest the head or the shoulders. (121) 
“In the event of an accident,” writes Saunders in language evoking the “disassembly lines” of 
the Chicago packinghouses, “the sharp angles and ornaments, with the movable seats, are 
exactly adapted to cut the passengers into mincemeat” (122). Yet Saunders sees himself as the 
hog here, not the hog speculator. The impingement of machine-nature on genteel bodies is 
more likely to be troped as violence and disarray than as an excess of regularity. Taylor writes 
of the “underdeveloped” character of the rail system as an example of the American preference 
for “the mere skeleton, or rudimentary outline, of a system, barely sufficient, in some respects, 
to be distinguished from no system at all” (478), while “A Cosmopolitan” complains that 
“travelling means in America rushing from one place to another, and next to rushing, pushing” 
(196). After purchasing his ticket, the traveler in America 
makes his way through an almost furious crowd, into another shed, still 
dirtier and meaner than the first, where he is literally pelted with huge iron-
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bound trunks; they pass between his legs threatening to upset him; they 
knock against his arms and his sides, they are lifted over his head and 
endanger his life. Then they are thrown pell-mell on a platform, and in the 
midst of this infernal din, bewildered and confused, he is rudely summoned 
by an Irishman on the other side: Now then, your ticket! (196) 
Such language evokes democratic turmoil, not technocratic control, and what impressed 
travelers in the decades after the Civil War was not the simultaneous movement of hundreds of 
bodies across geographical space, but the anarchy of railway spaces themselves.  
This anarchy, moreover, was also often figured as illegibility or a dearth of signification. 
Not only was the sensorium assaulted by the machine nature of the train, but authors struggled 
to translate the resulting “bewildered and confused” state into writing. “A Cosmopolitan” 
writes in prose continually interrupted by the fragmentary voices of others, yet he insists—at 
least three times—that the train and the station is marked by a lack of “information”; likewise, 
he tropes the train space as both obscure and labyrinthine, treating both the station and the 
carriage as “incarcerational” indeed but registering none of the reflective, rationalizing aspect 
of rail travel that de Certeau calls “navigational.” The rail passenger in the Pullman sleeper 
walks down […] into utter darkness, from which [a conductor’s] voice 
proceeds, and finds a man, lantern in hand, selling tickets for berths and 
staterooms. He obtains a ticket, but not the information where to find his 
berth, and at hap-hazard mounts a platform leading to a peculiar-looking 
car. It is locked. He starts to try the other end, and after having waded 
through a long mud-puddle, which he could not see in the deep night which 
reigns in this part of the building, he finds a colored servant who tells him 
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to walk in. Here also utter darkness! […] But before he has become well at 
home in the berths, […] he is once more imperatively ordered to show his 
ticket, a lantern is thrust in his eye and a second guard—perhaps a 
detective?—inspects his as if he were a criminal. (197) 
“A Cosmopolitan” in essence reads the spaces of the railway as literally unreadable, as a 
material assembly that obstructs his vision while allowing the railway officials to read him 
incorrectly. Another pseudonymous writer, “A Universal Railer,” jocularly emphasizes the 
coincidence of a material proliferation of signifiers with a deficiency of signification—that is, 
“meaning”—in the spaces surrounding the rail line itself: 
By an avalanche-like rather than a glacial movement, I transported myself 
to the window—a seat which I detest , because it betrays to the scientific 
eye delicious geological sensations defiled by foulest advertisements, badly 
spelt, as a general rule, and always irregularly stratified—a dike of Phalon 
running into a layer of warped Helmbold, or a conglomerate of 
Wintersmith, dipping violently down upon a bed of disintegrated New-York 
Smeakly as if to give evidence of volcanic action, when we know that there 
is no such thing a catastrophe in Nature, but the all things, even 
advertisements, evolute […] by slow and uniform degrees. (633) 
Here, “A Universal Railer” continues the rhetoric of both the subterranean and the 
catastrophic, further contributing to the Gilded Age discourse that linked illegibility and 
material disorder to punishment and claustration. While it is tempting to see these criticisms of 
the heterogeneity of railway space as echoes of Mark Twain’s similar depictions of both the 
steamboat and the railway, Twain’s complaint is precisely that such spaces were too 
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overwritten by nostalgic, sentimental, or superstitious ideologies. Twain feared an uncanny 
recrudescence of the kind of spatiality he associated with the Old South in the new America, 
while these genteel passengers worried about the abolition of any knowable spatial order at all. 
Like the Derricks père et fils, these travelers saw themselves as being consumed—swallowed 
and digested—by railway space. For them, railways were indeed spreading and subsuming 
space like an octopus, but this very trope emerges out of the simultaneous feeling of spatial 
enclosure and interpretive bafflement.  An octopus, after all, is not merely a figure for 
omnipresence, but one for shapelessness, the disorderly, the chthonic, and the asignifying22. 
All the more significant, then, is the marked difference between these accounts and some 
of the narratives of rail travel written around the time of the publication of The Octopus. I have 
already discussed the rise of “fictions of passengerhood” in the late nineteenth century. 
Arguably, however, around 1900, these fictions themselves undergo a thematic shift from 
focusing on passengerhood as a sociocultural technique for reconciling middle-class 
Gemütlichkeit with technical competence, to the pleasures of technical mastery itself. Norris’s 
novel about the spaces of the railroads, then, registers a historical moment in which trains and 
stations became more transparent, more legible, to middle-class passengers. French writer Paul 
Bourget, who was hardly without his own genteel and elitist prejudices, praised, rather than 
deplored, the “singular bent toward complexity” he discovered in the cars. He was particularly 
impressed with the very accoutrements that William Saunders had seen as a wilderness of 
savage blades: 
Everything is fitted, planned, compressed, so as to get the greatest number 
of adjustable articles into the smallest possible space. The arm-chair in 
which you are seated turns upon a pivot, and may be tipped to any angle 
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that pleases you. If you want your window open, a negro brings a metal 
screen which he slips into grooves cunningly devised between the ledge of 
the window and the raised sash. If you desire to take luncheon, play cards, 
or write he places before you a table which rests upon the floor by a single 
movable foot, the other end being fitted into the side of the car. Boys are 
constantly passing, offering newspapers and books. I distinguish among 
them Alphonse Daudet’s Sappho, with a second title added, Or, Lured by a 
Bad Woman’s Fatal Beauty! (40) 
Bourget’s praise of the railcar’s “planned” and “cunning” spatial organization, of the way the 
carriage is designed to please the passenger and to satisfy his desires, contrasts sharply with 
earlier accounts. Even more telling, perhaps, is his approbation of another common sight on 
American trains of the period—the mobile bookseller. While earlier writers had singled this 
institution out for special mockery, Bourget notes with approval the availability of a text by 
Alphonse Daudet—the very same author that Norris’s self-possessed young doctor reads in 
The Octopus. Similarly, the Briton James Fullarton Muirhead marveled at the convenience of 
“the drawing-room, the dining-room, the smoking-room, and the library” on a New York-to-
Chicago train (223). He also observed, “Card-tables and a selection of daily papers minister to 
the traveller’s amusement, while bulletin boards give the latest Stock Exchange quotations and 
the reports of the Government Weather Bureau. Those who desire it may enjoy a bath en route, 
or avail themselves of the services of a lady’s maid, a barber, a stenographer, and a type-
writer.” Muirhead not only seems to have succeeded at reading the spaces of the railway, but 
he found railway spaces appropriate for both reading and writing. For Muirhead and other like 
him, not just textuality, but meaning, flows transparently and unobstructed through these 
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spaces.  Moreover, both writers emphasized the absence of any violent motion on the train, 
Bourget extolling the “wisdom” of placing the carriage itself on “small six-wheeled trucks” 
(41), and Muirhead explicitly claiming that thanks to the steadiness of the railbed and the 
carriage, “letter-writing need not be a lost art on a railway journey” (224). Perhaps the ultimate 
expression of the idea of the rail carriage as a space not only of social comfort, but of cognitive 
lucidity, was brief article in the February 1893 edition of Manufacturer and Builder that 
described a new typewriter that could be used “on the lap, on the desk, on the train—in short, 
anywhere” (34; fig. 3). These scenes of textual production and consumption emphasize how 
passengers who were accustomed to office spaces around 1900 began to see—and delight in—
rail carriages as artifacts enmeshed in both mobile networks and networks of inscriptive 
circulation. 
Very likely, some of these changes were merely due to a real improvement in the 
technical efficiency and convenience of nineteenth-century American railroads. But, as I have 
already noted, turn-of-the-century passengers often praised exactly those elements of train 
spaces that earlier writers deplored. Perhaps most significantly, in contrast to those Victorian 
passengers who complained about the social “promiscuity” of the rail carriage, later 
passengers saw the social heterogeneity of the cars as compatible with, and even salutary to, 
middle-class selfhood. Muirhead, for example, lauded the “opportunity to move about in the 
train,” which was impossible in the British first-class carriage: “[A] conversation with Daisy 
Miller in the American parlour car is rendered doubly delightful by the consciousness that you 
may at any moment transfer yourself and your bons mots to Lydia Blood at the other end of 
the car, or retire with Gilead P. Beck to the snug little smoking-room” (224). In S. Weir 
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Mitchell’s novel Dr. North and His Friends, the eponymous narrator Dr. Owen North—a 
stand-in for Mitchell himself—says, 
[A] comfortable railway journey is always agreeable to me. Nowhere do I 
think as fluently and with more sure result than in a swift train. Here I feel 
secure from invasion. I am guarded by the immense average of silent 
reserve attained by the American. If, however, I no longer crave solitary 
thought, and desire to talk, in the smoking-car I am reasonably sure to find 
those who will cordially respond. I drop into a seat near some selected man, 
and in ten minutes he is telling me his life-story. To converse about what a 
man knows best is a certain way to please the man, and to learn what he 
knows and what you may not. I regret that I have kept no record of the 
many biographies frankly given me in the long hours of travel. (138) 
Mitchell glories here in the very anonymity that had troubled earlier riders. In contrast to the 
passengerial gregariousness emphasized in, for example, Howells’s Their Wedding Journey, 
he even sees the “silent reserve” of his fellow passengers—the kind of reserve that earlier 
writers would have attributed to bafflement or timidity in the face of the ubiquitous violence of 
the railway space—as particularly conducive to “fluent” thought.  Like Muirhead, Mitchell, 
associates railway spaces and their social impersonality with corporeal freedom and mental 
security. Apparently, then, the “navigational” side of passengerhood prevailed over the 
“incarcerational” for writers like Bourget, Muirhead, and Mitchell. For them, railway carriages 
and stations were libratory spaces, spaces to navigate freely, spaces to enjoy. 
Gilded-Age rail passengerhood was often, to use Norris’s own term, a contracted affair, 
but some passengers of the Progressive Era seemed to take the kind of larger, yet closely-
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attentive, view of their environment that Norris advocates in both his critical writing and The 
Octopus. Although Larson has contrasted train travel with automobile travel, writing that “the 
train traveller [. . .] is fully subjugated by the train’s visual spectacle, as s/he has no power to 
control, regulate, or frame the flow of landscape images that pass through his/her eyes” (90-
91), it seems clear that by the 1890s, at least some passengers did not see themselves as 
“subjugated” by the space of the rail carriage. Trains and their spaces, that is, did not 
automatically or transparently produce spatial knowledge; passengers had to be acclimated to 
such spaces in order for them to use the railroad as a “vision machine.” Arguably, however, 
the larger view of later passengers was itself mediated, a result of the way trains and their 
spaces were coming to be represented by the end of the 1800s. For example, beginning in 
1888, Scribner’s Magazine published a series of articles on American railroads; these were not 
traveler’s accounts, but expository essays that promised to give readers an insider’s view of the 
history and technical operations of the railroad23. Of these articles, perhaps the most 
remarkable is “Railway Management” by former Confederate general and rail executive 
Edward Porter Alexander. Aside from its detailed discussion of block switching, bridge gangs, 
and waybills, “Railway Management” is particularly noteworthy because of its copious 
illustrations, including a reproduction of a “diagram, or graphic representation” used by 
railroad superintendents of transportation in the preparation of train schedules (31; fig. 4), 
renderings of both the interior and exterior of the “very expensive and complicated apparatus” 
of signaling and switch towers, and an engraving of the office of a typical train dispatcher, the 
official in charge of the actual real-time operation of trains, including the management of 
“extra and delayed trains by direct telegraphic order” (34)24. This last illustration displays the 
dispatcher surrounded by a panoply of clocks, gauges, bulletins, windows, and telegraph 
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instruments; the scene emphasizes both the spatial interconnectedness of the rail office space 
and the proliferation of textuality within (fig. 5). Like the Derrick office at Los Muertos, this is 
a “nerve center”; unlike the Los Muertos office, however, this space seems to be a space of 
unimpeded agency in which the dispatcher moves freely and competently. The dispatcher—his 
legs splayed so he can more easily pivot in his chair, his hands busy with two separate tasks, 
his eyes wide open—seem less a body caught in the grasp of an octopus than an octopus 
himself. Likewise, the juxtaposition of this image with the bird’s-eye views of the railyards 
and the representations of the “expensive and complex apparatus” of the interlocking 
switching systems work to reproduce in the reader the central and omniscient spatial situation 
of the dispatcher, yielding a “larger view”—not an unmediated one to be sure, but indeed 
larger by virtue of its very mediation. 
Such images invited readers to imagine themselves in the place of the railway manager, 
and indeed to reduplicate this act of spatial reimagining so as to produce a paradoxically 
disembodied, but not unmediated, mental representation of the railroad. A few month earlier, 
Scribner’s had published “Railway Passenger Travel” by former Pullman Palace Car Company 
executive (and, ironically, former Union general) Horace Porter. This article included a 
number of engravings illustrating the interiors of passenger carriages, including an image of 
middle-class passengers sedately socializing and reading in a Pullman “parlor car.” The 
subsequent publication of “Railway Management,” with it illustrations, retroactively reveals 
the railcar interior itself to be “merely the part of an enormous whole.” Yet, instead of making 
the spaces of the railroad seem obscure, cryptic, or unknowable, this series of images makes 
the railroad seem precisely legible; it produces a “larger view” that is not simply a more 
capacious image, but something that seems like a map or diagram—or, even, a montage. It not 
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only provides a view of the railroad, then, but argues for a way of looking at it. Scribner’s 
readers seeing passengers reading in a Pullman parlor car not only get an ironizing view of 
themselves, they can imagine themselves taking this ironizing view as passengers. These 
articles—and especially their illustrations—unequivocally suggest the material imbrication 
and formal equivalence of reading, rail passengerhood, and rail management; hence, they not 
only allow potential passengers to read the spaces of the railroad, they also make a kind of 
omnivorous consumerist (if still middle-class) reading a model for navigating railway spaces. 
Despite the similarity between these texts and Norris’s own journalistic writing, Norris 
would have seen even these representations of the railroad as too genteel and antiseptic, as too 
merely celebratory of technology, as too unwilling to look closely at “the squalor of a dive, or 
the awful degradation of a disorderly house” (Responsibilities 167). Moreover, even if writers 
like Bourget, Muirheard, and Mitchell no longer suffered from the same kind of untrained 
sensorium that constrained earlier passengers, their more developed techniques of seeing 
railroad spaces were arguably blind to the very grotequeries and violences of the railroad that 
earlier writer were blinded by. Yet Norris himself seemed to think of authorship as something 
not unlike railroad management. Discussing the difference between the mere “novelist of 
composition” and the authentic “storyteller,” Norris writes that “every healthy-minded child 
[…] is a story-teller” (Responsibilities 30). Moreover, writes Norris, 
As soon as he begins to talk he tells stories. Witness the holocausts and 
carnage of the leaden platoons of the nursery table, the cataclysm of the 
Grand Trans-Continental Playroom and Front-Hall Railroad system. This, 
though, is not real story-telling. The toys practically tell the story for him 
and are no stimulant to the imagination. However, the child goes beyond the 
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toys. He dramatizes every object of his surroundings. The books of the 
library shelves are files of soldiers, the rugs are the isles of the seaway of 
the floor, the easy chair is the comfortable old gentleman holding out his 
arms, the sofa a private brig or a Baldwin locomotive, and the child creates 
of his surroundings an entire and complex work of fiction of which he is at 
one and the same time hero, author, and public. (30) 
The trope of railway management here is vexingly ambiguous. Norris insists the storytelling 
child must go “beyond” his toy trains to remain a storyteller; but in drawing “every object of 
his surroundings” into his “complex and entire world of fictions,” the child reproduces the 
material logic of capital—especially of railroad capital—in his own domestic space. Norris 
here implies that he bare technical fact of the toy train is limiting, but the way of seeing 
fostered by playing with toy trains is liberating. For the true adult storyteller, argues Norris, 
the playroom of the old days simply widens its walls till it includes the 
street outside, and the street beyond and other streets, the whole city, the 
whole world, and the story-teller discovers a new set of toys to play with, 
and new objects of measureless excitement to dramatize about, and in 
exactly, exactly the same spirit in which he trundled his tin train through the 
halls and shouted boarding orders from the sofa he moves now through the 
world’s playroom “making up stories”; only now his heroes and his public 
are outside himself and he alone may play the author. (31-32) 
Here, once again—going “beyond.” And, even more, encompassing “the whole world”—and 
yet doing so in “exactly the same spirit” in which the nascent storyteller imagined himself as, 
at once, railroad magnate, railroad engineer, and railroad conductor. The railroad keeps 
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coming back as a defining trope, no matter how far the storyteller goes “beyond.” The railroad 
is the veritable trope for self-transcendence itself. 
Hence, if the rail passenger must imagine himself in the place of the rail manager to 
master the constraining violence of the railroad space, the rail manager must become more like 
the newly-empowered rail passenger to avoid becoming trapped by his own imagined place of 
power. That is, he must keep moving, must keep going “beyond.” Indeed, “going beyond” is 
precisely what distinguishes the fate of Norris’s focalizer Presley from that of his putative 
villain S. Behrman. Behrman, after all, ends up as both agent and victim of motion. In the 
penultimate chapter of The Octopus, he deterritorializes the wheat twice—first by separating 
its production from the propertarian claims of the dispossessed ranchers and then by joining it 
more closely to the assemblages of harvesters, silos, trains, and ships that keep the wheat 
constantly moving. Yet, the more the grain moves, the more Norris uses the language of both 
stasis and looking to describe Berhman. We see Behrman crossing the fields of Los Muertos in 
his buggy, “searching the horizon for the feather of smoke that would mark the location of the 
steam harvester” (614). “However,” writes Norris, “he saw nothing.”: 
At length, S. Behrman halted his buggy and brought out his field 
glasses from beneath his seat. He stood up in his place and, adjusting the 
lenses, swept the prospect to the south and west. It was the same as though 
the sea of land were, in reality, the ocean, and he, lost in an open boat, were 
scanning the waste through his glasses, looking for the smoke of a steamer, 
hull down, below the horizon. 
The language of surveillance is here tied directly to that of halting, of lostness, of standing “in 
place.” Like the young train tycoon who doesn’t keep moving, Behrman risks being mastered 
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by what he is the master of. For good measure, Norris makes his point once more: for 
Behrman, “[t]he end, at length, had come; he had entered into his reward and saw himself at 
last installed in the place he had so long, so silently coveted; saw himself chief of a 
principality, the Master of the Wheat” (615). Like the Derricks before him, the minute 
Behrman sees himself “installed in place” is the minute he begins to suffer from the fixity of 
placed-ness. Hence, it’s not surprising that when Berman dies, looking without understanding 
should lead directly to being entrapped in the midst of tumult and flux. He “[stands] watching” 
above the grain hold of the Swanhilda as it is filled with wheat, “his ears deafened with the 
roar of the hard grains” (641). Already, as it were, arrested by the white noise of capital that 
signifies nothing to him, Behrman “[peers] down into the hold”: “It was dark. He could see 
nothing; but all about and over the hatch he air was full of a fine, impalpable dust that blinded 
the eyes and choked the throat and the nostrils” (641-642). Mesmerized, Behrman tumbles into 
the hold and the grain pours in, immobilizing him. He suffocates in the swelling volume of 
wheat, and Master of the Grain is installed in his final place by the grain itself. 
When we last see Presley, he is floating along with the wheat, not immured within it. He 
is aboard the same ship—the Swanhilda—in which Behrman is entombed. Like the scene of 
Behrman entranced by the spectacle of the oceans of wheat, this is also a scene of looking; 
from the quarterdeck, the highest deck on the ship, Presley “looked long and earnestly at the 
faint line of mountains that showed vague and bluish above the waste of tumbling water” 
(649). In his reverie, Presley ruefully recalls the events of the novel; in fact, having gone 
beyond the physical site of the novel’s whirl of events, he himself performs the origin of the 
novel as a story, as a narration. Indeed, he models Norris’s own conception of how novelists 
ought to work, laying out the events in his memory and selecting the most vivid and 
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representative images; the narrator gives us this act of memory as a montage, one beginning 
with an “opening shot” that mirrors the map of the San Joaquin that Norris himself puts on the 
novel’s flyleaf:  
He saw it all—the great sweep of the country opening to the view from the 
summit of the hills at the head waters of Broderson’s Creek; the barn dance 
at Annixter’s, the harness room with its jam of furious men; the quiet 
garden of the Mission; Dyke’s house, his flight upon the engine, his brave 
flight in the chaparral; Lyman Derrick at bay in the dining-room at the 
ranch house; the rabbit drive; the fight at the irrigating ditch, the shouting 
mob in the Bonneville Opera House. (650) 
What distinguishes Presley’s act of looking from that of Behrman, then, is precisely the 
difference between looking as mastery and looking as specular mystification. Behrman’s stare, 
both at Los Muertos and on the Swanhilda is simultaneously anxious and inert. It’s the look of 
someone who is beginning—too late!—to realize he has left himself out of his own picture. In 
contrast, Presely is both literally and cognitively in motion. Of course, Presley’s famous 
epiphany—the apotheosis of the wheat—is precisely the unearned “larger view” that the 
novel’s detractors have cited as its chief problem. Perhaps, however, we should take an even 
larger view of this very insight. Perhaps we should see the novel’s real celebration of “life” not 
in the strained rhetoric of Presley’s internal monologue, but in the way this insight helps 
Presley give birth to the narration of the wheat. Presley’s experience—his concrete knowledge 
of space as mediated by the railroad—is what has given birth to the insight in the first place. 
Behind the conflict between the railroad and the ranchers lies the vitalism of “the wheat”; but, 
behind this view of things is a way of seeing things conditioned by constant motion. 
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Chapter Three: 
Breakneck Pace: Limits to Mobility in An American Tragedy 
 
Attention, however mobile  
Readers have not failed to notice that from the very earliest passages, Dreiser’s An 
American Tragedy presents a world of gazing, fascination, comparison, envy, and 
speculation25. The novel begins with the itinerant Griffith family of missionaries wandering 
the streets of Kansas City attracting the idle stares of passersby; at the same time, Clyde 
Griffiths imagines himself being seen by these gawkers and quails at their contempt for him. 
Readers have also observed the way an instinct for specular conformity, “the old mass 
yearning for likeness in all things” (4), drives both Clyde’s embarrassment and the crowd’s 
scorn; Clyde sees the strangeness and inexplicableness of his family’s ostentatious piety 
through the eyes of strangers, he resents it only because he thinks nobody else finds it familiar. 
As Clyde resents being part of the spectacle of his family, the spectators themselves cannot 
help but observing Clyde’s “uneasy and self-conscious expression.” One of the crowd, an 
“idler and loafer of about forty” observes, “‘That oldest by don’t want to be here. He feels outa 
place, I can see that.’” (7). Hence, Clyde feels unlike “other people” because he imagines them 
imagining him as different, while the spectators themselves are perversely drawn to the signs 
of Clyde’s awkwardness, which only intensify their own feelings of disdain and aversion.  
All of this looking, however, is as inconclusive as it is compulsive. The onlookers may be 
right to perceive Clyde’s embarrassment, but almost everyone in this vignette is, in one way or 
another, “outa place”; Dreiser’s city nomads, that is, constantly compare themselves to each 
other under circumstances that frustrate certain knowledge about “place”—both social and 
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geographic. When the bystanders’ glance fastens on the Griffiths, they pause only “for a 
moment to eye them askance”; meanwhile, “this hesitancy, construed by [Asa Griffiths] 
apparently to constitute attention, however mobile” provokes Asa to begin “addressing them as 
though they were specifically here to hear him” (2). Yet, as Mr. Griffiths misrecognizes his 
own ephemeral position—one produced by mobile attention on mobile object—as central and 
fixed, the narrator calls the crowd itself a “vagrom and unstable street throng, [. . . ] forever 
shifting and changing” (5); and Asa can “only surmise” the origins and destinations of “the 
handsome automobiles that sped by, [and] the loitering pedestrians” that engulf the family like 
a tide. Likewise, the family has wandered from city to city—“Grand Rapids, Detroit, 
Milwaukee, Chicago, lastly Kansas City” (8)—their path describing a convoluted and arbitrary 
curve on the map of the United States, in sharp contrast to Carrie Meeber’s direct progression 
from hinterland to metropolis in Sister Carrie. Although this rhetoric of restless, chaotic 
motion has attracted less attention than the language of desire, the novel shares with The 
Octopus (along with Sister Carrie itself and both The Gilded Age and Life on the Mississippi, 
at times) a sense of the opacity of space and the idea of landscape and the built environment as 
a hieroglyphic. However, as we have seen, these earlier texts both advocate and offer 
themselves as models of a kind of mobile knowing; their manifold ambivalences 
notwithstanding, both Twain and Norris (and an earlier Dreiser) see writing—specifically 
mass-distributed texts—as a means of achieving a kind of immanent transcendence, a 
mediated-immediate relation with capitalist spatiality. An American Tragedy, on the other 
hand, seems to foreclose this possibility; nothing in the 1925 novel suggests a way of knowing 
space that will acclimatize middle-class subjects to the shock of motion and the ephemerality 
of place. For, while Twain and Norris implicitly oppose mobile techniques of knowing to 
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epistemologies that privilege social and geographic place, An American Tragedy presents these 
ways of knowledge as interleaved and dependent upon each other. Looking and comparing 
seem to provoke wandering; in turn, constant motion drives the epistemological uncertainty 
that gives rise to the desire to imitate. In An American Tragedy, knowing how to stay in 
motion is not a way to avoid getting stuck in one place; in fact, in accordance with the novel’s 
title, mobility is often merely a mechanism by which characters arrive at their preordained 
destinies. 
 
Don’t say sit down to me 
In An American Tragedy, mastery of mobile practices is always incomplete, always 
partial; it is more a consequence of being caught in a web of deterministic forces than a way to 
escape them. For example, nothing could be farther from the Derrick’s ultimately fatal (if 
ambivalent) attachment to domestic sedentarity than the way Clyde’s friends and coworkers 
from the Davidson-Green Hotel relate to domesticity. As they gather at Thomas Ratterer’s 
apartment none of them can imagine staying home to socialize; places for them are nothing 
more than nodes in an endless circulation of bodies and things. Nobody stays; everyone 
continually arrives and departs. Yet, there is something compulsive—even compulsory—about 
this hectic motion; Clyde’s friends see staying in motion both as a pleasure and, perversely, as 
a duty26. Mrs. Ratterer—like mothers in general in the novel, perhaps standing both for 
corporeality and an older and more sedentary ethic—says that her daughter needs “‘more 
rest’” because she risks being unable to “‘keep her place or stand it if she don’t get more 
sleep’” (72). Mrs. Ratterer sees labor as a “place” and labor-power as reproduced by inaction, 
by respite from movement. To this, Ratterer himself responds that his mother “‘can’t expect a 
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fellow in [his] line of work to get in early always,’” to which Hortense Briggs adds that she 
would “‘die if [she] had to stay in one night’” (72). For these young people, not only is 
motion—not rest—health itself, but the mandate for motion as recreation is aligned with work, 
not contrasted with it. Although Ratterer has just insisted that he is “‘on his feet all day an’ [he 
likes] to sit down once in a while’” (71), he also says that his “line of work” demands that he 
stay in physical circulation. Since Ratterer’s “line of work” is to facilitate consumption, it only 
makes sense that his own consumption of pleasure should take on the moral character of work; 
yet, staying in motion in An American Tragedy is neither unequivocally imposed from the 
outside—never simply a matter of capital or political power intervening in an extant sedentary 
order—nor merely a matter of mastering mobile techniques, and thereby mastering capitalist 
spatiality from the inside.  
Responding to an invitation to tarry at the Ratterers’ apartment, Clyde’s friend Greta 
Miller retorts, “‘Oh, don’t say sit down to me,’” 
[…] “with all the dates we got ahead of us this week. Oh, gee!” her eyes 
and eyebrows went up and she clasped her hands dramatically before her. 
“it’s just terrible, all the dancin’ we gotta do yet, this winter, don’t we, 
Hortense? Thursday night and Friday night and Saturday and Sunday 
nights,” she counted on her fingers most archly. “Oh, gee! It’s terrible, 
really” (71) 
The injunction to dance is binding on everyone, and because he has never danced, Clyde once 
again feels out of place among these young people who have no use for staying in place. It’s 
not enough to want to dance; Clyde must also know how to dance: “To think that [Hortense 
Briggs], to whom of all those here he was most drawn, could dismiss him and his dreams and 
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desires thus easily, and all because he couldn’t dance” (74). “Why hadn’t he gone to a dancing 
school before this,” he asks himself. Apparently, then, the desire to consume is not enough to 
compete in this world, and dancing, like “going out” itself, is not only a matter of the right 
tastes, but the right techniques—not just knowing, but knowing how27. Like Twain and Norris, 
Dreiser depicts here the technicization, as it were, of consumption; yet Twain and Norris, as 
we have seen, and however ambivalently, see this kind of Taylorized knowing, as a real 
advance over the way the superstition or spectacle of place that had limited rationality and 
productivity in antebellum America. Characters like Henry Brierly in The Gilded Age or the 
millionaire Cedarquist in The Octopus (and even Ames in Sister Carrie) stand for an 
expectation of the mastering of spatiality even in the face of being mastered by it; An 
American Tragedy, on the other hand, is far less certain of the opposition between these two 
possibilities. 
It’s never clear in An American Tragedy that the advance of capitalist spatiality is itself a 
knowable or consistent process. Geography is involved in moil and unrest; spaces change 
unpredictably—not just from the point of view of the characters, but from that of the novel 
itself. As in Twain and Norris, characters must learn to read the built environment anew in 
order to survive; not only can they not rely on traditional or received models of social relations 
(the family, lords and masters, the fixed relation of city and country), but they must learn the 
hard and impersonal laws of capitalist development that continually restructure real space. But 
the built environment in An American Tragedy itself seems to obey the caprices of desire as 
much as unvarying capitalist rationality. For example, when Clyde first encounters the 
fashionable, if provincial, Davidson-Green Hotel in Kansas City, he admires its “main 
entrance [ . . . ] a splendiferous combination of a glass and iron awning, coupled with a marble 
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corridor lined with palms” and the “taxis and automobiles [ . . . ] always in waiting” (26). 
Later, he surveys with exhilaration “the moving panorama of the main lobby—the character of 
the clerks behind the main desk—room clerk, key clerk, mail clerk, cashier and assistant 
cashier. And the various stands about the place—flower stand, news stand, cigar stand, 
telegraph office, taxicab office, and all manned by individuals who seemed to be curiously 
filled with the atmosphere of the place” (43). Clyde’s excitement over the energetic and 
multifarious work going on in the lobby immediately gets mixed up with envious thoughts 
about the allure and luxury of the hotel guests: “The wraps, furs, and other belongings in 
which they appeared, or which were often carried by these other boys and himself across the 
great lobby and into the cars or the dining-room or the several elevators. [ . . . ] Such grandeur. 
This, then, most certainly was what it was to be rich, to have consequence in the world—to 
have money” (43). Here, Clyde’s direct consciousness is of the “atmosphere” of glamor and 
“consequence” flowing from the rich guests themselves, adhering like imputed grace to the 
hotel and its workers. He sees, and even participates in, the unrest of mobility, but is less 
consciously concerned with its material processes than the spectacle of plenitude they produce. 
Yet, unlike the backcountry rubes of Life on the Mississippi who mistake the theatrical aspects 
of the steamboat for technical power, wrongly seeing the production of spectacle as a spectacle 
of production, Clyde beholds a world in which spectacle is the main mode of visibility for 
technical power. Twain’s Missouri hicks see the steamboat as more powerful and 
revolutionary than it really is; Clyde, on the other hand, like most of the guests and workers at 
the Davidson-Green, participates in a revolution of mobility without consciously knowing it as 
a technosocial process. 
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The hotel, like the Derrick ranch house or the antebellum steamboat, is an odd 
assemblage of combinations and couplings, assimilates within its industrialized and literally 
Fordist milieu both spatial and historical signifiers of premodernity. Its preposterous lines of 
palm trees at once standing for either tropical alterity or preindustrial colonial grandeur. 
Surrounded by mechanized mobility, they register the fact that by the early twentieth century, 
the tropical refuges of the world had themselves already been fully subsumed into industrial 
production and the world market.28 They celebrate the fluidity of space while, like the 
Derrick’s ranch house, disavowing it. Hence, Clyde understandably struggles to make sense 
the “splendiferous” spectacle of the lobby, even as he is dazzled by it. Is it a materialization of 
the representative power of capital, or a vestigial pocket of resistance against the “vulgarity” of 
mass production? Is its semiotic heterogeneity a manifestation of the multiplicity of social 
needs under capitalism, or as a clumsy hodgepodge resulting accidentally from the uneven 
development of that economy? In the Davidson-Green, ornament, ostentation, and theatricality 
are not opposed to sociotechical rationality; on the contrary, the libidinal force of the former 
seems to drive the materiality of the latter, while the latter finds the outlet for its material 
surpluses in the former. In this narrative partially imagined during Dreiser’s time in 
Hollywood, the Davidson-Green’s glamour seems conflated of the exotic Orient and its 
undisguised technological simulation; it is both the kind of fantasy space outside of capital 
represented in such cinematic productions as Intolerance (1916; dir. D.W. Griffith), Cleopatra 
(1917; dir. J. Gordon Edwards), and The Sheik (1921; dir. George Melford) and a double of the 
ephemeral spaces of film itself, such as the film set and the motion picture theater29. 
On the other hand, some spaces seem to diminish in glamor by dint of the very same 
processes of omnivorous capital; neighborhoods decay and disappear from the maps of 
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fashionableness, and rationalization works to advance semiotic impoverishment and 
barrenness. For example, Clyde follows his mother “along Spuce Street” to his sister’s secret 
apartment on “Baudry, which was really just a continuation of Spruce, but not so ugly” (92). 
The houses here “were quite old—quondam residences of an earlier day, but now turned into 
boarding and rooming houses.” The withdrawal of libidinal attachment here allows the purely 
utilitarian subdivision of space to advance, making the neighborhood a place for disgraced 
girls to be warehoused. Yet, the original decline of the district is unexplained, perhaps 
inexplicable. Space itself seems as fickle as Esta’s erstwhile lover; the development of space, 
that is, follows the unwavering demands of the economy, but what law drives the economy 
itself? Likewise, the Griffithses “combination home and mission” is situated among a 
confusing jumble of streets, “north of Independence Boulevard and west of Troost Avenue, the 
exact street or place being called Bickel, a very short thoroughfare opening off Missouri 
Avenue, a somewhat more lengthy but no less nondescript highway,” contained by the urban 
grid but also somehow lost within it, as if the grid itself breeds undefined and disorderly 
spaces within itself (9). Likewise, “[T]he entire neighborhood in which it stood was very 
faintly and yet not agreeably redolent of a commercial life which had long since moved farther 
south, if not west.” Here, not only does the novel ambivalently evoke “commercial life” as 
something both vital (hence, desirable) and pathological (because capricious and unknowable), 
but the narratorial voice itself seems uncertain of these special vicissitudes. Its conditional 
language —“street or place,” “faintly […] redolent,” “farther south, if not west”—goes athwart 
its attempts to place the house precisely, as if all this motion can only be evoked, not 
thoroughly known, through novelistic language. In particular, the diminished atmosphere of 
commercial activity, the sense of a territory marked by motion but drained of actual vitality, 
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paradoxically suggests that where capital space appears in itself, unadorned by the lure of 
bustle and unrest, it does not simply decline or decay, but perseveres in an indefinite, undead 
condition. This is not simply the contest between vitality and degeneracy, between capitalist 
efficiency and precapitalist ineptitude, that we have seen before; this is a space in which 
discontinuity and the aleatory are internal to capitalist space itself. If earlier texts had tried to 
inculcate in their readers a kind of Turnerian and Taylorist telos of spatial development—and 
to demonstrate the dangers of failing to learn this way of thinking space—An American 
Tragedy often seems to eschew any possibility of knowing the overarching rules of capitalist 
spatiality. 
This problem structures much of what happens in the novel. Wishful thinking and 
gullibility mix indistinguishably with hard-nosed realism and rational calculation not because 
of any recrudescence or atavism of the former, but because the two are inherently intercalated 
with each other in practice. Moreover, this intercalation is transubjective and technosocial, not 
merely “psychological”; it is bound up with the built environment, not just the behavior of 
“individual” men and women. For instance, the novel dwells so much on Hortense Briggs’s 
scheme to persuade Clyde to buy her a fur coat, in part, because the episode prefigures Clyde’s 
own elaborate plot to murder Roberta Alden; but this prolonged episode also demonstrates 
how capitalist spatiality both elicits and hinders desire, how it produces subjectivity as well as 
how subjects cannily use it for realizing aspirations. Hortense, Dreiser’s narrator tells us, is 
both calculating and dissolute, yet is “by no means always willing to divorce he self-
advantages from her pleasure. On the contrary, she was often troubled by a desire to like those 
whom she sought to use, and per contra, not to obligate herself to those she could not like” 
(101). Yet, in the coat episode, this mixture of “pleasure” and “use” describes not only 
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Hortense’s behavior, but the very materiality of shopping, seduction, and urban mobility. The 
events begin with Hortense, herself a retail worker in a department store, “walking along 
Baltimore Street near its junction with Fifteenth—the smartest portion of the shopping section 
of the city” during her lunch break, sees “in the window of one of the smaller and less 
exclusive fur stores of the city, a fur jacket of beaver that to her, viewed from the eye-point of 
her own particular build, coloring and temperament, was exactly what she needed to 
strengthen mightily her very limited personal wardrobe.” Here, Hortense sees the coat that’s 
just right for her, one “fashioned in such an individual way as to cause her to imagine that, 
once invested with it, her own physical charm would register more than it ever had.”  
And yet, the narrator’s language—and Hortense own—registers little of the “individual” 
characteristics of the coat, and the specifics of Hortense’s “build, coloring and temperament” 
are likewise vague. Rather than the coat eliciting Hortense’s desire, desire seems itself no more 
than an epiphenomenon of the spatial concatenation—carefully planned yet contingent, 
directly materialized in the built environment yet ephemeral—of street, shop window, 
spectators, coat and customer. Hortense addresses the coat as if it were a child or a small 
animal—“‘Oh, isn’t that just too sweet for words? And the very kind of coat I’ve been 
thinking of since I don’t know when. Oh, you pity sing!’”—yet her apostrophe is less a 
reification of the coat than a theatrical gesture toward other shoppers: She gushes “affectedly, 
thinking all at once as much of her own pose before the window and its effect on the passers-
by as of the coat before her.” What this scene reveals, then, is the real nature of consumer 
desire: It’s less that she’s fooled by the coat, or even by the lecherous and unscrupulous 
salesman Rubenstein, than she’s fooled by the nature of desire itself. She treats desire as an 
irresistible force, when, here, it is a structural effect of the materiality of the retail space itself. 
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Hortense wants the coat less than she wants to be seen wanting the coat; indeed, to be seen 
wanting the coat is more important than actually wearing the coat because this performance—
even more than ownership—signifies Hortense’s successful response to the ways in which she 
is interpellated by the city street. 
Yet, if Hortense’s desire is a product, literally, of her environment—if it is, to use Jacques 
Lacan’s term, extimate, not “intimate”—we cannot by any means read Hortense as merely 
naïve or deluded. Indeed, she is “cunning” in her dealings with both Rubenstein and Clyde, 
whom she persuades to buy her the coat (115). In haggling with Rubenstein, Hortense points 
out that she knows other stores where she can buy similar coats, to which Rubenstein responds 
that “this is a special coat. It’s copied from one of the smartest coats that was in New York last 
summer before the season opened. It has class. You won’t find no coat like this coat” (104). 
Walter Benn Michaels has identified the crucial problem here: “The coat is ‘special’ both 
because it’s unique (there is none like it in Kansas City) and because it’s not unique (there is 
one at least one just like it in New York)” (71). Michaels correctly points out that emulation of 
middle-class consumer tastes means, perversely enough, emulating a taste for the special, the 
different, the “unique.” But this kind of paradoxical specialness is as much a problem for the 
seller as for the buyer: How can the merchant produce the experience of “uniqueness” for 
someone who isn’t unique at all, who is merely a passerby like any other? Rachel Bowlby has 
pointed out that early twentieth-century merchants carefully considered the question of the 
busy passerby, who “unlike the flâneur, may well have a set destination—going to or from 
work, for instance” (58) and “who must be stopped in her tracks, brought to a standstill” (57). 
For Bowlby, the shop window is a technology; compounded of other technical innovations 
such as larger and more transparent plate glass and electrical or gas lighting, the window was 
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an apparatus that both arrested and presupposed motion. As with the cinema, with the shop 
window “the attraction of movement is [. . . ] an established psychological fact” (60). And, like 
cinematic or railroad spaces, store windows produce a new kind of seeing; they mold and 
manipulate the seer while training her in new modes of agency. They use us and we use 
them30. Moreover, although Bowlby is primarily concerned with the historical distinction 
between the luxury department store of the nineteenth century and the utilitarian supermarket 
of the twentieth, she sees a continuum between these two, between the space of shopping as 
leisure and shopping as a chore. For example, Bowlby cites French writer Paul Morand’s 
ambivalent reaction to New York’s Division Street at night, a scene he found both 
phantasmagorical and jarring with its harsh electric lighting and lack of clear traditional class 
markers. Although the department store will later be “romanticized in the slow-motion time of 
a shopping that is no more, as opposed to a [late twentieth-century] supermarket world that is 
brash, impersonal, routine” (13), Bowlby argues that Morand’s impressions reveal a 
department-store space that, like late nineteenth-century railroad stations and carriages in the 
writing of genteel authors, already “lacks all recognizable order, [and abolishes] ancient class 
differences with a luxury that is incongruously ‘instant’” (12). For Morand, writes Bowlby, 
luxury in this landscape paradoxicially “takes no time and is not connected to a past or a 
future.”31 Yet Hortense, while taken in by Rubenstein’s cant, is nevertheless at home in 
precisely the same kind of landscape that Morand found so alienating. 
As Hortense tries to convince to Clyde to buy the coat for her, she faces a double 
challenge of repeating the way coat itself solicits her desire. She must make herself available 
to Clyde, but she must also convince him that he is in store for something “special”—that is, 
her own sexual surrender. Nevertheless, “although she never would have never admitted it to 
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[Clyde],” sex with Hortense is already “the privilege of two others” (106) The apparent 
smirking irony of Dreiser’s narrator—“the privilege of two others”—perhaps seems like the 
kind of moralizing Dreiser would have normally condemned; yet it is less Hortense’s sexual 
liberty than the economy with which she manages it that the narrator targets here. If it seems 
like a privilege to sleep with Hortense, she works hard to make it seem that way. “[I]n the face 
of her desire for the coat, [Clyde’s] stature and interest for her were beginning to increase” as 
the value of her chastity begins to decrease; yet if she simply proposes to exchange sexual 
favors for the coat, those very sexual favors will seem less valuable. This problem requires 
Hortense to engage in an elaborate scheme to engineer an encounter among Clyde, the shop 
window, and herself: 
Hortense [. . .] was now thinking how unfortunate that a whole twenty-
four hours must intervene before she could bring him to view the coat with 
her—and so have an opportunity to begin her machinations. At the same 
time she pretended that the proposed meeting for the next night was a very 
difficult thing to bring about—more difficult than he could possibly 
appreciate. She even pretended to be uncertain as to whether she wanted to 
do it. (109) 
As the coat is “special” because it is set aside in the window, Hortense’s company is all the 
more desirable because both Clyde and Hortense must overcome all kinds of difficult (if 
spurious) obstacles to meet. And, “the next evening [. . .] in the glow of the overhanging arc-
lights showering their glistening radiance like rain, she appeared” (110). Like the coat’s 
appearance in the window, Hortense’s appearance is theater—but it is industrial theater lit by 
arc-lights in the midst of mechanized motion and commercial bustle, in which both Hortense 
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and Clyde are at once spectator and performer, and where nothing stays in one place, least of 
all the boundaries between stage and “house.” If Hortense is the master manipulator here, if 
she uses the very streets of Kansas City as a stage for hoodwinking Clyde, these very streets 
seem to be both the locus and limit of Hortense’s subjectivity. As she moves, so she it. On the 
other hand, if Clyde is Hortense’s dupe, it is precisely his apparent “upward mobility” than t 
makes him attractive to her, and her plan presupposes a certain degree of autonomous physical 
mobility on his part. 
Hortense and Clyde are not merely rubes or backward-looking romantics who are 
overtaken and crushed by the galloping advance of capitalist spatiality, as are Magnus and 
Annie Derrick or the Hoovens in The Octopus; nor, however, are they simply serenely 
competent spatial managers like Cedarquist or Shelgrim (or, by the end of the novel, Presley 
himself). For characters in An American Tragedy, dreaminess, distraction, and lack of self-
understanding can mesh seamlessly with spatial competence. At the same time, while much of 
Book One suggests that Jazz Age spatiality may itself be shaped by the moil of “irrational” 
desire, its conclusion implies that spatial heterogeneity and “uneven development” are both 
inevitable products of, and the ultimate limit of, mobile techniques. In the final chapters of the 
first Book, tellingly, both the culture and technics of the automobile make their appearance. 
Clyde’s friends are both intensely fascinated by the automobile and confident of their technical 
mastery of them; Willard Sparser, the chauffer’s son who has stolen a car in order to take a 
pleasure excursion, imagines himself “a master of car manipulation” on the drive to the 
Wigwam resort (124). Yet, while sparser closely watches the road in one way, Clyde himself, 
as narrative focalizer, seems to withdraw into an aestheticizing reverie that differently figures 
the roadscape:  
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Dark vignettes of wood went by to the right and left. Fields away, 
sentinel hills rose and fell like waves. A wide-armed scarecrow fluttering in 
the wind, its tall decayed, stood near at hand in one place. And from near it 
a flock of crows rose and winged direct toward a distant wood lightly 
penciled against a foreground of snow. (124) 
If in Twain and Norris both technosocial competence and reflective thought can arise out of 
the experience of motion, and can in turn enhance agency, in Dreiser these two capacities are 
separated by a kind of psychic division of labor. As Clyde and his friends travel through rural 
Missouri, this division is a real separation between the way Sparser and Clyde experience the 
trip to the Wigwam. Sparser acts “with the air of one to whom such a magnificent car was a 
commonplace thing,” putting “one arm around Laura [Sipe] while he guided the car with the 
other” (124-125). Sparser is sure, that is, not only to competently mange the car, but to do so 
ostentatiously. On the other hand, Clyde “who for all his years in Kansas City had never 
ventured much beyond Kansas City” (124), and at this point in the novel relatively unsure of 
his own mastery of mobile techniques, remains “dubious about the wisdom of taking the car” 
and worries that he and his friends “might all be wrecked by such fast driving” (125). Clyde 
experiences speed anxiously, yet his feeling of helpless passivity also gives rise to an 
exhilarating sense of dislocation. 
This distinction—which will become more important as Clyde begins to take on, without 
integrating, both kinds of mobile experience—appears earlier in Dreiser’s 1916 automobile 
travel narrative A Hoosier Holiday. Remarkably, this book describes the experience of auto 
travel in almost exactly the same words as An American Tragedy: Dreiser writes that his 
chauffeur, called “Speed” in the memoir, drives at “breakneck” speed; and, like Sparser, 
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Speed’s consciousness is completely occupied by matters of motion. “Speed” had been part of 
the crew that established the route of the transcontinental Lincoln Highway, and presents 
Dreiser with “a large packet of photographs [. . .]—mementoes of that celebrated pioneer 
venture” (159). Dreiser, however, is astonished that Speed has taken no photographs of the 
“beautiful and striking things” along the route: 
The views, if you will believe me, were all if mired cars an rutty roads and 
great valleys which might have been attractive or impressive if they had 
been properly photographed. The car was always in the foreground, spoiling 
everything. [“Speed”] had always selected dull scenes of cars in 
procession—the same cars in the same procession, only in different order, 
and never before any radically different scene. (160) 
These photographs, writes Dreiser, reveal “exactly how Speed’s mind worked.” Interpreting 
the stance Speed takes toward his own photographic auto narrative, Dreiser writes, “the cars 
contained important men and women, or were supposed to, because the owners had money. 
Hence, the cars and their occupants were the great things about this trip, and wherever the cars 
were, there was the interest—never elsewhere.” If this attitude seems to anticipate in some 
ways Dreiser’s characterization of Clyde (and a fortiori Sparser), it implicitly, yet distinctly, 
contrasts with the way Dreiser paints his own experience of automobile motion: 
So on and on, up hills and down dale, and now and then we seemed to be 
skirting the Susquehanna. At other times we seemed to be off in side hills 
where there were no towns of any size. A railroad train came into view and 
disappeared; a trolley track joined us and disappeared; a toll road made us 
pay fifteen cents—and disappeared. (72) 
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This more impressionistic rhetoric of things moving as the passenger himself remains still, and 
of uncertainty as to place and distance, presages the way the narrator of An American Tragedy 
focalizes Clyde’s impressions of “sentinel hills [rising] and [falling] like waves” and “distant 
wood[s] lightly penciled against a foreground of snow.” Hence, Clyde resembles Speed to the 
extent that he masters spatial techniques, and Dreiser himself to the degree that his failure to 
master such techniques renders him a passive observer of motion. 
Yet, seen retrospectively from the rhetoric of An American Tragedy, it’s difficult to see 
the distinction between Dreiser and Speed merely as the difference between naïve mechanical 
competence and the authorial “larger view” Norris advocates by in The Octopus. For if Dreiser 
is the more aesthetically receptive here, he is also a technological naïf; and unlike Presley in 
The Octopus, who masters writing as he masters capitalist space—and who masters mobility 
as he becomes a writer—Dreiser explicitly presents his consciousness as lulled and distracted 
by automobile travel:  
And [. . .] as we dashed along toward Warsaw [, Indiana,] under a 
starry sky, [. . .] I allowed myself to sink into the most commemorative 
state. When you forget the now and go back a number of years and change 
yourself into a boy and view old scenes and see old faces, what an 
unbelievably strange and inexplicable thing life becomes! We attempt 
solutions of this thing, but to me it is the most vacuous of all employments. 
I rather prefer to take it as a strange, unbelievable, impossible orchestral 
blending of sounds and scenes and moods and odors and sensations, which 
have no real meaning and yet which, tinkling and kaleidoscopic as they are, 
are important for that reason. I never ride this way at night, or when I am 
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tired by day or night, but that life becomes this uncanny blur of nothingness. 
(152-153). 
Auto travel reduces Dreiser to a state “half awake and half in a dreamland of my own creating” 
(153), a dreamland in which the western New York of 1915 blends indistinguishably with the 
Indiana of his childhood. And yet Dreiser specifically denies, almost in the same breath, that 
the automobile (or railroad, x-ray, photography, or motion picture) is a kind of “vision 
machine”: “Mechanicalizing the world does not, cannot, it seems to me, add to the individual’s 
capacity for sensory response” (154). Yet even this certainty is rendered ambivalently, for 
Dreiser admits that, as he speeds along outside Buffalo, he has “grow[n] dim in [his] 
researches,” and that he is “not all-wise” and cannot clearly imagine the future capacities of 
the automobile. In short, Dreiser may write patronizingly about Speed and his naivety, but he 
presents his own experience of passengerhood very differently from the kind of synoptic mode 
of seeing that Presley learns form his experiences in railway space. For Dreiser, there is no 
contradiction between mobile mastery and limited subjectivity; yet, the experience of motion 
can be valuable to the degree that it disconnects subjectivity from the need for mastery. 
Motion produces a phantasmagorical experience not only for the untrained sensorium, but for 
the trained one as well—and this is, indeed, is both its chief virtue and its primary danger. 
The tendency of consciousness to split, to separate the tasks of seeing and doing—or, 
perhaps more precisely, to make synoptic vision passive while making active vision sequential 
and partial—resembles the description of Vanamee aboard his plough in The Octopus. Here, 
again, technosocial competence is opposed to a consciousness that takes in everything but is 
“lulled and stupefied” by a “strange, unbelievable, impossible orchestral blending of sounds 
and scenes and moods and odors and sensations.” In Norris, this separation characterizes the 
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way people know spaces under conditions of capitalist production; failure to see productively 
is to risk being reduced to a mere mechanical “part of an enormous [capitalist] whole.” Here, 
however, it is the process of consumption that, as it were, subsumes Clyde and his friends. 
Moreover, as I have argued, Norris makes the disciplining of consciousness (as opposed to the 
mere disciplining of the body) the prerequisite for success, and even for survival, under 
conditions of capitalist spatiality; in Norris, spatial consciousness remains unevenly 
developed, and the implicit function of the naturalist novel is to supplement the 
underdeveloped consciousness of its middle-class readers. In An American Tragedy, on the 
other hand, spatial consciousness and its associated techniques seem to run ahead of the built 
environment itself. Unlike Uncle Dan’l or Beriah Sellars in The Gilded Age, Clyde and the 
others do not read the restlessness of (“really-subsumed”) capitalist space in terms of an older 
mercantile (“formally-subsumed”) spatiality; unlike Annie Derrick or Minna Hooven in The 
Octopus, they do not yearn for this older spatiality or its promise of security and 
Gemütlichkeit. Yet, while these young people master mobile techniques, the rural space of the 
Wigwam remains as heterogeneous and technically intractable as Kansas City itself. We have 
already seen, for example, the way dancing is both a kind of theater and a kind of corporeal 
technology in earlier chapters. And at the Wigwam, where the daytrippers go to get away from 
the constraints of the city, pleasure is once again both mechanically mediated and dependent 
on public visibility. Upon arrival, the pleasure seekers begin at once to operate the machinery 
of recreation: 
The car was parked, and they all trooped into the inn, and at once 
Higby briskly went over and started the large, noisy, clattery, tinny 
Nickelodeon with a nickel. And to rival him, and for a prank, Hegglund ran 
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to the Victrola which stood in the corner and put on a record of “The 
Grizzly Bear,” which he found lying there. 
At the first sounds of this strain, which they all knew, Tina Kogle 
called: “Oh, let’s all dance to that, will you? Can’t you stop that other old 
thing?” she added. 
“Sure, after it runs down,” explained Ratterer, laughingly. “The only 
way to stop that thing is to not feed it any nickels.” 
By now a waiter coming in, Higby began to inquire what everybody 
wanted. And in the meantime, to show off her charms, Hortense had taken 
to the center of the floor and was attempting to imitate a grizzly bear waling 
on its hind legs, which she could do amusingly enough—quite gracefully. 
And Sparser, seeing her alone in the center of the floor was anxious to 
interest her now, followed her and tried to imitate her motions from behind. 
(126) 
At once grotesque and pathetically jejune, this scene once again contrasts the hotel staff’s 
technosocial cleverness with the tendency of the technosocial network to operate as if it had a 
will of its own. The phantasmagoria of both entertainment machines uncannily and noisily 
grinding out music while the vacationers caper bearishly not only parodies the way the 
Davidson-Green mixes restless motion with glamor, but again demonstrates the way the 
technosocial environment both shapes and obstructs practices of consuming luxury. Although 
they can integrate their bodies fully into the world of industrial space, and although their 
technical expertise assures them of the Victrola’s technical superiority over the Wurlitzer, 
Clyde and his friends can never perfectly master a technosocial order whose very materiality is 
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driven by the vicissitudes of marketing schemes, fashions, and the anarchy of competition. The 
“noisy, clattery, tinny Nickelodeon” here, which the pleasure-seekers disparage in favor of the 
Victrola, not only serves as a figure for them (it keeps going until it runs down or it runs out of 
money), but the way the first machine continues mechanically, overrunning the operation of 
the second, and thereby proleptically tropes the novel’s subsequent collisions, shocks, and 
breakdowns. 
The image of the player piano running on mindlessly until its motive power stops, all the 
while clattering alongside the spinning disc on the Victrola, suggests a world in which the 
normal operation of things is fraught with the possibility of catastrophe. Conversely, the scene 
at the frozen pond at the Wigwam implies that mobile technique in this world involves the 
capacity to recuperate the disorder and muddle, to re-entrain chaos into the production of 
enjoyment. The party rush “pell-mell” from the lodge to the lake, running “here and there, 
slipping and sliding—Higby, Lucille and Maida immediately falling down, but scrambling to 
their feel with bursts of laughter” (129). This rhetoric of moving “here and there,” along with 
that of the revelers acting “in spite of” themselves and doing what they “[can] not help” doing 
(130), evokes being out of control and the breakdown of mobility into mere motion. It suggests 
a reversion, as in Twain and Norris, to an older spatiality: On the icy pond, they are “more like 
young satyrs and nymphs of an older day” (129). Yet much of this disarray is deliberate and 
theatrical; the revelers play “crack the whip,” “running and doubling back and forth until all 
beyond Maida had fallen and let go” (130). And, as Hortense falls together with Sparser on the 
ice, her 
skirts, becoming awry in some way, moved up to above her knees. But 
instead of showing any embarrassment, as Clyde thought and wished she 
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might, she sat there for a few moments without shame and even laughing 
heartily—and Sparser with her and still holding her hand. And Laura Sipe, 
having fallen in such a way as to trip Higby, who had fallen across her, they 
also lay there laughing and yet in a most suggestive position, as Clyde 
thought. He noted, too, that Laura Sipe's skirts had been worked above her 
knees. And Sparser, now sitting up, was pointing to her pretty legs and 
laughing loudly, showing most of his teeth. And all the others were emitting 
peals and squeals of laughter. (130) 
This sexual display, as calculated as it is, elicits (apparently) spontaneous laughter. And this 
performance is so pleasurable that, the revelers, like a broken record, repeat it, this time merely 
rearranging their bodies—although Clyde, chagrined at Hortense’s indifferent treatment, 
“wanted to stop and quarrel with Sparser. But so brisk and eager was Hegglund that they were 
off before he could even think of doing so” (131). Once again, the young people are “thrown 
down and spun around on the ice like curling irons” and 
Entangled with these others, Clyde and they spun across forty feet of 
smooth, green ice and piled against a snow bank. At the finish, as he found, 
Lucille Nickolas was lying across his knees face down in such a spanking 
position that he was compelled to laugh. And Maida Axelrod was on her 
back, next to Ratterer, her legs straight up in the air; on purpose he thought. 
[. . .] Hegglund, intensely susceptible to humor at all times, doubled to the 
knees, slapped his thighs and bawled. And Sparser opened his big mouth 
and chortled and grimaced until he was scarlet. So infectious was the result 
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that for the time being Clyde forgot his jealousy. He too looked and 
laughed. But Clyde's mood had not changed really. 
Here, it is the theatrical self that is all body, all internalized mobile technique. The rhetoric of 
“compulsion,” “susceptibility,” and “infection” mixes with what is done “on purpose.” All of 
these behaviors are done automatically, unthinkingly, like the operation of the player-piano or 
the Victrola; yet even the spills and crashes of bodies are performed with “purpose.” This, 
then, is a terrain in which the calculated and the finely-engineered do not always work as 
expected, where mastery is itself no safeguard against catastrophe; yet, it is also one in which 
the accidents and chaos may themselves be the most precise stagecraft. 
Likewise, the car crash that occurs on return from the Wigwam results from an event that 
for readers in the nineteen-twenties evocatively figured both the advent, and the uneven 
development, of rationalized space: a traffic jam. The accident that sends Clyde fleeing Kansas 
City results less from and ineptitude of Sparser’s than from the way the built environment 
stymies even them most elaborate and careful plans. First, there is “a long and unexpected and 
disturbing wait at a grade crossing where two freight trains met and passed” (137), then yet 
“another delay [. . .] owing to a grade crossing.” In the first decades of the twentieth century, 
the grade crossing, the intersection of the anarchically-sprawling auto infrastructure with the 
established rail network, was as much a headache to both drivers and planners as the material 
heterogeneity of the rail network was for administrators and passengers in the 1860s and 
1870s, and here, the entrance of the train into the road network works as a nucleation point 
around which the entire system, competencies notwithstanding, grinds to a halt32. Again, after 
striking and killing a little girl, although both Sparser and his stolen Packard are more than a 
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match for the police who pursue them, the city itself seems to conspire against the revelers; on 
the outskirts of Kansas City, they come to a place where “the pavement suddenly ended,” and 
because another cross street was visible a hundred feet or so further on, and 
[Sparser] imagined that by turning into that he might find a paved 
thoroughfare again, he sped on and then swung sharply to the left, only to 
crash roughly into a pile of paving stones left by a contractor who was 
preparing to pave the way. [. . .] And diagonally opposite to these, 
lengthwise of a prospective sidewalk, had been laid a pile of lumber for a 
house. (141) 
The car “carom[s]” from paving stones to lumber pile, spilling the passengers in a catastrophe 
that echoes both the meaningless lurching of the player piano and the ludic pratfalls of the 
frozen pond at the Wigwam. Indeed, like both the Davidson-Green and the Wigwam, the 
material infrastructure of Kansas City itself is historically and spatially hybrid: always 
expanding, modern enough for an extensive highway and rail system, yet with gaps and 
inconsistencies that inevitably steer the vacationers toward their accident. If the hotel 
employees and their friends fail at last to navigate spaces of capitalist modernity, if their 
“cognitive maps” fail them, it is therefore because they are trapped in a geographic space in 
which capitalism itself, like the street where they finally crash, is perpetually under 
(re)construction. 
 
A basement world 
Like the Dyke in The Octopus, Clyde at first escapes the pursuing agents of the State—
and, as with Dyke, this escape will prove to be temporary. But at the moment of Clyde’s 
desperate flight, An American Tragedy shifts scenes as well, moving abruptly to Lycurgus, 
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New York, and the domestic space of Clyde’s wealthy cousins. Hence, instead of first seeing 
the Lycurgus Griffiths focalized through Clyde, in Book Two, we first see Clyde from their 
perspective. Immediately, we move from poverty to comfort, from apparent ineptitude to 
confidence and competence; we move—seemingly—from a landscape characterized by 
everything Clyde wants to escape to one of everything he craves. This shift of setting and 
focalization, however, partially confounds the narrator’s claims about Samuel Griffiths’ 
superior “shrewd[ness]” and “inciseive[ness]” in contrast with his brother and Clyde’s father 
Asa, since everything about this branch of the family evokes a similar sense of nervous motion 
and self-conscious anxiety as does the novel’s first section. Space here, among the rich, is just 
as much in ferment as in the busy commercial streets of Kansas City. The first chapter of Book 
Two narrates the Lycurgus Griffithses “by degrees [. . .] assembling for the family meal” 
(147). Here and throughout Book Two, the constituents of the Griffiths family are perpetually 
abroad, either for business reasons—in this case, Samuel has been in Chicago conferring with 
other businessmen over the threat of price-cutting by “upstart rivals in the west”—or, as Mrs. 
Griffiths laments, echoing the concerns of Mrs. Ratterer in the first section, “dancing, 
cabareting, automobiling to one city and another, without due social supervision” (149). And, 
as in Book Two, not only the social landscape, but the physical landscape along with it, is 
under constant metamorphosis. The Griffithses, for example, cannot simply resist the lure of 
social newcomers like the Finchleys and the Cranstons, the “‘fast set’ of local life” (149). For, 
these parvenus are not content merely to move into the area and to build new factories; once in 
place, they begin to undermine the importance of places in general, establishing new kinds of 
mobility based on private motor transportation and mass construction techniques. As the 
younger Griffiths daughter, Bella, says, “‘Just think [. . .],” 
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“The Finchleys are going to give up their place out at Greenwood Lake this 
coming summer and go up to Twelfth Lake near Pine Point. They're going 
to build a new bungalow up there. And Sondra says that this time it's going 
to be right down at the water's edge—not away from it, as it is out here. 
And they're going to have a great big verandah with a hardwood floor. And 
a boathouse big enough for a thirty-foot electric launch that Mr. Finchley is 
going to buy for Stuart. [. . .] I wish you and Dad would make up your 
minds to build up there now sometime, Mamma. It looks to me now as 
though nearly everybody that's worth anything down here is moving up 
there.” (149-150) 
If the Lycurgus Griffithses are those to whom Clyde looks up, whom he tries to emulate, Bella 
Griffiths tries to emulate those upon whom Mrs. Griffiths looks down, and for reasons not 
unlike those that drew Clyde to the Davidson-Green; that is, while the Kansas City hotel was 
glamorous for Clyde because it was like a “moving panorama,” the newcomers to Lycurgus 
are irresistible to Bella because they set the landscape into motion, literally remaking the social 
map. Even Gilbert, perhaps the most outwardly conservative of the Griffithses, criticizes the 
Cranstons for “‘spreading out faster than [he] would if [he] had their business,’” while 
inwardly admitting that they are “really more daring if not socially more avid of life” than the 
Griffithses (154). 
The parallels between the discourse of the parvenu here and in, for example, a Gilded-
Age text like The Rise of Silas Lapham (1885) are illuminating. First, in both fictions the 
wealthy almost instinctively use the rhetoric of spatial contamination to make sense of those 
immediately beneath them: Bromfield Corey contemns Lapham for “rival[ing] the hues of 
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nature in her wildest haunts with the tints of his mineral paint” (91), while Gilbert Griffiths 
worries about the Cranstons “spreading out faster” than they should. Likewise, it’s this very 
fact of “spreading out” that draws the younger generation of old money to the arrivistes. Tom 
Corey, who has been to Texas and seen the world beyond Beacon Hill, wants to market 
Lapham paint in Mexico and Chile, and eventually becomes the agent of Lapham’s erstwhile 
rivals and new partners in South America; Bella Griffiths is similarly entranced by the new 
summer homes and yachts of the Fichleys and Cranstons. Here, however, the parallels break 
down, not the least because the Griffithses can make only the most ambiguous claims to being 
genteel, Samuel Griffiths only “[h]aving arrived in Lycurgus about twenty-five years before 
with some capital and a determination to invest in a new collar enterprise which had been 
proposed to him” (155). As Clare Virginia Eby has pointed out, the Lycurgus Griffithses are 
themselves “imitators [. . .] who pass in the community for the real thing” (201). Indeed, 
Samuel Griffiths resembles Lapham the industrialist—who himself has a brother who is “a 
Baptist preacher in Kansas” (Lapham 8)—more than he does Corey, and Lapham is arguably a 
bit more economically established than Griffiths. More to the point, Lycurgus is not Boston 
and Wykeagy Avenue is not Beacon Hill. In The Rise of Silas Lapham, Back Bay is the “new 
land” constructed as an alternative to the fashionable, but exclusive, Beacon Hill; in An 
American Tragedy, all of Lycurgus is “new land.” And, while Sister Carrie moves linearly 
from rural Wisconsin to Chicago to New York City, that is, from rural to urban and from 
periphery to center, the second and third Books of An American Tragedy center on what at the 
time was called a “garden city” or a “satellite city”—a made space imagined as a refuge from 
urban congestion33. Dreiser himself reported glowingly on the “garden” industrial 
communities of Pullman in Chicago and South Park in Dayton, sometimes striking the kind of 
208  
 
 
pietistic, paternalist pose that he will later be famous for criticizing. Of Pullman, he writes: 
“Pullman is a perfectly equipped town of 12,000 inhabitants, built out from one harmonious 
whole, where all that is discordant or demoralizing is eliminated, and where all that inspires to 
self-respect, thrift and economy and to cleanliness of person and hought is generously 
provided” (“Pullman” 232)34. Lycurgus parodically echoes such communities as these, and 
seems to be based at least in part on the industrial suburb of Johnson City, which Dreiser 
encountered on his 1916 motor trip narrated in A Hoosier Holiday35. The Wykeagy Avenue 
neighborhood is almost certainly intended to evoke images of Wykagyl, New York, an upscale 
community within New Rochelle—in short, a suburb of a suburb—which was being newly 
developed in the 1920s and was then, as now, almost universally associated with its country 
club and golf. This, then, is a world in which the rich are just a nomadic as the poor, and in 
which a doubly-paradoxical retreat from “machine space” is fully mediated by mechanized 
transport and perpetually remakes the built landscape of the northeastern industrial core. 
If the affluent in An American Tragedy can only preserve their social position by staying 
in (industrialized) motion, Clyde, in turn, learns to imitate the swells by constantly shifting his 
position within the industrial system of mobility. After fleeing from the automobile accident, 
Clyde drifts throughout the Midwest, “essaying one small job and another, in St. Louis, Peoria, 
Chicago, Milwaukee—dishwashing in a restaurant, soda-clerking in a small outlying drug-
store, attempting to learn to be a shoe clerk, a grocer's clerk, and what not; and being 
discharged and laid off and quitting because he did not like it” (163), later securing a job as a 
delivery-wagon driver in Chicago. Interestingly enough, Clyde performs his duties faithfully 
and without complaint; only when he encounters his old friend Thomas Ratterer, who teases 
him over his unglamorous job, does he begin to doubt himself and his job. Ratterer induces 
209  
 
 
Clyde to take a position at the Union League, a men’s social club. Clyde’s yearning for the 
Union League job ironically leads him to give up a position directly involved in transportation 
to take one in which motion is more visible, in which he can see “the noiseless vigor and 
reserve that characterizes the ultra successful” (171), and in which he can be seen as a part of 
this purposeful commotion: 
For to this club from day to day came or went such a company of seemingly 
mentally and socially worldly elect as he had never seen anywhere before, 
the self-integrated and self-centered from not only all of the states of his 
native land but from all countries and continents. American politicians from 
the north, south, east, west—the principal politicians and bosses, or alleged 
statesmen of their particular regions—surgeons, scientists, arrived 
physicians, generals, literary and social figures, not only from America but 
from the world over. (170-171) 
These literal movers, coming and going, from all over the world, are a new model of mobility 
for Clyde; unlike the denizens of the Green-Davidson,  
[t]hey often ate alone, conferred in pairs and groups, noiselessly—read their 
papers or books, or went here and there in swiftly driven automobiles—but 
for the most part seemed to be unaware of, or at least unaffected by, that 
element of passion, which, to his immature mind up to this time, had 
seemed to propel and disarrange so many things in those lesser worlds with 
which up to now he had been identified. (171) 
As he seeks to avoid “disarrangment” and haphazard “propulsion,” then, Clyde, “under the 
influence of this organization and various personalities who came [there],” is partially remade. 
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In the process of producing motion, he is trained in new mobile techniques, and he begins to 
imagine that the “one of these very remarkable men whom he saw entering or departing from 
here might take a fancy to him and offer him a connection with something important 
somewhere” (171-172) and that he may thereby move “into a world such as he had never 
known” (172).  
And yet, for all of this Dreiser ensures that we see that the apparent difference between 
the task of delivery driver and bellhop is itself both “artificial” and artifactual, a product of the 
technosocial network of which the Union League is a part. As a wagon-driver, after all, Clyde 
merely carries out a function outside the club that, as a bellhop, he continues within. On one 
hand, Ratterer’s disdain for the delivery job is preposterous, since Ratterer himself is little 
more than a “liveried” version of Clyde; on the other, when the two encounter each other 
Clyde is delivering “a package of ties and handkerchiefs” to the Union League Club, literally 
working to produce the material differences between himself and those within. Clyde, then, is 
both producer and product of social differentiation; but the appearance of differentiation is 
itself part of the machinery of mobility. As on the streets of Kansas City, the system of class 
difference is neither a false appearance nor only a by-product of systems of mobility, but 
materially subsumed by and reciprocally entrained with them. Indeed, the delivery of the ties 
and handkerchiefs indirectly connects Clyde to his uncle through the web of textile and 
garment production, a technosocial network that also embraces both the shrinking room—a 
room in which “webs” of fabric are processed—-and the stamping room at the Griffiths Collar 
and Shirt Company. Dreiser further reinforces this sense of horizontal contiguousness, as 
opposed to vertical differentiation, in his descriptions of both of these industrial spaces. We 
read of 
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row after row of porcelain tubs or troughs, lengthwise of the room, and end 
to end, which reached from one exterior wall to the other. [. . .] And near-
by, north and south of these tubs, and paralleling them for the length of this 
room, all of a hundred and fifty feet in length, were enormous drying racks 
or moving skeleton platforms, boxed, top and bottom and sides, with hot 
steam pipes, between which on rolls, but festooned in such a fashion as to 
take advantage of these pipes, above, below and on either side, were more 
of these webs, but unwound and wet and draped as described, yet moving 
along slowly on these rolls from the east end of the room to the west. (187-
188)  
Although we might read this portrayal of the shrinking room as a perfect example of what H.L. 
Mencken called his tendency to “an endless piling up of minutiae, an almost ferocious tracking 
down of ions, electrons and molecules, an unshakable determination to tell it all” (83), this 
almost Kafkian or Borgesian description blurs the distinction between capitalist rationality and 
gothic, illegible chaos. More to the point, “[t]his movement [. . .] accompanied by an 
enormous rattle and clatter of ratchet arms which automatically shook and moved these lengths 
of cloth forward from east to west” (188) doubles Clyde’s own narrative, only reversing 
Clyde’s progress from west to east. This rhetoric literalizes the connections among techniques 
of mobility, the production of commodities, and the cultivation of what Gilbert Griffiths thinks 
of as “polish and manner” (333). Or rather, it collapses all of these into the same process of 
material circulation or pure “motion.”  
However, moving up the workplace ladder in An American Tragedy seems to mean little 
more than being moved along a production line. As Michaels writes “[t]he rhythm of factory 
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life [. . .] produces Clydes as well as collars” (93). When Clyde is promoted to a managerial 
job in the stitching room, he is almost speechless over the apparent difference between the it 
and the shrinking room: “There were so very, very many women—hundreds of them—
stretching far and away between white walls and white columns to the eastern end of the 
building. And tall windows that reached from floor to ceiling let in a veritable flood of light” 
(237). Later, he marvels at “[s]itting at an official desk in a corner commanding a charming 
river view,” receiving friendly visits from other managers, and “[looking] about him[self] from 
time to time [and] taking an interest in the factory as a whole” (240-241). Now, Clyde is not 
only in motion and producing motion, he is again seen to be in motion and sees others in 
motion, and he “[feels] at last [. . .] he was a figure of some importance” in the factory (240). 
Yet, the narrator supplies ample evidence that Clyde’s promotion to the fifth floor produces no 
“elevation” of Clyde’s consciousness, but only a further integration of his unconscious 
sensorium into the plant’s productive technosocial network36. Even the language used to 
describe the stitching room, focalized through Clyde, is redolent of Clyde’s naïve and vulgarly 
theological worldview. The room is suffused with light and extends in endless whiteness 
toward “the east,” unlike the Piranesian labyrinths of the basement works; in contrast to the 
masculine underworld of the shrinking room, this space is marked by a surplus of femininity, 
and if “these girls were not all pretty” (237), he eventually encounters a Beatrice in the “more 
spiritual” (and virginal) Roberta Alden (247). Yet, if Clyde thinks he has exchanged Hell for 
Paradise, he is nevertheless guided through both spaces by the very same Virgil, the unctuous 
and self-effacing factotum Joshua Whiggam. Moreover, the elaborate network of “chutes” that 
terminate in the stitching room merely continues the path that begins with the machinery of the 
basement works. As in the shrinking room, where webs travel through a series of vertical 
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detours in an essentially horizontal process, Clyde’s own movement from basement to loft 
merely parallels the vertical detour of the collars. The narrator, withdrawing from Clyde as a 
focalizer, here only gives us more of the rhetoric of blind, mechanistic production that had 
characterized the shrinking room passages. Here, the women workers must “cope with a 
constant stream of unstitched collar bundles which fell through several chutes from the floor 
above” (236), while Clyde must ensure the “stamping process went uninterruptedly forward” 
and that the collars are then “duly [. . .] transmitted to the stitchers” (233). Although this step 
in the production process a textual one—the collars are stamped while Clyde records “the 
number of dozens stamped by each girl [. . .] in order that her pay should correspond with her 
services” (233)—as a supervisor working with tables, records, and inscriptions, Clyde is no 
less a producer of motion here than in the shrinking room. If he goes from physical labor to 
“brain labor,” and if his consciousness is even freer to wander as his body becomes even more 
accustomed to the routine of the factory, he finds nothing liberating in the fact that he has 
moved from directly manipulating the stuff of collars to indirectly manipulating it by 
managing textuality.  
The stamping room, “merely railed off [. . .] by a low fence” (236), so apparently 
different from the shrinking room, in fact only differs from the rest of the factory in that it 
sorts collars rather than, strictly speaking, “making” them, and inscribes on them the markers 
of their different sizes. Significantly, this is also the place where they are marked with their 
brand name—“Griffiths”—which signifies both the owner of the commodity and their 
authenticity as a sign of “polish and manner.” The material work the stamping room performs 
on the collars turns them from useful things into fungible goods; it adds something 
intangible—“information”—to the collars as use values and, by doing so, converts them from 
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“mere” use values into elements of an unending stream of circulating commodities. Similarly, 
on one hand, Clyde is required to behave with an air of “finish” in the stamping room, where 
the finishing touches are performed on the garment that confers a similar sense of “finish” on 
the wearer. On the other, the finishing room is only one link in the process of commodity 
production, the collar is only a commodity, and Clyde is only a worker—albeit, one bearing 
the name “Griffiths.” This ambivalence toward Clyde’s ascent in the factory hierarchy once 
again cements the novel’s implication that the systems of status and fashion are not only 
simultaneously labyrinthine and mechanical like the operations of the Griffiths plant, but that 
they are directly enmeshed with the functioning of the latter. Likewise, when Dreiser writes 
that before his promotion, Clyde “drift[s] along in his basement world,” he alludes at once to a 
series of claustral proletarian spaces—the shrinking room of the factory, Mrs. Braley’s 
rooming house, the places where Clyde and his friend Dillard go for amusement—through 
which Clyde moves and which are apparently opposed to the open and sunlit spaces of the 
upper classes, and to the whole “world” of the novel as claustral and illegible, as determined 
by the operations of mysterious yet uncompromising technical networks and drift. Hence, as 
Clyde moves “upward,” as he begins to establish personal connections among the industrial 
bourgeoisies of Lycurgus, he also becomes connected to any number of impersonal technical 
networks—especially networks of transportation and communication. The more liberated from 
the world of basements he becomes, from his point of view, the more in fact he becomes a part 
of that very world.  
As Michaels argues, in An American Tragedy, “the conditions of leisure turn out to be 
indistinguishable from the conditions of factory labor” (91); moreover, “the choice between 
drift and mastery, work and pleasure is compromised by the irreducible interdependence of the 
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terms between which one is supposed to be choosing” (93). This means, in turn, that the novel 
continually flattens the difference between the spaces of leisure and the spaces of production. 
But this flattening works both ways: “pleasure” both produces and presupposes newly-
industrialized spaces, but the system of these spaces is never complete, never a totality. The 
system itself is capricious; it can’t be “gamed.” As I have already suggested, nowhere in 
American Tragedy is this more apparent than in its treatment in what we today call 
“automobility”37. On one hand, the novel presents the automobile as the quintessential object 
of Clyde’s desire; his aspirations to join his cousins’ social set seem to emerge, along with is 
desire for Sondra Finchley, on the occasion of an “annual inter-city automobile floral parade 
and contest” where Clyde observes Sonda “breasting a white rose-surfaced stream and guiding 
her craft with a paddle covered with yellow daffodils—a floral representation of some Indian 
legend in connection with the Mohawk River” (242). Sondra, playing the part of a princess in 
an auto-mobile simulacrum of a canoe, both theatrical and technosocially adept, “recapture[s] 
Clyde’s fancy” because she seems the very embodiment of the kind of frictionless “drift” that 
Michaels correctly identifies as “a class pleasure” (93). On the other hand, the automobile is 
often both a metonymy and technical site for the limits of mobility. Inasmuch as the parade 
float, like Sellers’s false railroad map or Norris’s colossal map of California made of dried 
apricots, is yet another example of the spurious and spectacular representation of motion, it 
satirizes mobility as a reactionary fantasy of premodern simplicity and naturalness. It reveals 
that mobility only works because we believe it works. It unmasks the automobile as wish-
fulfillment as much as mobile technique—or, in short, as a fetish. 
As Dreiser’s biographer Jerome Loving has suggested, Dreiser seems much of the time to 
implicitly oppose the automobile as a means of bourgeois mobility to the streetcar and railroad 
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as technologies of working-class mobility (301-302). I have already discussed some of 
Dreiser’s ambivalences about the motorcar, but Dreiser’s writing about his own experiences as 
a mobile subject predate An American Tragedy and even A Hoosier Holiday. In fact, Dreiser’s 
career as a journalist and literary author is almost as closely tied to streetcars and railroads as 
Twain’s is to the western steamboat; Dreiser’s first assignment at the Toledo Blade was to 
report on a streetcar strike—a job he recounts in Newspaper Days and which inspired a scene 
in Sister Carrie—and he famously based his “Trilogy of Desire” (The Financier [1912], The 
Titan [1914], The Stoic [1947]) on the life of Charles Tyson Yerkes, the “traction king” of the 
late nineteenth century. More remarkably, Dreiser (writing as “Herman D. White”) presented 
himself as the streetcar passenger par excellence in “From New York to Boston by Trolley,” 
an article he published in Ainslee’s magazine in 1899. In this essay, Dreiser narrates his 
journey from New York to Boston, almost all by electric streetcar; he concludes that any 
passenger following his example “will find it difficult to realize that he has come 241 miles by 
this novel method. Progress has been so insensible, so much like a short car ride in your home 
town, that all these pleasant miles have gone for nothing” (100). If the fantasy of “insensible 
progress” seems to presage the ideals of both automobility and the kind of “drift” that 
Michaels identifies as the privilege of the managerial classes, much of the essay nonetheless 
suggests that the “progress” from New York to Boston has not been quite insensible. The 
trolley route, for example is not perfectly continuous: 
At new Rochelle, just two hours out from the Harlem River, comes the 
first of several breaks which go to make the route imperfect. It extends from 
New Rochelle to Stamford, seventeen miles away, and there is no way out 
save by railroad. There are trolley lines, but they do not help us on our way 
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to Boston. Several are projected to connect these two important places, but 
they are dreams. It is said the great railroad which spans the distance has 
something to do with this condition. (91) 
Writing that “[t]he lines of the various companies” do not quite “meet end to end and car to 
car,” Dreiser implies that what continuity there is unintentional, although the administrators 
may “dream” of patching the gaps therein. The streetcar system, first of all, achieves this 
imperfect unity without conscious plan; it appears as a “‘force born out of certain conditions,’” 
like Shelgrim’s vision of the railroad. Moreover, consciously making a totality of this quasi-
system may seem like a “dream,” but Dreiser suggests that the main barrier to the completion 
of the system is precisely the deliberate intervention of the long-distance railroads. Like Twain 
and Norris, the youthful Dreiser seeks here to turn railway logic against the railroads 
themselves, making them and their arbitrary power the enemy of mobility.  
At the same time, Dreiser implicitly makes the narration of his own journey the 
supplement that retroactively confers unity on the not-yet-unified streetcar system. He writes 
that 
At Framingham every one knows to Boston by trolley. [. . .] Back at 
Worcester very few people know that such a trip can be made. They know 
that trolley lines extend to South Framingham, but are not certain of the 
connections beyond. At other points along the route no one seemed to know 
that there was any other trolley connections anywhere save between their 
town and the nearest city. No end of interest could be exited by the simple 
explanation of that route. (99) 
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The system is nearly a completed circuit, although without any deliberate plan; in fact 
deliberate planning stands in the way of the system’s completion. Yet, those living along the 
route are mostly ignorant of the degree of completion already extant. Dreiser implies that he 
himself, by dint of having pioneered the journey, is qualified to make the “simple 
explanation[s]” that might liberate them—and implicitly, Dreiser’s own readers—from their 
limited view of the built environment. Hence the essay itself is at once an “explanation” of the 
route’s connectedness and Dreiser’s authorization of himself as a mobile practitioner and 
interpreter of spaces. Accordingly, the essay, so reminiscent of Norris’s articles in The Wave, 
presents the experience of the trip itself as a montage of images integrated by the author’s 
interpretive competence. In the New York suburbs, he tells us, “are gas and water, electric 
lights and trolley cars, and yet wide doors stand open to the summer breeze and flowers bloom 
at the door-steps. Hills and dales succeeded in picture after picture” (92). Riding the trolley is a 
cinematic experience, made so by the speed “which was not great enough to destroy [his 
impressions’] value, and yet sufficient enough to give pleasant change.” Yet if the streetcar 
itself is responsible for the kaleidoscopic variety of the images Dreiser sees on the journey, he 
nonetheless need to intervene at times to assure us that apparent disorder is, in fact, 
orderliness: 
The one striking feature from Wallingford to Hartford is the seemingly 
hap-hazard distribution of manufactories. In the midst of the loveliest 
scenery the car will sheer away close upon some huge industry with 
buildings of red brick, its sheds and smokestacks set down close to a mill 
pond. It is not always plain to the eye that there is any connection between 
the manufactory and the railway, and yet a spur-track always leads out to 
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these industries. The entire region is a confused compound of shop and 
farm, with little groups of houses set down at random. (95) 
The language here seems to blur the distinction between and “seeming” and real disarray. 
What is certain is that all points in space are connected to the railway, however things appear 
to the common passenger. In short, wherever disorder appears in the essay, Dreiser assures us 
he can discover and underlying orderliness, thanks to his mastery of mobile techniques. The 
essay is like a map of hidden connections—but is precisely not a map, but a narration that 
models a kind of spatial practice that both presupposes and supplements a map-reading 
competence.  
Although Mimi Sheller and John Urry define “automobility” in strict opposition to the 
railroad’s “strict timetabling of mobility that accompanied railways in the mid-nineteenth 
century” (744), this essay presents streetcar passengerhood as an example of what they define 
as automobility: it employs rhetorics of both “autonomous humans and autonomous machines 
only able to roam in certain time-space scapes” (729), and emphasizes the sense of “seamless 
journeys from home-away-home” (745). Before we leap to the conclusion that, for Dreiser, the 
technical differences between rail and automobile travel makes all the difference between 
immobility and auto-mobility, then, we should note that his streetcar narrative already makes 
the trolley an instrument of auto-mobility in contrast to the “wearisome, flashy, dusty paths” of 
the long-distance steam railroad (“Trolley” 92). Yet, by the time he took his automobile trip in 
1914, he seemingly had begun to identify the automobile as the proper technical form of 
autonomous mobility:  
At best the railways have become huge, clumsy, unwieldy affairs little 
suited to the temperamental needs and moods of the average human being. 
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They are mass carriers, freight handlers, great hurry conveniences for 
overburdened commercial minds, but little more. After all, travel, however 
much it may be a matter of necessity, is in most instances, or should be, a 
matter of pleasure. If not, why go forth to roam the world so wide? Are not 
trees, flowers, attractive scenes, great mountains, interesting cities, and 
streets and terminals the objective? [. . .] Should the discomforts become 
too great, as in the case of the majority of railroads, and any reasonable 
substitute offer itself, as the automobile, the old form of conveyance will 
assuredly have to give way. (92) 
Already, Dreiser seems to have forgotten “all the pleasant miles” of his streetcar journey; now 
all rail transportation is a barrier to authentic mobility because of the fixed route the train is 
constrained to travel. The railroad “has no latitude, no elasticity” in contrast to the automobile. 
Yet, if Dreiser seems here to replace the streetcar with the automobile as a model of flexibility, 
efficiency, and autonomy, elsewhere, as I have pointed out, he treats the automobile 
infrastructure as an example of spatial fragmentation and chaos. For example, entering 
Pennsylvania from New York along the shore of Lake Erie, Dreiser and his companions 
encounter a portion of highway damaged by recent floods. Dreiser writes, “The road grew very 
bad. It was a dirt road, a kind of marshy, oily, mucky, looking thing, cut into deep ruts. After a 
short distance under darksome trees, it turned into a wide, marshy looking area with a number 
of railroad tracks crossing it from east to west and numerous freight trains and switch engines 
jangling to and fro in the dark” (187). This road appears to be marked as an approach to Erie, 
Pennsylvania, but the illuminated sigh the travelers see is in fact a marker for a General 
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Electric factory “stuck off on some windy beach or marsh, no doubt, miles from the city.” The 
road itself become a veritable barrier to mobility here: 
And this road grew worse and worse. The car lurched so at times that I 
thought we might be thrown out. [. . .] Finally, having gone a considerable 
distance on this course, we seemed to be mired. We would dash into a 
muddy slough and there the wheels would just spin without making any 
progress. The way out of this was to trample earth behind the wheels and 
then back up. I began to think we were good for a night in the open. 
Franklin and I walked back blocks and blocks to see whether by chance we 
hadn’t gotten on the wrong road. Having decided that we were doing as 
well as could be expected under the circumstances, we returned and sat in 
the car. After much time wasted we struck a better portion of the road, 
coming to where it turned at right angles over the maze of unguarded tracks 
which we had been paralleling all this while. It was a treacherous place, 
with neither gates nor watchmen but just a great welter of dark tracks with 
freight cars standing here and there, signal lights glimmering in the distance 
and engines and trains switching up and down.” (187-188) 
This is an infernal space—a “maze” and “treacherous place, with neither gates nor watchmen.” 
Here, the automobile fails, but the railroad, like the steam monster in The Octopus, persists, its 
movements illegible and dangerous, its cyclopean railbeds inert and massive and its “signal 
lights glimmering in the distance and engines and trains switching up and down.” The 
individual, self-contained nature of the automobile, on the other hand, makes it particularly 
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vulnerable to incompletenesses and inconsistencies in its technosocial networks; greater 
apparent autonomy is, in fact, an index of greater interdependence and determinacy. 
If A Hoosier Holiday supplants the streetcar with the automobile as the solution to the 
problem of “the fixed route,” it also suggests a much greater degree of skepticism about auto-
mobility than Dreiser’s streetcar essay. In “From New York to Boston by Trolley,” Dreiser 
writes himself as a standard Progressive-Era passenger-detective; he not only employs the 
techniques of the transportation engineer in navigating the streetcar system, he actually 
surpasses his model because he fills in the gaps therein. Conversely, in A Hoosier Holiday, he 
makes the task of navigating the technosocial spaces of capital a slapstick of wrong turns, 
mazes, mudbaths, and mirages38. A Hoosier Holiday suggests that in the years after “From 
New York to Boston by Trolley,” Dreiser’s faith in mobility began to waver. On one hand, the 
wish for unimpeded motion begins to seem less and less like the rational passenger’s simple 
desire for greater technical mastery over space; on the other hand, the dream of a frictionless 
medium for motion, of a totalized and knowable technosocial network, begins to fade. These 
two ambivalences are linked: The irrationalities of striving for mobility end up materialized in 
the built environment, while this fractured and evanescent environment itself continually 
frustrates the practice of mobile techniques. Likewise, Clyde perpetually finds his mastery of 
mobile techniques to be inadequate to his social ambitions. He carries on his affair with 
Roberta with the silent collaboration of the streetcar ban train and networks. As they begin 
their trysts, Clyde, knowing Roberta doesn’t want to be observed, suggests they meet at “‘a 
little park—Mohawk—just west of Dreamland on the Mohawk Street line” (277-278). 
Although Roberta demurs, eventually she herself becomes an expert in using trains and 
trolleys to evade notice; planning to take an excursion with Clyde under the pretext of visiting 
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her sister Grace, she adroitly imagines how the anonymity and geographic reach of the rail 
system can free them from the restrictive moralizing gaze of Roberta’s neighbors: 
“[Y]ou have to go to Fonda first, then change cars there. But I could leave 
here any time on the trolley and there are only two trains a day from Fonda, 
one at two, and one at seven on Saturday. So I might leave here any time 
before two, you see, and then if I didn’t make the two o’clock train, it 
would be all right, wouldn’t it? I could go on the seven. And you could be 
over there, or meet me on the way, just so no one here saw us. Then I could 
go on and you could come back. I could arrange that with Agnes, I’m sure. I 
would have to write her.” (286) 
The narration of the actual outing is even more meticulous in detailing the transfers and routes 
Clyde and Roberta take. Again, this elaboration may seem like no more than the kind of 
pedantry of language that Mencken decried, it also underscores the doubleness of Clyde’s and 
Robert’s mastery of mobile technique. On one hand the streetcar and railroad are libratory 
tools that, as with the Annixters in The Octopus, unfetter the couple not only from physical 
place, but also from the straits of sexual etiquette; on the other, their obligation to use such 
techniques registers how circumscribed their agency really is. This paradox is further 
emphasized by the narrator’s description of the amusement park the couple visits during their 
excursion. They come upon  
a pleasure park called Starlight where, in addition to a few clap-trap 
pleasure concessions such as a ring of captive aeroplanes, a Ferris wheel, a 
merry-go-round, an old mill and a dance floor, was a small lake with boats. 
It was after its fashion an idyllic spot with a little band-stand out on an 
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island near the center of the lake and on the shore a grave and captive bear 
in a cage. (287) 
The language here emphasizes the combining of motion and immobility, pleasure and 
captivity, even accelerating this rhetoric as Clyde and Roberta together ride the carousel:  
Round and round they spun on the noisy, grinding machine, surveying now 
a few idle pleasure seekers who were in boats upon the lake, now some who 
were flying round in the gaudy green and white captive aeroplanes or 
turning upward and then down in the suspended cages of the Ferris wheel. 
(288) 
On one hand, constant motion is implicitly compared to sexual indulgence, to bliss, to 
freedom: “[S]ince the merry-go-round was in full blast, nothing would do but that Roberta 
should ride with him. And in the gayest of moods, they climbed on, and he placed her on a 
zebra, and then stood close in order that he might keep his arm about her, and both try to catch 
the brass ring.” On the other, the machinery here merely moves in tight circles, and inasmuch 
as some of these machines double in miniature the transportation systems of the productive 
world beyond—planes and boats—it reveals that this isolated and “idyllic spot” is little more 
than a training ground for mobility itself; yet, the mode of its material entrainment with the 
rest of the mobile world is to be a simulation of mobility that disciplines and teaches 
constraint. If you want ride along, you must be content with going in circles39. So it is with the 
park’s screened-in dance pavilion: To participate in “color and the music and the motions of 
the dancers gliding rhythmically here and there,” you must be willing (and able) to wait at the 
turnstile and buy a ticket—“ten cents per dance per couple” (289). 
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Mobility, then, only comes with social and even physical isolation. Clyde and Roberta 
continue their trysts as Roberta secures new lodgings in a house with a separate entrance that 
“permit[s] ingress and egress without contact with any other portion of the house” (295). We 
learn that Roberta—still unwilling to sleep with Clyde—nevertheless chooses this apartment 
specifically for “its geometric position in relation to the rest of the house,” for its seclusion and 
anonymity (297). Meanwhile, although the couple continue to frequent “such spots as could be 
conveniently reached by interurban lines” (296), these “out-of-door resorts which [. . .] had 
provided diversion, and that at a fairly safe distance from Lycurgus” have begun to close for 
the winter. Hence, “while [Roberta’s] movements were unrestrained, there was no place to go” 
unless Clyde is allowed visit Roberta in her new flat (297-298). If Clyde’s promotion to the 
stamping room had meant moving from mere motion to public visibility, and consequently had 
seemed like the acquisition of authentic social mobility, he now learns just how constraining 
visibility can be. Not only can no degree of technosocial competence bridge the gap between 
social strata, but, for Clyde, practicing mobility in public can even be a barrier to social 
advancement. The network of private rooms, amusement resorts, and railroads that had 
hitherto seemed a terrain of liberation now seems like the risk-laden landscape Dreiser had 
encountered in eastern Pennsylvania; the lines of escape from his erstwhile “basement world” 
now appear as elements of that very world. Consequently, Clyde’s affections shift from 
Roberta to Sondra Finchley in part because Sondra—as metonymized by her automobile—
represents a larger, freer field for mobility; yet she also stands for the possibility of liberation 
from mobility itself. That is, for Clyde, Sondra represents a kind of permanency and 
comforting domesticity:  
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Just to think the Wimblinger Finchley Electric Sweeper Company was one 
of the largest manufacturing concerns here. Its tall walls and stacks made a 
part of the striking sky line across the Mohawk. And the Finchley residence 
in Wykeagy Avenue, near that of the Griffiths, was one of the most 
impressive among that distinguished row of houses which had come with 
the latest and most discriminating architectural taste here—Italian 
Renaissance—cream hued marble and Dutchess County sandstone 
combined. And the Finchleys were among the most discussed of families 
here. (319) 
Here, monumentality and conspicuousness mark status—“status” in its full etymological 
connection to “stasis.” Yet there is no contradiction here to the original sense that Clyde is 
drawn to Sondra as mobility corporealized, as he sees her “guiding her craft with a paddle 
covered with yellow daffodils—a floral representation of some Indian legend in connection 
with the Mohawk River.” For this very image evacuates mobility of technique, naturalizes it, 
indeed makes it as natural as place itself. For Clyde as he is in Kansas City or with Roberta, 
the important thing is to know how to stay in motion; but, oddly enough, as the shortcomings 
of technosocial mobility become clearer to Clyde, social mobility becomes a matter of being 
“impressive” and “distinguished,” which means having a place, possessing a distinction. The 
automobile marks the place where mobility in the strict technical sense and social climbing 
begin to part ways, even as they continue to seem to travel together. The ideology of 
automobility notwithstanding, the motor car seems to do little to enhance actual spatial 
autonomy while introducing a dimension of ownership. Automobility is a theatrical excess 
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beyond auto-mobility; it is a conspicuous mobility that, by its very emphasis on spectacle, 
renders mobility as such abject and déclassé. 
At first, it had seemed to Clyde that being in motion required the supplement of being 
seen; now, as the affair with Sondra progresses, it appears that being seen is the thing itself. 
But this also implies a passage from activity to passivity, from competence to merely 
occupying a place. Hence, as Michaels implies, Sondra—the one who possesses an 
automobile—wants to possess Clyde more than Clyde wants to possess Sondra. What Clyde 
wants, in fact, is to be seen to be possessed by Sondra. As Michaels writes: 
Clyde’s near identity to Gilbert helps constitute (especially for Sondra) a 
kind of slippery class erotics: Clyde’s resemblance to Gilbert identifies him 
as one of Sondra’s own class [. . .]; at the same time, however, Sondra is 
attracted to Clyde because he is a lower-class Gilbert [. . .]. Clyde is thus 
simultaneously above and below Sondra, attractive as the embodiment of an 
almost utopian class fluidity—utopian not in imagining that class lines can 
be crossed (the history of the Griffithses and the Finchleys testifies they 
can) but in imagining the possibility of belonging to more than one—or 
rather, the possibility of a single person (Clyde, and through him, Sondra 
herself) embodying the moment of crossing. (88; emphasis in original) 
Being possessed by Sondra would make Clyde the “embodiment” of what the Fichleys 
represent to Mrs. Griffiths: the “fast set.” But Clyde, looking up from below, sees being in this 
“set” rather like Mrs. Griffiths does from her (putatively) superior position, as a matter of 
being rather than doing, of status rather than praxis. Wanting to achieve a subjectivity beyond 
(technosocial) mobility, that is, he begins to desire to be an object. Part of her attraction to 
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him, accordingly, is her infantilizing baby-talk; and, although (as Michaels points out) both 
Clyde and Sondra use baby-talk with each other, Sondra’s is more strongly characterized by a 
kind of objectifying imperiousness. She writes in a letter to Clyde: 
You must hurry and come up, dear. It’s too nice for words. Green roads to 
gallop through, and swimming and dancing at the Casino every afternoon at 
four. Just back from a wonderful gallop on Dickey and going again after 
luncheon to mail these letters. Bertine says she’ll write you a letter to-day or 
tomorrow good for any week-end or any old time, so when Sonda says 
come, you come, you hear, else Sonda whip hard. You baddie, good boy. 
(450) 
Like “Dicky,” Clyde must respond when called—must gallop, swim, and dance on 
command—and he does respond “eagerly” to Sondra’s letter (451). It seems as if the solution 
to the shortcomings of mobile techniques is to be commanded, to be made an instrument of 
someone else’s mobility. From Clyde’s perspective, courting Sondra—or, rather, being 
courted by Sondra—is a way of squaring the circle of mobility, a way of being in motion but 
beyond the need for mobile techniques. It is a means both to achieve perpetual motion and to 
find a place in the social order. The text, however, gives us many reasons to question this 
stance. Even as he tries to find a place beyond mere technosocial mobility, Clyde keeps 
running into the need for mobile techniques, and, hence, their limits. In fact, much of the 
narrative leading up to Roberta’s murder interweaves scenes of Clyde’s apparent mastery of 
space and those of the way spaces seem uncannily and perpetually to steer him toward the 
events at Big Bittern Lake. Roberta chances to see Clyde “pausing in front of the post office” 
(442) and talking to Arabella Stark, who in her “large and impressive-looking car” is 
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“affectedly posed at the wheel, not only for the benefit of Clyde but the public in general” 
(442-443). Clyde’s apparent accession to a world beyond mobility—the automobile is 
window-dressing, “impressive” precisely because it is posed, staged, immobile—not only 
makes him more visible to Roberta, but makes his public visibility visible to her; yet, on this 
public street where thousands pass anonymously, Clyde himself doesn’t see himself being seen 
by Roberta. Clyde fails to see here that having traded in the need to be anonymous for the 
pleasure of being on display makes him vulnerable to Roberta and her own mobile techniques. 
Likewise, when Clyde, Sondra, and their friends take a weekend drive to a lake resort, they are 
“compelled to detour east in the direction of Roberta’s home” (443). If the post office vignette 
proleptically hints at the role letters and letter-carriers will play in Clyde’s conviction for 
murder, the detour passage echoes all the novel’s earlier detours—especially the ones in 
Kansas City that led to the accident that sent Clyde fleeing. Moreover, Dreiser’s meticulous 
rendering of the cartographic details of the detour echo his same obsessive attention to detail in 
the factory passages: “[C]oming finally to a north and south road which ran directly from 
Trippettsville past the Alden farm, they turned north into that. And a few minutes later, came 
directly to the corner adjoining the Alden farm, where an east and west road led to Biltz.” This 
rhetoric reinforces both the sense of the domination of space by built systems and the 
haphazard state of those systems; Clyde’s chance encounter with Roberta’s father brings the 
“specter of Roberta and all that she represented” back into his hitherto blissful consciousness 
just as the highway detour, interrupting the traveler’s otherwise unimpeded progress to Arrow 
Lake, raises the specter of the shortcomings of automobility (444). And, although the narrator 
says that these incidents, for both Roberta and Clyde, underscore the difference between 
Roberta’s world and Sondra’s, for us they only show how inextricable these two “worlds” are. 
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Precisely because Sondra’s world must continually extend itself into Roberta’s, Roberta’s can 
always interrupt and perturb Sondra’s. 
There is nothing in An American Tragedy, in other words, outside Clyde’s basement 
world. The delusional appearance of an outside is, in fact, both structural element and 
structural effect of the topography of this basement world. There are no pathways in this world 
without detours, obstructions, breakdowns, and blind alleys; likewise, as in the space of the 
factory—and for workers (and even capitalists) as for products—there are no detours that do 
not lead inevitably through the faulty, yet nonetheless automatic, sorting processes of capital. 
Contingency and determinacy, so bound up in the work of other writers with reified “forces” 
like heredity and libido, are here indistinguishable from the very rationalized built 
environment that had hitherto seemed like a cure for the weaknesses of the flesh or the 
inheritances of history. “‘The important thing,’” says the factotum Whiggam, “‘is to see that 
there is no mistake as to the number [. . .] of collars that come down here and are stamped, and 
also that there’s no delay in stamping them and getting them out to the stitchers’” (237). But 
when Roberta discovers “that a bundle of collars which she had already stamped as sixteens 
were not of that size but smaller” (275-276), there is no way to trace the source of the error, no 
way to know whether to blame Roberta’s own fecklessness or some glitch in the system of 
chutes and conveyors that have transported the collars to the stamping room. To follow the 
path perfectly can be—must be—to err. The collars can always be sent back, of course; the 
important thing is that they find their way to the market. 
 
Sorting contests 
Dreiser’s narrator tells us that while Clyde wishes that the detour of Roberta’s pregnancy 
could be overcome so he can resume the path of marriage to Sondra, Roberta’s murder is 
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actually planned by his “efrit,” a voice “from the depths of some lower or higher world never 
before guessed or plumbed by him” (482). This “diabolical” voice, however, does not speak 
like the inner, the yearning and daydreaming, Clyde. On the contrary, this manifestation of a 
“leering and diabolic wish or wisdom concealed in his own nature” (483) seems to speak as 
the very persona of mobility itself. The efrit knows nothing of ethics, but everything about 
routes, networks, locations, distances, and vehicles. The efrit first appears in the context of 
Clyde’s discovery, as he mails a letter to Sondra, of a newspaper item about an accidental 
drowning, and reemerges as Clyde speaks to Roberta over the telephone; the efrit manifests 
itself, then, seemingly out of the mass communication network itself: 
As Clyde stood at the telephone in a small outlying drug store and 
talked—the lonely proprietor buried in a silly romance among his pots and 
phials at the back—it seemed as though the Giant Efrit that had previously 
materialized in the silent halls of his brain, was once more here at his 
elbow—that he himself, cold and numb and fearsome, was being talked 
through—not actually talking himself. 
Go to the lake which you visited with Sondra! 
Get travel folders of the region there from either the Lycurgus House 
here or the depot. 
Go to the south end of it and from there walk south, afterwards. 
Pick a boat that will upset easily—one with a round bottom, such as 
those you have seen here at Crum Lake and up there. 
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Buy a new and different hat and leave that on the water—one that 
cannot be traced to you. You might even tear the lining out of it so that it 
cannot be traced. 
Pack all of your things in your trunk here, but leave it, so that swiftly, 
in the event that anything goes wrong, you can return here and get it and 
depart. 
And take only such things with you as will make it seem as though you 
were going for an outing to Twelfth Lake—not away, so that should you be 
sought at Twelfth Lake, it will look as though you had gone only there, not 
elsewhere. (491) 
The efrit that had seemed like something interior to Clyde nonetheless speaks as something 
exterior—“through” him—just as Clyde himself speaks through the telephone, as if Clyde is 
nothing more than the prosthesis of his own efrtit. Moreover, this voice that is at once 
everywhere and nowhere is an expert in traveling light and anonymously; in its spatial 
competences, it is a veritable travel agent and train conductor. The efrit instructs Clyde in 
making use of textuality for mastering the spaces of the upstate lakes—“Get travel folders”—
and in effacing the textual traces that might lead pursuers to him—“Buy a new and different 
hat.” In short, although Dreiser’s narrator calls the efrit’s plans “the most bizarre and 
haphazard of schemes” (482), schemes of the kind imagined by “a small and routed army in 
full flight before a major one,” the voice that plans Roberta’s murder never seems (to Clyde) 
like that of pathological mania or delusion, but like his own managerial voice—that is, like the 
reasonable yet stern voice of a Gilbert Griffiths or a Joshua Whiggam. Indeed, it often seems 
as if the built environment itself speaks through the efrit and plans and carries out Roberta’s 
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murder in collaboration with Clyde. As Clyde waits for the westbound train at Fonda, the 
narratorial focalization splits—Dreiser using here two typefaces—between Clyde’s scheming 
and confident consciousness and his doubting and anxious self. Here, the exteriority of the 
efrit seems clear: the efrit is pure agency, outward-directed thought, more like a competent 
general than a routed army, while the other Clyde oscillates between halfhearted rebellion and 
aestheticizing passivity. It is almost as if “Clyde” is now the masochistic instrument of the 
dominant efrit. In fact, this other Clyde—perhaps the “authentic” one—seems much like 
Dreiser’s presentation of himself on the trip to Indiana: dreamy, impressionable, unfocused. 
“What ‘Clyde’ represents, then,” write Lee Clark Mitchell, “is a locus of reflexes and desires, 
[that reveal] how little responsibility he bears. Indeed, when desire for Roberta’s demise grows 
so strong as to threaten his moral reflexes, it can only find expression as a voice that speaks 
through him” (55). Arguably, however, “morality” resides in the desiring Clyde, the Clyde 
who wants a place beyond mobility; the efrit that speaks through Clyde is, in turn, “reflex,” or 
learned technique. In short, the problem of The Octopus seems to have reemerged here; 
Clyde’s spatial consciousness is doubly decentered. Part of him is pure technique, a cogitating 
node in a technosocial network and nothing more; another part of him is all daydream and 
vision, with neither volition nor intellect.  
Yet An American Tragedy suggests that this condition is not an undeveloped kind of 
mobility, but, on the contrary, a result of the contradictions in mobility itself. In fact, the 
conundrum of the novel is that the development of the technosocially-competent self, the self 
of technique, the cynical yet rational self, enervates and excludes the ethical or reflective self; 
yet, it is the reflective self that suffers the social abjection and sense of placelessness for which 
mobile techniques offer themselves as a remedy. In the end, any sense of desire as a trait of an 
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authentic and interior self, even of desire for “success,” is an obstacle to “success” itself. 
Accordingly, Clyde’s residual and feeble resistance to the mandate of the efrit, as much as the 
emergence of the efrit itself, leads to Clyde’s eventual failure. Clyde seemingly fails, that is, 
because his sentimental and passive (and even religious) self continually undermines his 
resolute managerial self40. Where, then, in An American Tragedy do we find a counterexample, 
a subjectivity that do seem to have some unobstructed access to technosocial competence? 
Mitchell has pointed out how both Gilbert Griffiths and Roberta Alden act as specular doubles 
for Clyde; but while Mitchell argues that Roberta “embodies a part of [Clyde] rejected and cast 
out” (44), his formerly “rejected” self, she also ultimately displays a kind of ruthlessness that 
Clyde himself can never muster. Clyde’s ambiguous decision to murder Roberta comes finally 
only after Roberta threatens to blackmail him, to reveal their affair to Lycurgus and thereby 
spoil his game of class masquerade. In threatening Clyde, Roberta seems to give up on 
romantic daydreaming and instead begins to manipulate Clyde, like the efrit itself, according 
to her own technosocial competences. At this point, Roberta in fact resembles Clyde’s other 
double—Gilbert—more than Clyde himself. Gilbert is first described as “smaller and a little 
older and certainly much colder than [Clyde]—such a youth, in short, as Clyde would have 
liked to imagine himself to be—trained in an executive sense, apparently authoritative and 
efficient” (183). Gilbert further reveals his difference from Clyde when he describes Clyde to 
his sister Myra: “‘He’s like all those young fellows who work for hotels. He thinks clothes are 
the whole thing, I guess. He had on a light brown suit and a brown tie and a hat to match and 
brown shoes. His tie was to bright and he had on one of those bright pink striped shirts like 
they used to wear three or four years ago. Besides his clothes aren’t cut right” (194-195). 
Gilbert knows very well that codes of fashion are mere arbitrary and even ephemeral sign 
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systems, that they’re not “the whole thing”; nevertheless, he knows those codes—what’s 
“right,” what’s “too bright,” what’s “three or four years” out of date—much better that Clyde 
does—or, rather, he knows them differently. Gilbert, then, even more than Roberta, exhibit a 
cynical distance from social codes, less a hysteric self-theatricalization than a calculated 
manipulation of performative signs: fashionable Gilbert, victimized Roberta. 
However, no character in An American Tragedy acts his part as well as District Attorney 
Orville Mason. When Mason promises to bring Roberta’s killer to justice in “his very best 
oratorical mood,” his “thrilled audience” is stirred to action by his “dramatic stand, his very 
picturesque and even heroic appearance” (542-543). Arguably, the proliferation of theatrical 
metaphors here, if anything, implies the very same sort of interiority that, in Clyde, results in a 
failure of agency. After all, if there is a role, must there not also be an actor? However, while 
Mason is far from a brilliant criminologist—his “profiling” of Clyde could not be more 
inaccurate—he does efficiently marshal and exploit the material and institutional resources at 
hand, including “word of mouth, telephone, telegraph,” and the press (525). While Clyde 
wants to emulate the role of a social actor—to act as an actor—he knows that role from the 
position of a spectator, from one who yearns to be on stage; Mason, however—who has 
achieved the rank of District Attorney by exploiting symbolic competence as a “local news-
gatherer,” first in Bridgeburg, then in Utica, and by his “shrewd and ambitious willingness to 
do as he was instructed” (527)—sees the drama of social difference from backstage, as it were, 
having served the functions of stage manager, stage technician, and director. Moreover, 
Mason’s “facial handicap,” his misshapen nose, both permanently marks his physical 
difference and makes him all the more conscious of the arbitrariness of the “youthful sorting 
contests” at which he failed. For Mason, therefore, the misrecognition that Clyde experiences 
236  
 
 
in the lobby of the Davidson-Green is impossible; Mason thrills an audience of political 
spectators while never allowing any specular, narcissistic illusions to interfere with his purely 
institutional role; more precisely, Mason directly integrates performative competence into his 
practice. It might be said that for Clyde, “shrewdness” remains the handmaiden of desire—
shrewdness, such as it is, making its appearance as the efrit, something both alien and 
doubtful—while for Mason, the reverse obtains. For Clyde, pragmatic, methodical, “cynical” 
ways of knowing work fitfully and imperfectly only to further the dreams of social emulation; 
for Mason, conversely, the accurate performance of ambition, moral righteousness, and 
sympathy is itself produced by a pure operation of institutional, technosocial competence. 
When Mason makes his speech to Titus Alden about bringing the killer to justice, it’s the 
sincerity of the “outburst of emotion” (453) that seems to come from nowhere, and which 
breaks through his normally calm and practical way of speaking. If amoral, managerial, 
calculation appears as an alien voice to Clyde, irruptions of oratorical and theatrical 
performativity, pure corporeal practice, are Mason’s own efrit. 
In other words, Mason becomes both a competent detective and Clyde’s nemesis merely 
by “mindlessly” pretending to be so. Indeed, we first encounter Mason not as a figure, but as 
another node in a network of telegraphs, trains, telephones, and automobiles. We find him not 
in person, but by name, as the machinery—both figurative and literal—of the police begins to 
respond to news of Roberta’s murder. Coroner Fred Heit, his thoughts of the bounties of a 
mail-order retail catalogue “interrupted by the whirr of a telephone bell” (518), relays the news 
to his secretary Earl Newcomb; as Heit and Newcomb prepare to take a train to Big Bittern 
Lake, who in turn relays it to Zillah Saunders:  
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[B]eing struck by the preoccupation and haste of Mr. Newcomb, usually so 
much more deliberate, she now called: “Hello, Earl. What’s the rush? 
Where you going so fast?” 
“Double drowning up at Big Bittern, we hear. Maybe something 
worse. Mr. Heit’s going up and I’m going along. We have to make that 
3:10.” 
“Who said so? Is it anyone from here?” 
“Don’t know yet, but don’t think so. There was a letter in the girl’s 
pocket addressed to some one in Biltz, Mimico County, a Mrs. Alden. I’ll 
tell you when we get back or I’ll telephone you.” 
“My goodness, if it’s a crime, Mr. Mason’ll be interested, won’t he?” 
“Sure, I’ll telephone him, or Mr. Heit will. If you see Bud Parker or 
Karel Badnell, tell ’em I had to go out of town, and call up my mother for 
me, will you, Zillah, and tell her, too. I’m afraid I won’t have time.” 
“Sure I will, Earl.” 
“Thanks.” (519-520) 
The language here, both offhand and telegraphic, underscores the automaticity of the apparatus 
that has begun to seek out Roberta’s murderer, while ironizing the sense of the characters’ 
excitement. This is, once again, both theater and the merest mechanical labor, the two aspects 
fused together as closely as in the Griffiths collar works. And once again, the meticulousness 
of Dreiser’s narration emphasizes the way a perpetual motion of bodies, machines, and texts 
works inevitably toward Clyde’s arrest and eventual conviction.  
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Clyde and Mason, then, represent two different sides of failed, faulty, or spurious 
subjectivity. For both, “subjectivity” is nothing more than an effect of institutional 
apparatuses. But Clyde always seems to be subject to institutional machinery, while Mason is 
the seemingly ubiquitous and omnipotent subject of the police machine. At the risk of 
stretching an analogy too far, this difference resembles the difference between the “large, 
noisy, clattery, tinny” player-piano at the Wigwam, both crudely mimetic and technically 
poorly-integrated, and the Victrola, whose representational apparatus is simultaneously more 
technically efficient, more convincing, more versatile, and more institutionally decentered, 
since both its production and its operation relies on more “deterritorialized” and materially 
distributed knowledges and practices. Mason is so effective precisely because of his 
epistemological distance from the roles he plays. Yet this “distance” could not be farther from 
Norris’s (misnamed) “larger view”—the view of the spectator who has mastered mobile 
technique as “mediated immediacy.” For, in Norris’s ideal of the naturalist author, at least as 
represented by Presley in The Octopus, mastering both mobility and mediation allows the 
subject to act as if he stands outside the moil of capitalist spatiality; for Mason, however, the 
appearance of “standing above” everything is itself—precisely—an appearance. Neither Norris 
nor Dreiser admit the possibility of genuinely transcendental techniques for knowing the 
spaces of capital; Dreiser, moreover, rejects even the quasi-transcendence of the skilled 
detective-navigator; Mason, unlike Phillip Sterling in The Gilded Age or Presely in The 
Octopus—develops mobility only at the expense of submerging his own autonomous 
subjectivity and agency. This is why Mason does such a competent job catching Clyde, and it 
is also why he gets Clyde convicted, even though the version of Roberta’s murder he presents 
to the jury is no more “true” than that of the defense team. Mason methodically but 
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mechanically marshals all the material traces of Clyde’s journey, first from Lycurgus to Big 
Bittern Lake, and then to Bear Lake. He does not simply narratively re-present the crime; his 
very method reproduces its planning. In his opening arguments, he begins with Roberta’s 
letters—recovered from the hiding places of Clyde’s flat, and then “produced a map of the 
Adirondacks” 
which he had had made for the purpose, and on which in red ink were 
traced the movements of Clyde up to and after her death—up to the time of 
his arrest at Big Bear. Also, in doing this, he paused to tell the jury of 
Clyde’s well-conceived plan of hiding his identity, the various false 
registrations, the two hats. Here also he explained that on the train between 
Fonda and Utica, as again between Utica and Grass Lake, he had not ridden 
in the same car with Roberta. (670) 
Inviting the jury to imagine the path Clyde has taken through upstate New York, Mason leaves 
them no alternative to the route marked out in red ink; he makes their spatial imaginations 
double his, just as his has doubled Clyde’s. And it is maps once again when Mason confronts 
Clyde with the travel folders he used in planning the trip through the Adirondacks. First, 
Mason tricks Clyde into revealing that he has lied about the provenance of these brochures, all 
of which have “a Lycurgus House stamp on the cover” (728). The Lycurgus House stamp, 
recalling both the material form and social function of the stamp on the collars produced 
Griffiths, and in red ink like Mason’s map, remind us of the ways texts move through space 
yet always point back to their origins. Yet, this is only enough to show that Clyde is lying 
about the folders; he must still prove Clyde’s intent to murder Roberta—which he does by 
using the maps on the flyers themselves: 
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And here [Mason] returned the identical stamped folder [. . ]. [I]n the center 
was a map showing the Indian Chain together with Twelfth, Big Bittern, 
and Grass Lakes, as well as many others, and at the bottom of this map a 
road plainly indicated as leading from Grass Lake and Gun Lodge south 
past the southern end of Big Bittern to Three Mile Bay. Now seeing this 
after so long a time again, he suddenly decided that it must be his 
knowledge of this road that Mason was seeking to establish, and a little 
quivery and creepy now, he replied: “Yes, it may be the one. It looks like it. 
I guess it is, maybe.” 
“Don’t you know that it is?” insisted Mason, darkly and dourly. “Can’t 
you tell from reading that item there whether it is or not?” 
“Well, it looks like it,” replied Clyde, evasively after examining the 
item which had inclined him toward Grass Lake in the first place. “I 
suppose maybe it is.” 
“You suppose! You suppose! Getting a little more cautious now that 
we’re getting down to something practical. Well, just look at that map there 
again and tell me what you see. Tell me if you don’t see a road marked as 
leading south from Grass Lake.” 
“Yes,” replied Clyde, a little sullenly and bitterly after a time, so flayed 
and bruised was he by this man who was so determined to harry him to his 
grave. He fingered the map and pretended to look as directed, but was 
seeing only all that he had seen long before there in Lycurgus, so shortly 
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before he departed for Fonda to meet Roberta. And now here it was being 
used against him. 
“And where does it run, please? Do you mind telling the jury where it 
runs—from where to where?” 
And Clyde, nervous and fearful and physically very much reduced, 
now replied: “Well, it runs from Grass Lake to Three Mile Bay.” 
“And to what or near what other places in between?” continued Mason, 
looking over his shoulder. 
“Gun Lodge. That’s all.” 
“What about Big Bittern? Doesn’t it run near that when it gets to the 
south of it?” 
“Yes, sir, it does here.” 
Here, Mason does not seek to establish what Clyde did, but what he thought; he does not 
evoke Clyde’s corporeal movement through physical space, but his cognitive movement 
through a textualized space. He produces a narrative, not of what happened the day of the 
murder, but of what happened days before, showing that the actual crime perfectly followed 
Clyde’s original plan. Mason here harks back to his opening arguments: 
“He is a bearded man. He has had more social and educational advantages 
than any one of you in the jury box. He has traveled. In hotels and clubs and 
the society with which he was so intimately connected in Lycurgus, he has 
been in contact with decent, respectable, and even able and distinguished 
people. Why, as a matter of fact, at the time of his arrest two months ago, he 
was part of as smart a society and summer resort group as this region 
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boasts. Remember that! His mind is a mature, not, an immature one. It is 
fully developed and balanced perfectly.” (675) 
Mason’s version of Clyde is a portrait of an accomplished and competent manager, an 
intellectual laborer. In short, Mason tries to paint Clyde as not only mobile, but a mobile 
subject, and hence culpable. 
Yet, although this strategy gets Clyde convicted, the novel implies that it actually proves 
nothing. The novel consistently hints that such a reading of Clyde’s actions overlooks the 
“other” Clyde, the Clyde who really is a “moral coward.” In fact, this misreading in implicit 
not only in Mason’s method of argument, but also in the institutional network that materially 
informs it. The mapping of traces can never establish intent; rather, once it has proven mobile 
subjectivity, it can only deduce that Clyde is indeed a “murderer of the coldest and blackest 
type” (773). Likewise, Orville Mason can only imagine himself as the righteous avenger of 
Roberta Alden because he himself is nothing at all other than a mobile subject. That is, if 
Clyde had imagined “success” as some place beyond mobility, as a home, Mason actually 
“succeeds” because he is nothing more than his own efrit, which in turn means that he is 
nothing more than mobility. Perversely enough, he appears to Clyde as a potent persecutory 
figure only to the degree than he has made himself and instrument of technosocial networks. 
Hence, Mason and Clyde confront each other in a closed spatiality that precludes any kind of 
epistemological transcendence—even the kind paradoxical transcendence through an 
“immanent” technosocial spatial competence advocated by Twain or Norris. But what makes 
this closed world different from that of earlier “naturalist” fictions? In such a closed world, 
why exactly does Clyde get the electric chair while Sister Carrie’s Carrie Meeber manages to 
take the New York stage by storm? The question becomes more knotty when we consider that 
243  
 
 
Carrie’s story and Clyde’s story really don’t diverge significantly until each falls permanently 
into the orbit of the of an institutional machinery—the judicial system on one hand, the culture 
industry on the other. Both these institutions operate according to the same epistemological 
presuppositions; in both worlds, exacting technical methods are marshaled to produce 
representations, narrations, information. More importantly, the two institutions into which 
these characters fall are largely opposed to each other according to the way they convert the 
world into knowledge. In the legal system, with its claims to uncovering the truth, contingency 
works to generate crises in which the possibly innocent may be found “officially” guilty; the 
police and courts can no more permit the accused to remain in a state of indeterminacy than 
Clyde himself can remain trapped between the humdrum sphere of technical labor and that of 
his glamorous friends. Clyde’s sense that the world is structured by likenesses, castes, different 
kinds—and not by flux and mechanism—is doubled by the way the putatively impersonal 
logic of the police and courts assigns accused criminals to their proper social “place.” 
Conversely, in show business the proliferation of contingency is actually cultivated as a 
pathway to novelty, which is paradoxically enough the closest thing to sure path to market 
success. Carrie’s gaffes, produced in the context of the industry of spectacle, make her a 
“personality.” An explosion of epistemological chaos under the increasing complexification of 
technosocial spaces is both the condition of Carrie’s success and the reason Clyde is found 
“guilty.” The tragedy of An American Tragedy is that a world in which Carrie can succeed 
spectacularly is necessarily one in which Clyde can be executed for (at best) questionable 
reasons. Success, that is, is never merely a matter of mastery or its lack, but of the aleatoric 
materiality of machine space itself. 
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My emphasis on theater, amusement, and spectacle as technique leads me to suggest that 
Clyde’s most significant double is in fact Carrie Meeber. Carrie, like Clyde, follows a path 
from city to city, form identity to identity, but unlike Clyde, Carrie’s entering into the theater 
professionalizes this absence of rooted connection to her work, of a “personal and heartfelt” 
epistemological stance. Professional acting, that is, subjects lack of inwardness itself to a 
technical discipline; the theater, like the police for Mason, becomes a disciplinary mechanism 
for the dissatisfied yet vogelfrei Carrie. Under the real subsumption of production to capital, 
the condition of being vogelfrei, of being deterritorialized, is itself directly yoked to 
production—unlike the condition of formal subsumption, under which the vogelfrei former 
peasant is reterritorialized within the factory walls, while outside the factory, feudal conditions 
are modified only by the introduction of the money wage. While Clyde’s fate is to succumb to 
the vicissitudes of these two moments of modernity, Carrie, as it were, learns to survive the 
churning, grinding, “sorting game” of this historical collision by making mutability and 
“cynicism” the (absent) core of her subjectivity. 
“It is curious to note how quickly a profession absorbs one” announces the narrator of 
Sister Carrie as Carrie begins her stage career: “The showy world in which her interests lay 
completely absorbed her” (442). The ambiguity of the word “absorb,” along with the paradox 
of a “showy world” foreground the hybridity of theater as an industry; is Carrie simply naïvely 
fascinated by the spectacle of theater, or, as she is described, “cleverly” playing a part in a 
spectacle-producing apparatus? Does she always remain a spectator or does she become an 
authentic producer? Furthermore, is this spectacle only show and ornament, something apart 
from the world, or an intrinsic part of the real world, both subsuming and subsumed by 
technosocial networks, both mechanical and part of a larger machine? Carrie’s first real 
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success has its origins in a scene that reveals both the purely pragmatic and materially 
socialized condition of theatrical production—that is, the extent to which is both like (fully 
modern, fully imbricated with market forces) and unlike (characterized only by “mental” labor, 
without the taint of the exploitation of “brute” labor) industrial production. Chagrinned by her 
casting as “a silent little Quakeress,” Carrie, “does not know” that “there was the least show of 
wrinkles between her eyes, and her mouth was puckered in sullenness” (446). The frown, the 
pucker—like Mason’s “facial handicap”—is strictly a failure as mimesis, but as a “quaint and 
droll” novelty, it is immediately a kind of “semiotic excess.” A contingent material flaw in 
itself, her grimace becomes productive; it advances the commercial value of the theatrical 
production by producing a performative difference that, in turn, produces a proliferation of 
interpretive textuality in the entertainment press. Carrie may scowl sullenly, but it takes the 
combined work of an author, a manager, a stage-manager, (along with, presumably, any 
number of carpenters, grips, and stagehands) and a company of correspondents to actually 
manufacture “‘Carrie’s frown’” (448). 
Although Carrie’s break comes from an accidental divergence from strict performative 
discipline, her success, like Mason’s, is largely owing to a willingness to do as she is 
instructed. Clyde Griffiths must simply emulate a single role—that of the traditional, even 
“quaint,” personal servant—and emulative prowess, along with a kind of masculine, atavistic, 
socialization, provides the extent of his work discipline; Carrie’s job, conversely, is emulation 
itself—and it requires “drilling,” even for ersatz soldiers like Carrie’s friend. The world of 
theatrical production in Sister Carrie, with its “brutal roughness” (390), its “constant urging, 
coupled with irascibility and energy” (391) is one in which an atmosphere of glamour like that 
of the Davidson-Green is produced with the Promethean vigor and lockstep organization of 
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Samuel Griffith’s factory. It’s not altogether inappropriate, then, their differences 
notwithstanding, that glamorous Carrie should be attracted to the briskly intellectual Bob 
Ames. Perhaps it’s that Ames is “‘connected with an electrical company’” (330), and since 
electricity keeps the lights shining on Carrie, the presses disseminating information about 
Carrie, the streetcars bringing spectators to see Carrie—so is Carrie. Of course, to be 
connected to an electrical company is to be implicitly, uncannily, technological; fittingly, 
Ames “really had a very bright mind, which was finding its chief development in electrical 
knowledge” (335). Yet, “[h]is sympathies for other forms of information, however, and for 
types of people, were quick and warm.” If Ames’s asceticism and mild moralism, along with 
his knack for collecting information, suggest an earlier version of Mason, he is nevertheless a 
warmer and quicker Mason—more a technocrat than a detective, but also a humanist. On the 
other hand, Mason and Ames have learned to play the sorting contests of capital by roughly 
the same method: by being connected to the power. 
In An American Tragedy, Mason combines, much more cynically, Ames’s technocratic 
pragmatism and Carrie’s protean performativity; yet the later novel is much more ambivalent 
than Sister Carrie. If Mason survives the sorting game of capital, it is at the expense of own 
“inner” self—and consequently, of Clyde, whose conviction and execution result on the 
spectacle of that same sorting game. Mason, in the end, seems moreover hardly less pathetic 
than Clyde himself.  Sister Carrie at least ambiguously seems to celebrate the encounter of 
Ames and Carrie, their (possible) mutual ethical growth, an advance signaling, less 
moralistically, a new and stronger (and more historically progressive) technical alliance 
between cultural and industrial production. On the other hand, Mason’s enhanced image as an 
effective lawman seems even more spurious than that of Carrie as a Broadway sensation. If 
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technosocial prowess and social striving reinforce each other in Mason’s case, it seems likely 
that two illusory effects simply reinforce each other’s inauthenticity; Mason’s crusading 
“oratory” would seem foolish if his subordinates (including the nonhuman agents of 
communication apparatuses) didn’t work so efficiently; but could these adjuncts and 
lieutenants know how to operate so “well” if Mason’s oratory hadn’t already told them how to 
know what their eventual goals are supposed to be? If the sorting game in Sister Carrie leads 
to a kind of productive enrichment and development of social needs, it leads only to 
institutional perpetuation in An American Tragedy. In An American Tragedy sorting contests 
are both ludic and severe. But they are also productive, and what they produce is spaces, 
spatial knowledges, and, consequently, the producers themselves. 
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Notes
 
1 Ginetter Verstraete has written of the way “[t]he rhetorical topoi [. . .] that the railroad mobilized 
[. . .] were meant to create a recognizable place that certain Americans could inhabit, a face they could 
identify with, a position they could take up in the midst of uncertainty and uprootedness” (150). Such 
rhetoric both “about literally moving all people in different ways,” displacing some and enriching 
others, while “figuratively emplacing a specific citizenry—white, male, and heterosexual.” Versraete 
writes here about the rhetoric surrounding the completion of the transcontinental railroad in 1869. What 
Adams’s rhetoric demonstrates is the way the railroad and its associated rhetorics, having displaced 
racial and gender “others,” has one last frontier to “emplace”: that of while heterosexual men 
themselves. For Adams, stubborn attachments to place, and even to the rights of individualistic 
entrepreneurial capital itself, are now to be subjected to the technical logic of the rail network. For a 
further discussion of the “cult of the network,” see Mattelart, pp. 85-111. 
2 JoAnne Yates has insightfully and thoroughly examined such new textual practices in Control 
trough Communications, especially in pp. 65-100. She specifically argues that many of the new “genres 
or generic forms of modern internal [business] communication” (65) originated in military practice and, 
among commercial enterprises, were first adopted by railroads, owing to “geographic dispersion and 
unique safety problems” (68). Yates sees this as not only writing in the service of “scientific 
management,” but as revolution in the scientific management of writing itself; “the letterlike report of 
the nineteenth century,” she writes, “had given way to newer forms and styles reflecting the need to 
transfer information as efficiently as possible” (92). 
3 See Harvey’s discussion of the urban reformers and the social problem of “impos[ing] coherence 
on the spatial system as a whole” in Consciousness and the Urban Experience, pp. 10-16. 
4 Carl Smith discusses the rhetoric of The Plan of Chicago on pp. 86-110. See also Churchill and 
Danzer. 
5 See The Machine in the Garden, pp. 341-353. 
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6 For all his insistence on the difference between his own fiction and that of the earlier American 
realists—and specifically of William Dean Howells—Norris nevertheless explored many of the same 
American scenes, with much the same satiric tone, that Howells and Twain had. For example, in a 
November 1897 issue of The Wave, Norris published a farcical railroad drama titled “The Isabella 
Regina.” With is gentle lampooning of a honeymooning pair of rail travelers and its derision of the 
institution of the railroad pass, “The Isabella Regina” could easily have been written by Howells or 
Twain ten or twenty years earlier. 
7 In this study, I specifically focus on those parts of The Gilded Age written by Twain. I take as 
my guide Leisy’s “Mark Twain’s Part in The Gilded Age.” Although Leisy points out that “the strands 
of Warner and Mark Twain in this novel were more closely interwoven” than had earlier been supposed 
in Albert Bigelow Paine’s biography of Twain, his own analysis nevertheless affirms that most of the 
novel’s treatment of railroads and print technology is attributable to Twain. 
8 This shift parallels the shift in film history between what Martin Loiperdinger calls “the 
founding myth of cinema’s birth” (90)—the famous (urban) legend of the Parisian audience’s terrified 
reaction to the Lumière Brothers’ L’Arrivée d’un train en gare de la Ciotat—and the portrayal of 
industrial production in Charlie Chaplin’s Modern Times. In the first case, the response of the audience 
is satirized as a naïve misrecognition of modernity as the arrival of something both foreign and 
monstrous. In the second case, the film narrative emphasizes the predicament of the producers 
themselves, shifting the story form one of spectators fooled by an apparatus, to one of incoherent 
apparatuses kept in motion by the heroic efforts of those trapped within. 
9 The relevant texts here are Hunter, pp. 384-389 and 488-519 and Kane, pp. 12-17. In 
comparison to railway operators, steamship owners had little direct control over the technical operation 
or technosocial organization of their capital. Moreover, steamboat owners operated their capital “with 
little funding from the government when compared with canals or railroads” (Kane 15), which meant 
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that the initial state-assisted capital accumulation of the railroad system—in stark contrast to the 
“limited relief” and “[p]iecemeal measures of improvement” afforded the steamboats (Hunter 181; 
emphasis added)—put the boats at a competitive disadvantage even when they were, strictly speaking, 
more economically productive. 
10 Marx uses this word most frequently in Part Eight of Capital, Vo1. I. See especially pp. 873-
904. Ben Fowkes usually translates this German word as “free and rightless.” 
11 See Capital, Vol. III, pp.728-748, for Marx’s discussion of the close relationship of “usurer’s” 
and merchant capital to both slavery and the underdevelopment of technology. See also Genovese, The 
Political Economy of Slavery, especially pp. 15-26 and 54-61. 
12 My (perhaps somewhat imprecise) use of this term is borrowed From Deleuze and Guatarri, See 
especially their full discussion on pp. 153-300 of Anti-Oedipus. 
13 Gitelman defines inscription as mechanically-mediated reading and writing; inscriptive 
apparatuses include typewriters and various processes for reproducing images such as halftoning and 
xerography, but also mechanical and electromechanical devices like the phonograph. She writes, 
Telephones reproduce speech at a distance, but photographs both reproduce and 
conserve, able to reproduce again and again “at any future time,” because of the 
delicate spirals inscribed in the surface of records. The same parameters of economy 
and durability that characterize “storing up” sound for later mechanical reproduction 
helped animate such contemporary phenomena as the tensile bureaucracy of 
managerial capital, the ideal of objectivity in the professions and media, and the 
success of new popular culture forms. Economy and durability informed new models 
of inscriptive duplication, such as the office mimeograph, which allowed bureaucrats 
to have their copy and send one too. Likewise, economy and durability characterized 
considerations of photography and then motion pictures, which stored up sights and 
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movements. Incidents as fleeting as the pulsations of the heart and activities as 
evanescent as the private use of electrical current were captured, registered, metered, 
and read in new mechanical ways. (3) 
As Gitelman points out, “[t]he study of inscriptions shows the realm of writing and reading, of 
symbolic action and experience, in its proximity to objects and machines” (10). This study seeks to 
extend Gitelman’s arguments by showing, not just how inscription connects language machines to 
rhetorics and ideologies, but how these machines are, in turn, entrained in a larger network of 
transportational machines—a network the experience of which informed subjectivity and sociality 
during the years 1869-1929. Also relevant to my argument is Hankins and Silverman’s discussion of 
the origins of automatic recording devices in Instruments and the Imagination. Hankins and Silverman 
point out that mechanical inscriptive technology finds its first significant technical advance with the 
birth of Watt’s steam engine and one of its most widespread practical applications in the 
anthropometric techniques of Étienne-Jules Marey. Hence, inscription begins with the simultaneous 
need to control both machines and bodies; see pp. 113-147. Also see Yates, pp. 21-64. 
1414George L. Henderson devotes a meticulously researched and deftly argued chapter of his 
California and the Fictions of Capital to The Octopus and its treatment of the problems of representing 
space. Other important readings of The Octopus in light of the geographic expansion of capital include 
Castronovo’s “Geo-Aesthetics: Fascism, Globalism, and Frank Norris,” Hsu’s “Literature and Regional 
Production,” and Berte’s “Mapping The Octopus: Frank Norris’ Naturalist Geography.” 
15 A concise and thoughtful discussion of the metaphor of technosocial networks as nervous 
systems can be found in Otis’s “The Metaphoric Circuit.” Mattelart also discusses the paradoxes and 
vicissitudes of this conceit in The Invention of Communication, especially pp. 85-111 and pp. 163-223. 
For a discussion of the trope in a British context, see Morus. 
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16 In general, neither electromechanical telegraphy nor its immediately derivative technologies 
proved to be useful in managing the direct production process—with the exception of their use in the 
railroads themselves. they were not practical for what we would now call “synchronous” 
communications and there was little integration of small-scale networks with long-distance systems. 
They were more hierarchical and local than networked. See Alex Prada, “Socio-Technical Agency in 
Financial Markets: The Case of the Stock Ticker” for a discussion of the limits and slow development 
of the stock ticker. Also see Tarr, Finholt, Goodman, “The City and the Telegraph: Urban 
Telecommunications in the Pre-Telephone Era.” 
17 Karen Hatunnen has traced the evolution of the domestic living space as the gradual and 
indirect disappearance of the strict separation of the public and private in American houses:  
The nineteenth-century parlor had encouraged a clear distinction between the private self, 
demanding perfect moral restraint by those who sat erect upon its horsehair sofas and 
exchanged the ritual gestures of the formal call, yet permitting genteel guests to retreat to the 
sitting room or other private rooms of the house to seek freedom from self-restraint. But the 
living room collapsed the distinction between the public and the private self by dragging the 
private self out on center stage, exposing it to any and all visitors, and insisting that it be open, 
warm, and charming. (“Parlor” 187-188) 
Similarly, Schivelbusch has discussed the Victorian drawing room as a “refuge” from the technosocial 
networks of the late twentieth century. According to Schivelbusch, even when gas, electricity, and 
telephones were accepted in bourgeois households, they were considered both too “mechanical” and 
too “public” for the parlors of the middle classes. See Disenchanted Night, pp. 155-188. Both 
discussions suggest that the “overstuffed” and cluttered décor of the late Victorian parlor was a kind of 
“vanishing mediator” that both disguised and facilitated the emergence of the more technicized, 
streamlined living spaces of the twentieth century. 
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18 See Gitleman, Scripts, especially pp. 184-218 for a discussion of the typewriter as a 
technosocial prosthetic. 
19 See Cronon, pp. 207-213, for a discussion of the codevelopment of Chicago as a railway 
terminal and the remaking of the spaces of meat processing. Cronon points out that the common 
technical demands of meat slaughtering and rail transportation mandated “a single unified stockyard 
that would concentrate the city’s livestock business at one location” (210). This vast stockyard, 
although reproducing the economic centrality of Chicago, was itself doubly liminal. First, like 
Schivelbusch’s urban railyards, it was an “alien appendage” that was “stigmatized as being industrial 
and proletarian” (Schivelbusch 171-172); but also, the economic management of the yard called for 
separate bourgeois spaces within the space of the stockyard. One of these spaces was the Hough House 
hotel, with its own “parlour, barbershop, and billiard room” (Cronon 211); another was the Exchange 
Building, with is “polished wood surfaces and plush upholstery,” that “seemed somehow at a distance 
from the animals in whose flesh it dealt, as if to deny the bloody consequences of the transactions that 
went on within it” (212). Hence, the placement of the stockyard at the margin of town facilitated a 
disavowal of Chicago’s larger technosocial processes, while the Hough House and the Exchange 
Building were spaces for both the control of such processes and for the disavowal of their “bloody” and 
violently catastrophe-ridden nature. 
20 Cecilia Tichi convincingly places Norris in the company of Williams and Pound in Shifting 
Gears: Technology, Literature, Culture in Modernist America. Tichi writes that in Norris (and in 
Dreiser and London), “the mix of American flora and fauna with pistons, gears, and engines indicates 
that the perceptual boundary between what is considered to be natural, and what technological, is 
disappearing” (34). Tichi thus includes Norris in her constellation of cultural producers for whom 
“[k]nowledge of the workings of nature is […] knowledge of machines” (40). Indeed, Norris often 
flaunted his “knowledge of machines” in such journalistic writings as “On a Battleship” (1896), 
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“Moving a Fifty-Ton Gun” (1896), and “The Postal Telegraph” (1897). More to the point, Norris 
frequently equated the journalistic work of going “behind the scenes” with explaining the “machinery” 
of cultural and political institutions—for example, in the essays “Waiting for Their Cue” (1896) and 
“The ‘Upper Office’ at Work” (1897). Norris’s ubiquitous use of the rhetoric of machinery suggests he 
saw not just the novelist’s, but also the journalist’s, job as the task of “reverse engineering” complex 
and sublime technological and social processes for his readers. 
21 See especially Discipline and Punish, pp. 135-169. 
22 See MacDougall’s “The Wire Devils” for a discussion of metaphors of tentacles, webs, spiders, 
and octopuses in the early years of the twentieth century. Octopuses and spiders leant their traditional 
associations of unknowability and disorderliness to many discussions of capitalist monopolies in the 
years around 1900, and these discourses often mixed grossly visceral language with moralistic and 
religious rhetoric. In 1911, for example, T.M. Sample, in a book nostalgically dedicated “TO THE 
HOMES OF AMERICA” and containing a chapter on “the Waning of Conjugal Affection,” proclaimed that 
the “cancerous parasitical growths on the body politic must be cut out, the bloodsucking tentacles of 
corporations must be amputated, and the places where they grew cauterized to prevent their 
reappearance” (86). In 1908, alongside an illustration of the dragon “MONOPOLY” rising from the 
Pacific and swallowing North America, William Shuler Harris wrote, “[W]hile [the public] slept, the 
octopus-like arms of [the] Standard Oil Company were quietly reaching over the whole industrial life 
of the country. Many an individual and many a small company went down to ruin before the ever slimy 
crawl of this monster of Monopoly” (127). Moreover, “the serpent of Monopoly is more slippery than 
an eel, and it usually manages, by one twist or another, to escape the grasp of the law” (128). This anti-
monopoly language, with its emphasis on contamination, seduction, defilement, anthropophagy, 
corporeal disintegration, and emasculation, was often far from “progressive,” and frequently 
overlapped with the rhetorics of racism, nativism, anti-Semitism, and heteronormativity. 
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23 Significantly, these articles appeared almost exactly contemporarily with Jacob Riis’s original 
1889 article “How the Other Half Lives: Studies Among the Tenements.” The coincidence of the rail 
articles with Riis’s essay is significant if for no other reason than their shared preoccupation with 
industrial spatiality. If, as Stephanie Foote has suggested, How the Other Half Lives is “a primer for the 
authority to move between and within sections of the city” (132), what are we to make of these 
remarkably similar representations of spaces coded as middle-class? Arguably, such articles were the 
introjective counterparts to Riis’s projections of spatial disorder onto the racially other. The evidence of 
earlier genteel writing about the railroad notwithstanding, the Scribner’s articles seem to model for 
middle-class readers “how their own ‘half’ lived.” 
24 See Cresswell, especially pp. 57-121, for a comparison of the way graphic representations were 
used in both Taylorizing the workplace and organizing transportation networks, particularly the rail 
system. 
25 Clare Virginia Eby has perspicaciously treated narcissism and mirroring in An American 
Tragedy in “The Psychology of Desire.” But these ideas are also central to Lee Clark Mitchell’s “‘And 
Then Rose for the First Time: Repetition and Doubling in An American Tragedy,” as well as Philip 
Fisher’s “Looking Around to See Who I Am: Dreiser’s Territory of the Self.” 
26 Drawing on the work of Walter Benjamin, Jacques Lacan, and Slavoj Žižek, Todd McGowan 
has discussed the importance of “commanded enjoyment” in Sister Carrie; see pp. 28-36.  
27 Cresswell (pp. 123-145) has shown how professional dance instructors of the 1920s developed a 
discourse of “correct movement” in which the language of Taylorism combined with that of racism. 
While teaching dancers how “properly” to perform steps originating in the American South and Latin 
America, they also aggressively sought to purge such dances of “degenerate” and “freakish” elements 
considered both racially impure and déclassé.  
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28 Schivelbusch argues that the design and construction of railroad terminals followed a similar 
principle of heterogeneity: “One part of it, the neoclassical stone building, belonged to the city; the 
other part of it, the steel and glass construct, was a pure function of the railroad’s ‘industrial’ side” 
(Railway 174). However, Schivelbusch’s main point is that this “disguis[ing of] the industrial aspect of 
things by ornamentation” (175) itself serves the utilitarian purpose of helping passengers cognitively 
orient themselves in the passage from rail car to city street—that is, that this “ornamentation” is itself 
ambiguously “industrial.” Moreover, Schivelbusch points out neoclassical ornament soon gave way to 
self-conscious and unconcealed utilitarianism in design. Hence, ornamental illusion played both a 
spatial and historical mediating role.  
29 Compare Clyde’s reaction to the Davidson-Green to Dreiser’s own first reaction to the world of 
the Hollywood film studio: “We [Dreiser and Helen Pages Richardson] go to a little place opposite 
Metro Studio in Romaine Street for breakfast. [. . .] We watch actors & actresses arriving in cars for 
work. I get a sense of great animal activity & joy in life in those whom we see here.” (Diaries 310). 
30 See also Zukin, especially pp. 825-828 and Braverman, especially pp. 248-258. 
31 Along similar lines, Gail McDonald points out that in Gilded Age department stores “[t]he 
‘business’ of the business was kept out of sight, normally on the uppermost floor; thus, the notion of a 
contract to exchange money for good, was, as it were, euphemized” (234). On the other hand, William 
Cronon has shown that by peeling away the walls of the building and revealing the productive activity 
of “the uppermost floors,” the cover illustration of 1900 Montgomery Ward & Co. catalog explicitly 
presents the store as “a swarm of anonymous insects performing their intricate labors according to the 
mysterious dictates of a mysterious collective intelligence” (337). Similarly, a 1897 issue of Scribner’s, 
complete with “ILLUSTRATIONS DRAWN ENTIRELY FROM ACTUAL SCENES” (135), calls the 
contemporaneous large hotel a “many cog-wheeled machine,” explicitly compares its operation to “the 
running of a railroad, or an express company” and describes the chief task of a hotel manager as 
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“securing capable and efficient men for the carrying out of ideas he knows are practicable, and which 
he feels mathematically certain would bring success if he could only divide his personality into a score 
of parts, and station one at the head of each branch of the business organism” (143). Likewise, a 1911 
book published by the Wanamaker Stores in Philadelphia simultaneously evoked familial 
Gemütlichkeit and mechanical motion; along with providing a “bird’s eye view” of the Wanamaker 
department store—built in an abandoned railroad terminal and called the “Wanamaker Grand Depot” 
for many years (see fig. 6)—the Golden Book of the Wanamaker Stores explained:  
In keeping with the form of the store was the form of the business, as explained to the 
store family the day before the opening, when Mr. Wanamaker compared it to an immense 
wheel, each employe [sic] a spoke in the wheel. 
He said he would be the motive power to keep it in motion, and if each spoke would 
remain in its place and do its duty, he promised that the motive power would never fall behind, 
but keep going ahead revolving this wheel and making it the largest and best of its kind in the 
world. (53)  
Neither the authors of the The Golden Book nor Wanamaker himself seem to find any contradiction in 
calling his workforce a “family” and comparing it to a perpetually rotating wheel. Nor does the explicit 
comparison of the store to a depot or the implicit one to a roundhouse—like an office, a kind of “nerve-
center” for the railroad—seem to diminish the giant mart’s aura of elegance and luxury. Prefiguring 
much of the language of The Plan of Chicago, The Golden Book constantly identifies the store as a 
means of transportation, rather than as a “place”—even going so far as to invoke the language of 
Taylorist efficiency: “Carrying [. . .] merchandise direct from the hands of the maker to the home of the 
consumer without intermediate waste, it is fair to say this business, by removing obstructions in the 
channel, has made navigable the shortest route between the Port of Supply and the Port of Demand” 
(2). Like Cronon,  Maria Kaika and Erik Swyngedouw have specifically periodized the final decades of 
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the nineteenth and the first fourteen years of the twentieth century as an era, located between the 
ornament of the early Victorian period and the streamlining of the Modernist epoch, in which the bare 
matter of technosocial networks was deliberately celebrated. They write,  
The urban became saturated with pipelines, cables, tubes and ducts of various sizes and 
colours; things that celebrated the mythic images of early modernity, encapsulating and 
literally carrying the idea of progress into the urban domain. Their material existence provided 
the confirmation and lived experience that the road to a better society was under construction 
and paved with networks. (129) 
As with railroad terminals, then, by the late nineteenth century, the technosocial apparatus that had 
hitherto been effaced in public spaces had started to become a central image of the department store.  
32 Like steamboat explosions in the early nineteenth century and the discomfort of rail travel in the 
middle of the nineteenth century, the problem of the grade crossing persistently occupied engineers, 
town planners, and popular writers during the early twentieth century. Like these earlier discourses, the 
discourse of the grade crossing alternatively and indiscriminately blamed the problem of accidents and 
congestion at rail level crossings on the practices of drivers, on one hand, and the planning of rail and 
road systems, on the other. And, as in these earlier cases, the solution to such problems often sought 
retroactively to “rationally” entrain practices and apparatuses that, in themselves, had hitherto seemed 
the very model of efficiency and order. For an extending discussion of the specific problems of the 
grade crossing, see Stilgoe, pp. 163-188. The inherent physical difficulties of making automobile 
technosociality a controllable totality have also been discussed from a engineering and mathematical 
standpoint by Nagatani, and from a sociological perspective by Beckmann. 
33 The terms “garden city” and “satellite city” were often used to mean “suburb.” Yet, although 
Lycurgus in An American Tragedy is not what we would now call a “suburb,” all of these terms were 
contested and ambiguous in the first decades of the twentieth century. In 1912, Frederic C. Howe 
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identified “three types of garden cities”: “the self contained industrial community,” “the garden 
suburb,” and “the factory village built about a manufacturing plant by some large employer” (2). 
Howe’s examples are all English, but the first definition seems roughly to fit Dreiser’s portrayal of 
Lycurgus, while the second and third could be compared, respectively, to the “streetcar suburb” of Oak 
Park, Illinois, and Ford’s settlement at Highland Park. To make matters more confusing, in 1922 Lewis 
Mumford condemned “Suburbia” as a condition in which the “quality of life for the great mass of 
people who live within the political boundaries of the metropolis itself is inferior to that which a city 
with an adequate equipment and a thorough realization of the creative needs of the community is 
capable of producing” (15). He continues, “In this sense the ‘suburb’ called Brookline is a genuine city 
while the greater part of the ‘city of Boston’ is a suburb. [In Boston] we have scarcely begun to make 
an adequate distribution of libraries, meeting places, parks, gymnasia, and similar equipment, without 
which life in the city tends to be carried on at a low level of routine—physically as well as mentally.” 
In this usage, suburban Brookline is more a “satellite city” than a “suburb.” Similarly, ten years earlier, 
Howe wrote,  
The main difference between the ordinary city and the garden city is this: the former is 
left to the unrestrained license of speculators, builders, owners, to a constant conflict of public 
and private interests; the latter treats the community as a unit, with rights superior to those of 
any of its individual members. One is a city of unrelated and for the most part uncontrolled 
private property rights; the other is a community intelligently planned and harmoniously 
adjusted, with the emphasis always on the rights to the community rather than on the rights of 
the individual property owner.  
Hence, the garden city was seen not just as a refuge from congestion, but from precisely the condition 
we would now call “sprawl,” or what Mumford calls “metropolitanism” (16); in turn, communities like 
Brookline or Evanston, Illinois, which we would now think of as quintessentially suburban, were often 
266  
 
 
 
thought of as self-contained, rationally-planned, communities. See also Harvey, Consciousness and the 
Urban Experience, pp. 48-56. 
34 See “The Town of Pullman” and “It Pays to Treat Workers Generously.” 
35 See pp. 107-110. 
36 For a lucid discussion of the importance of being seen in An American Tragedy, see Karaganis, 
especially pp. 155-166. 
37 In “The ‘System’ of Automobility,” John Urry writes, “‘Auto’ mobility [. . .] involves 
autonomous humans combined with machines with capacity for autonomous movement along paths, 
lanes, streets and routeways of one society after another. what is key is not the ‘car’ as such but the 
system of these fluid interconnections” (26). Speaking directly to my concerns her, he succinctly adds: 
“Automobility is thus a system that coerces people into an intense flexibility. [. . .] The car is the literal 
“iron cage” of modernity, motorized, moving and domestic” (28). 
38 Even so, in his Hollywood diaries, Dreiser seems to have resumed his love affair with the 
streetcar, carefully—almost obsessively—detailing the various trolley routes he uses in exploring 
southern California. These diaries do give us even further insight into Dreiser’s ambivalence about 
mobility; when his lover Helen Richardson faints at a hotel, Dreiser is repeatedly frustrated as he tries 
to procure a doctor: “We try for a doctor—none to be had on Sunday. All motoring here. I then call a 
taxi & take [Richardson] home—fare $2.50 for a ten minute run!” (American Diaries 311). Blaming 
car culture for a shortage of available doctors, Dreiser the next day writes of the “women playing tennis 
[and t]heir affected voices,” the “many high priced cars,” and the “beautiful houses” of Beverly Hills, 
abruptly adding that “[Richardson] is too beautiful not to have a car & I resent our poverty” (312). 
Tellingly, this event interrupts a hitherto unbroken chain of anecdotes about—almost exclusively 
about—traveling and sex. While Dreiser’s journals, as I have suggested, meticulously detail Dreiser’s 
use of various modes of transport, this near-pedantry about streetcars and subways is particularly 
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pronounced in the Hollywood diaries, which alternately narrate Dreiser’s and Richardson’s tourist 
excursions around Los Angeles and their subsequent sexual encounters. Dreiser both explicitly and 
implicitly associates Richardson and her sexual vitality with technologies of mobility. On the way to 
California they “quarrel over past loves—the boys & men she has flirted with on trains to everywhere” 
(286); later, writes Dreiser, “I had a dream last night that I got off a train & that it started without me 
but I ran after it & with difficulty made it. Helen & I indulge in a delightful round, as usual. She has the 
most teasing methods” (290). Dreiser seems constantly to link sexual bliss to mobility, and to associate 
sexual frustration with frustrated mobility. Yet, at the same time, his “resentment” over not having a 
car has less to do with mobility than with possession; the automobile that Richardson is “too beautiful 
not to have” seems less a means for staying motion than a sign of social status.  
39 In Amusing the Million, especially pp. 72-82 Kasson is especially insightful and lucid in his 
discussion of the origins and technosocial function of the mechanical thrill ride. Also important is 
Brown’s discussion in The Material Unconscious, especially pp. 27-69. 
40 Dreiser explicitly associates his father’s religious temperament with technosocial incompetence 
and “moral coward[ace]”—the same term Clyde’s lawyers use in their defense arguments—in A 
Hoosier Holiday (387). 
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